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
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SOULS IN THE MAKING



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*An Introduction to Pastoral
Psychology*

BY

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PREFACE

THIS volume needs no apology; it would never have been written had an apology been called for. Nevertheless, some justification is imperative. That, I trust, will be found in the introductory chapter. A word, however, may be allowed regarding the origin of the book.

For a long time I have felt that whatever contribution psychology could make to theology and to the validation of our Christian experience, it could be of enormous value to the preacher and pastor in the understanding of the growth, the conflicts, and failures of the soul. The minister's difficulty does not lie in finding grounds for his convictions, but in the creation of an interest in the Christian way of life. Theology may tell him what his people ought to believe, but cannot help him when he asks how they come to believe or disbelieve. Christian ethics may tell him what the Christian standards are, but it gives him no guidance in dealing with those who come to him with the temptations, the impulses, the conflicts which make the Christian standards seem impossible of realization. The Roman Catholic Church has not neglected this practical need of the clergy as witness her volumes on Moral Theology designed to guide them in the spiritual direction of their people.

It is in this spiritual direction and moral guidance that modern psychology comes to the aid of the pastor. Yet so far little attempt has been made to relate the theoretical and clinical findings of psychology to the practical difficulties of our ministers

and clergy. Indeed, the trend of the popular volumes on psychology makes the minister wonder whether conscience and reason have any authoritative place in a world swayed by instinct and emotion; and it has had the effect of undermining and lessening the effectiveness of his convictions.

In the summer term of 1927 I gave a series of lectures on Pastoral Psychology to our outgoing students to which ministers in the city were invited. This volume is the outcome of that series. In the first part I have attempted to find out what the basis of human nature is; to get an interpretation of instinct; to analyse conscience and reason and to examine their authority from purely psychological premises. I have then gone on to examine how from that basis the instinctive self becomes transmuted into a moral and spiritual self. This brought me into the realm of moral and spiritual conflict, its origin, development, and resolution. To do this I had to analyse the meaning of the 'unconscious,' relate it to moral responsibility, examine the process of repression. In the penultimate chapter I have dealt with pastoral method, the actual dealing with the various kinds of conflict with which the pastor is likely to have difficulty; while in the last chapter I have attempted to show that however skilful the psychotherapist or psychoanalyst may be in laying bare the difficulties to the achievement of personality, religion alone can unify the once divided life; the adjustment to God is imperative in the fully developed and unified personality; the Gospel alone can give the comprehensive end in which all our tendencies become

sublimated and used in the interests of what Emerson said was the greatest enterprise God had set man—the achievement of personality.

Although the volume is meant for the minister and pastor, I hope that it may fall into the hands of some psychologists who are interested in the psychology of character and personality; as I am presumptuous enough to think that a contribution to the subject will be found in these pages.

I know that in certain quarters the application of modern psychology to the conflicts of our people, young and old, is suspect. I can only hope that they will believe that I have no other object in writing than that of attempting to mint into the current coin of pastoral work the findings of a science which will yet have greater influence on both theology and religious life. To that end I hope the many illustrations of personal dealing will contribute.

I am under obligation to many writers; and I think I have given the references to all quotations and the source of helpful suggestions. But I can truly say that the conclusions reached in this volume are my own.

My sincere thanks are due to my revered colleague, Dr. A. R. Henderson, who carefully went through the first draft of the MS., and made very helpful suggestions as to treatment of certain parts of the subject; and also relating to style. Unfortunately, I had not his guidance for the re-written MS.; a grievous loss as I am afraid I have tended to fall into lecturing style here and there. I had, however, the advantage of the criticism of a minister of a large church, himself a great pastor as well as

preacher. The Rev. H. Newsham, M.A., of Montrose Street Church, Glasgow, read the whole MS. from the point of view of the working minister, and I was not slow to accept many of his suggestions. As he is also well informed as to modern psychology his criticism was of immense value. I have also to thank Dr. Peel, editor of the *Congregational Quarterly*, for permission to use an article I contributed to that excellent publication. Likewise I am under obligation to George Allen & Unwin Ltd. for the block which illustrates the psychological types; and not least to their Reader for excellent criticism of the first draft of this volume.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

WHAT MINISTERIAL TRAINING LACKED.

“WHILE the value of a knowledge of character is often recognized, it is the one subject which is never systematically taught because there is little or no systematic knowledge about it.”¹

These words from Shand's epoch-making book, *The Foundations of Character*, first brought home to me what my training at the university and theological college lacked. I had learned much from my professors, but it was not until I read that sentence that I realized my almost total ignorance of the movements of the soul I had been sent out to bring into relation with God. Indeed, outside the metaphysics class in Aberdeen University I cannot recall any attempt to tell us what the soul is. I was conscious during the seven years of training that there was something lacking, but what it was I had never been able to define clearly to myself. I had no quarrel with what was taught; it was what was not taught—and at that time could not be taught—that was to make the work of the ministry so hard and often so ineffective, as well as so unsatisfying.

¹ Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, Introduction.

THE WEAKNESS OF ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

To this day I can remember vividly my feelings when I entered the Ethics classroom. Our professor was one of the 'giants.' Here, I thought, I shall learn to help men to love the 'good,' to see the ideal, to pursue 'the end.' Alas! in delimiting his subject-matter, the great giant told us that ethics was not concerned as to whether men were good or not, nor as to how goodness was acquired, but only with the nature of 'the good.' We were to study the *summum bonum*, the highest good that men can seek, the good that men ought to pursue; our problem was not that of either helping men to feel that they ought to seek the good or to help them when they saw the good and felt they ought to obey it and could not. We spent a session studying the abstraction 'the good' without ever coming into contact with the concrete reality, the good man. That I received tremendous intellectual stimulus from that professor, I gladly record; but I got nothing that would help me to help the man who might say: "I see the good but cannot help following the evil." Nevertheless, I was only vaguely conscious of what was lacking; and the session was by no means unprofitable even from a practical point of view; it was something to have learned how to set about evaluating the ideals that men pursue. The psychology class did much to stimulate interest in the basic material of character and belief. But psychology was still under the influence of metaphysics; still too much dominated by the idea that the rational and intellectual processes were all-important in the

achievement of character or belief. No differentiation was then made between mental and psychological development, between the formation of an intellectual system and the integration of the instinctive and emotional interests into a unified personality. Emotion was still suspect; it was a disturbing factor; and instincts were thought of as belonging to our animal nature. From the point of view of the older psychology man was still the rational being; and the problem was to discover why he ever acted irrationally, and not as now, why it is possible for him to act rationally. Little or no emphasis was laid on the fact that a man may be mentally well developed and psychologically little more than a child; that men may be brilliant intellectually and yet afraid to pass a graveyard in the dark, or the prey of the most irrational fears and impulses. The fields of belief and conduct were separated; ethics and conduct, psychology and behaviour were in logic-tight compartments. Here again, however, I confess that not an hour was wasted. I am more thankful than I can say for the grounding in what is sometimes called 'academic psychology'; as we shall see later, I was compelled to turn to it for the integrating factor of personality. Professor Woodworth quotes a wag who said: "Psychology first lost its soul; then it lost consciousness; but it still has a little behaviour left." My training in academic psychology saved me from reaching that absurd position. The weakness of the older psychology was not that it studied the soul, or even over-emphasized it; but that it first defined it *a priori* and then attempted to deduce its attributes from its

defined essence. I left the university still ignorant as to how to reach the soul; with not the slightest idea as to the relation of behaviour to the growth of personality.

THE WEAKNESS IN THEOLOGICAL TRAINING.

Naturally all this was very bewildering to one whose whole future was mortgaged to the task of helping the young to convictions and character. But the theological college was in front of me; there, surely, I should receive practical guidance in soul-winning, in character-making, in how to help others to believe what was said to be 'saving truth.' I could not quarrel with the university as it did not profess to be practical; but I expected that my training in the theological college would not be unlike that which a lad receives who having taken his university degree in engineering then spends two or three years in an engineering shop learning to relate his knowledge to the concrete problems of machines. I was quite aware that there were many problems of theology and Biblical criticism which would seem far removed from the work of pulpit or pastor; and yet I felt that there must be a vital relation somewhere if I could but find it. Certainly it would matter little to my preaching or pastoral work whether the Epistle to the Galatians was written to North or South Galatia; but it did matter that I should feel that the convictions expressed there were dynamic forces; it did matter that I should know how to help men to have the same experience of Christ as Paul had. Again, let it be understood that I am not quarrelling with

what was taught, or about the time spent on the Galatian problem, or the authorship of the various books in the Bible, etc.; all that is vitally necessary for effective and satisfying work. It does matter that a minister should know the religious systems of the world; how men have defended Biblical doctrine; the theories which have been held regarding the Person and Work of our Lord. The preacher who belittles these questions of criticism and theology has, as a rule, little to say; he must be at the mercy of passing topics for his sermons. The function of theology is to make the Gospel effective. My quarrel was that there was no systematic attempt to relate our studies to the work of the minister and pastor. It was easy to dilate on the indifference of the masses to this great salvation of which we heard so much; which I had experienced in my own soul; it was easy to believe that the forgiveness of sins, fellowship with God, the service of Christ and His Kingdom were the values to pursue; but how were we to bring this home to men? If to reach 'the stature of the manhood of Christ' was the great enterprise that God had set each individual, how were we to make men realize this? That my professors in theology shared with me the rich stores of their wealth, I am more than willing to grant; but why could it not have been minted into the current coin of the market place?

There was one last hope in Pastoral Theology which came in our final year. Would this help me? Here, surely, we should learn about the anatomy of the soul; the organs of character; the diseases which sap the spiritual life; the inhibitions behind our

temptations; the moral diseases which bring the soul to the very depths of despair; that perfect balance of soul functions in which one finds 'the peace of God that passeth all understanding.' Alas! We received many useful hints about conducting marriages, etc., at least I guess so; for the only memory I have of that class is: "Don't forget to send to your host or hostess of the week-end a letter of thanks"; a capital piece of advice, I admit, but ought we not to have carried away more? Is there not something wrong with a pastoral theology class that gives no help in the understanding of the sheep, in pastoring the flock, in detecting the symptoms of disease, and in the therapeutics of the soul?

Conscious as I am now of the lack I was only vaguely conscious of it then. The sentence from Shand revealed like a flash that the subject I ought to have known most about had scarcely even been approached. My work was to bring home a Gospel able to regenerate human nature, and here I was with no systematic knowledge of human nature; indeed had been taught to suspect it. It had to be changed; if unruly, crushed; we had to be emptied before we could be saved!

FROM THEOLOGY TO PSYCHOLOGY.

It was this revelation of my own ignorance that sent me aside from the exclusive study of theology. To have a conception of God is of infinite value to the preacher and pastor; to have a gospel is to have a message; but I soon realized that half our work is ineffective because we have little or no knowledge of

the soul we desire to bring into relationship with God; or of the human nature to which the Gospel has to be brought home.

I turned, then, to the study, not of the things most surely believed, but of 'the will to believe,' not of the ideal, the *summum bonum*, but of the channels of grace along which the power of God unto salvation comes to the soul. My theology might be shaky, but my evangelical experience was sure; and it was this latter I was commissioned to transmit. I may have misunderstood the grace of God—indeed, theology is still uncertain as to whether it is a substance or an attitude of God—but I could not doubt the promises of God. His grace was to be sufficient for us. Yet here was I confronted with those who knew what they ought to do, and wanted to do it and could not; here was I anxious as ever minister was to bring the message home yet ignorant of the *how*.

The war came; an *infra* human situation was created. It may have been inevitable, but inevitability, as Sir Henry Jones taught us, is not a moral justification: "The free choice of an end conceived as good, was not operative. There is no right thing left in the world for it to do. Its very best, its duty, is the tragical choice between two evils."¹ Shall I ever forget the impression of helplessness these words made upon my mind? The situation was admirably summed up by Principal Jacks in the same number of the *Hibbert Journal*: "The impression left in the mind is that the will of humanity is being thwarted and mocked. It is as though another will,

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, October 1914.

not human, had wrested the control of man's affairs from the hands of man and set him at variance with himself; a malign will, which asserts its mastery by forcing civilization to use the choicest fruits of the ages as weapons of offence against humanity."¹

But what was this 'malign will' that created an *infra* human situation in which the only good left was a choice of two evils? What was this other will that set man at variance with himself? I could not take the facile view of a well-known Bishop that it was the work of the devil. "You have no right," said that dignitary, "to blame God; it is the work of the devil. God is hindered at every moment by the devil and all his works." Nor could I accept the thin, thoughtless statement of another Bishop that God was kept from interfering in the war by such 'moral offences as strikes, slackness in work, dishonesty in contracts, and drink.' God was to get out of His dilemma as soon as we abandoned these, and victory was to be ours.² Was there ever such poverty of thought? What other will could be behind that awful tragedy but the human will? But of the nature and content of that will we had heard nothing!

Then came the period when we were to prepare for 'The New World,' 'The Spiritual Reconstruction.' Here and there were some few souls who cried in the wilderness that the new world must come out of a new heart; but by the vast multitude of our publicists, the emphasis was laid upon political and

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, October 1914.

² See *Our Social Heritage*, Graham Wallas, chap. xii.

industrial changes; it was to come by changing the external structure of society. It was largely forgotten that social structure is the product of personality; and of that personality we had been taught nothing.

It is really impossible to exaggerate the tremendous disadvantage under which the preacher, educationalist or social reformer labours when he lacks a knowledge of human nature—its dynamic tendencies, its controlling sentiments, its conscience and reason. Without that knowledge one may see the individual or society steeped in sin when it is really only morally diseased; one may construct policies or programmes to appeal to the reason of democracy and they fall on deaf ears, not because democracy is positively indifferent, but because it is impossible psychologically to draw man's attention or create interest by appeals to reason alone; some other interest must be aroused before the reason comes into play. We may reason with the moral pervert, the drunkard, the sensualist, or the indifferent, but there is no response. Indeed, we cannot call the morally diseased harder names than he has called himself; we cannot make the drunkard see his folly more clearly than he has seen it himself; we cannot make him drive his will harder than he has tried to drive it; we cannot make the indifferent feel guilty; for indifference is a negative state; it is a state lacking interest, lacking the very disposition to attend to religious things. If we would help these we must first understand them; if we would change the face of society we must first understand the motives which underlie the very being of

society. "The state is the individual writ large," wrote Plato long ago; and to change the structure of society we must first understand the nature of personality whose objective product it is.

I am not concerned in these pages with collective behaviour. It is true that the preacher must never forget how society as a whole or in its groups does much to condition the behaviour of the individual. Recent biological research tends to confirm the view that there is no transmission of acquired characters. We cannot inherit traits of character. Sin is not biologically transmitted. It is transmitted like certain diseases: either by social contact, or it may be caught like a germ from the social atmosphere which the child or youth breathes. There are sins which are possible only to organized groups; sins of super-individual entities; and though they may have originated in individuals, yet when they are socialized their location is moved from the individual to the group, and individual responsibility is too feeble to be felt. These the preacher cannot ignore if he is true to the Kingdom of God; if he keeps in mind that the end of the Gospel is not a saved soul here and there; not a heterogeneous mass of saved individuals, not a glorified group of Plymouth Brethren, but a social whole, animated and sustained by the Will of God. The Divine drama of Creation, Incarnation, Atonement and Resurrection, finds its full meaning only when its end is seen as the mastery of civilization in and for Christ; when its view of God and its consequent ethic becomes as much a part and parcel of the general outlook of men, of their ethical and intel-

lectual atmosphere as is the theory of Evolution or the Copernican theory. To translate the Gospel into terms of individual salvation alone is to dwarf it until it becomes ridiculous; when it is given its social, national and international significance that Drama becomes man's profoundest inspiration.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PASTOR.

But all this concerns the preacher more than the pastor. In the long run it is through the individual, through personality, that the social atmosphere becomes changed; it is in the individual that society experiences her gains and losses. Only by a figure of speech can we say that society suffers; it is the individuals composing the society who feel, will, or experience. In any case, our task here is to consider the individual soul; its psychological nature; the laws of its health; the symptoms, the origin and cure of its diseases. As pastors we go out as 'soul-doctors'; and as the general practitioner in medicine must know something of the anatomy of the body, the physiology of the various organs, the subjective and objective signs of health and disease, and nowadays, have some knowledge of preventive medicine, so it has always seemed to me, that the pastor ought to know the analogous conditions of the soul.

I turned, then, to the study of 'The New Psychology,' for which I had had a fair preparation. Fortunately I had kept up my studies in philosophy, ethics, and academic psychology, although the last had been modified by the study of James; and with a university knowledge of the biological point of

view the atmosphere of the new studies was not altogether strange. My interest was not speculative; it was eminently practical; it arose in the needs of pastoral work and preaching. I wanted to understand the processes behind behaviour; how beliefs come to have dynamic power; whether it was possible to direct the mind towards interests that make for character; whether it was possible to understand how differences of character, temperament, and personality arose; how temptations come and how they are overcome. After an extensive study of the psychoanalytic view I was convinced that it had much to teach the teacher, preacher and educationalist generally. With the end of the war came the experiences of those who had dealt extensively with war neuroses, or what is known popularly as 'shell-shock' cases; there was a correction of the psychoanalytic school's over-emphasis on the sexual element in motive. I saw human nature in a new perspective, with instinct and emotion not as the enemies of the spiritual life, but as their allies; I realized that the determining influences for character, belief and personality play upon the child long before the rational and moral processes have much power to inhibit or direct them. Nevertheless, I had no opportunity of correcting or verifying the views of medical psychologists. I was unprepared to draw conclusions from their study of abnormal cases, and I could not agree with McDougall's contention that neither conscience nor reason was able to initiate any action. Had the mind no end in itself? Was it just a new instrument evolved in the interests of instinct? Had

conscience neither authority nor power? Was it a mere spectator of the conflict, and reason but an arbiter among moral values with no power to intervene? I was convinced, however, that repression of instincts and a false view of human nature, leading to a wrong sense of guilt and false moral conflicts, lay at the root of many failures to become adapted to the realities of life. On the positive side I had become persuaded that a religious faith that was intelligent; a prayer-life that was real and not in a logic-tight compartment; the expression of the self in activity were valuable preventive, as well as therapeutic, agents in the health of the soul.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL GAINED FROM PASTORAL WORK.

My pastoral work gave me the first opportunities of putting to a practical test the knowledge thus gained. From the beginning of my ministry pastoral work had played a large part and to visit the sick or to discuss the difficulties of my people was never a task. In Wolverhampton I made it a practice to be in my vestry most Wednesday evenings to see anyone on any matter. There were few nights in which I had no visitors; and though I had my share of what might be called 'undesirables,' I learned not a little from them. It was a confessional in the true sense of the word; and there I learned that one had often to probe beneath the surface to get at the difficulties. It was not until I came to Nottingham that I had the opportunity of studying at first hand functional disorders, perversions, compulsive habits, and that large

class of troubles called 'nerves'—a word which covers a great deal of ignorance of the relation of the mind to mental and physical symptoms. How few general practitioners or ministers ever stop to think out what is meant by the phrase 'a nervous breakdown'; they are apt to become impatient with such cases. "It is just nerves," says the doctor, but to the discerning the word may convey the knowledge that someone is fighting for his very soul. Two years ago I was asked by the Rev. J. Sutherland, of Belgrave Church, Leeds, if I would come once a fortnight and see anyone who was having difficulty with life; a year later the Rev. A. Briggs, of Sneinton, Nottingham, asked me to do the same thing in his church; and thus my experience was considerably widened; now there are few days on which I do not see someone. Out of it all there was firmly planted in my mind the conviction that this branch of psychology has much to give to the preacher and pastor.

That the whole discussion may become concrete here are two cases which will illustrate what the sympathetic and understanding pastor may do.

A young man of fine physique was sent to me suffering from various symptoms. The first thing I noticed about him was that he had a tendency to stammer and to tremble; indeed, the last symptom was very marked. He was afraid to enter a crowded tramcar or railway carriage. Though he was fond of the church he dare not stay through a service because of a tendency to faint, and he had not been able to enjoy a service comfortably for years. So distressing had his symptoms become that he had

carried the means of suicide for some time. Analysis showed a long history of morbid sex curiosity against which he had striven with tears; there was a repressed masturbation complex, and allied to both was a strong fixation on the mother and a humiliating inferiority complex. We need not enter into details as to how all this was laid bare; enough to say that as we talked the whole of his symptoms over, their causes and consequents, we found that we were at the same time talking them out. Steadily, as the meaning of the symptoms was made clear and the instinctive nature seen in its true perspective, the depression was lifted and the man was enabled to control his impulses; his confidence in himself increased, and his irrational fears were allayed. To-day he is head of his department in business, happily married, and has an increased interest in his church.

This young man's condition illustrates what the sympathetic minister can do. He had to be encouraged to open his mind without fear that I should think he was the chief of sinners. In other words, the minister must convey the impression that his condition is understood; that he will not be blamed as though he had never struggled against his temptations; his consciousness of guilt will be dealt with sanely without attempting either to over-emphasize or belittle it; his pent-up sense of weakness and moral failure must get an outlet. The work is not over when the conflicting moral tendencies have been brought clearly into consciousness and the repression overcome; the energy liberated must get a healthy

outlet, it must be attached to legitimate interests. In this case interest in the church spontaneously revived; and, with the heavier responsibilities his work involved, the sublimation of his natural tendencies was made easier.

Another case, not unlike many with which the ordinary pastor is called upon to deal in his normal visitation, will be of interest here as there is no obvious sex factor. He is a young man of twenty; well educated, of bright appearance, and, indeed, to see him one would never dream he was anything but a happy youth with not a care in the world. When he opened his mind I found that when he left the Grammar School he went into business with his father, but he soon left, and he tried various jobs, and then came back to his father. Six months before I saw him he had left his father's business and also his father's home. During those six months the desire to do any work or be anything had gradually departed. He gave me a number of reasons as to why he could not continue in business: it was dishonest, there was no possibility of keeping one's idealism, etc. It was not difficult to see that there was real antagonism to his father; but he had no idea as to the great extent of this antagonism. His mother was dead, and he was an only child. I began to explore his early home life: the relations between father and mother, and that of the lad to both. The father was one of those very assertive men, his mother was well educated. Incident after incident was brought from the recesses of memory in which the child had suffered arbitrary punishments, taunts

about his lack of self-assertion and masculinity; there was also a period when mother and child had to leave home on account of the father's behaviour. The condition of the youth was now easy to understand; he both feared and yet was drawn to his father; he envied his assertion and yet hated it. The harshness of the father had now become a symbol of life itself: it was harsh in its demands, he dare not make a mistake, punishment would be severe. As a growing child he shrank from the father and sought the protection of the mother. Slowly I helped him to see how his resentment to his father compelled him unconsciously to put his father always in the wrong, and indeed to give his father endless trouble; and how his unconscious tendency to seek the protection of the mother was making him regress to an infantile stage of life; that his fear of life was just the projected fear of his father. I helped him to realize the progressive elements in his life, and how these were in conflict with the regressive and were thus causing his trouble. He had a strong intellectual interest in religion which I tried to turn into a real spiritual interest. To-day he is back with his father, and his whole outlook changed both to his father and life itself.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS A METHOD.

That I may get the ear of those who may think that all analysis is wedded to the theories of psychoanalysis, i.e. that the sexual element is the driving force in life, let me say at once that psychoanalysis is both a theory and a method. Every psychotherapist,

or minister, who is in the habit of dealing with his people individually, as, e.g. Dr. Fosdick, uses the analytic method. That method may be summed up in the phrase *talking things over and talking them out*. We need not boggle over the word by which the method is described. Freud calls it 'psycho-analysis'; Sir James Purves Stewart designates it 'mental exploration'; Dr. W. M. Brown has settled upon the word 'Autognosis,' i.e. giving a person knowledge of the mental processes behind his trouble. Every method is an attempt to get into clear consciousness the processes, conscious, subconscious, or unconscious, that have become disturbing factors in the physical, mental or moral life of the person concerned. Often the symptoms of psychological disturbance are physical, as for example in cases of conversion-hysteria, stammer, functional paralysis; in all these functional disorders physical symptoms are manifested for which there is no physical basis, or rather no physical basis can be demonstrated. Professor Haldane has argued that though no alteration of bodily tissue can be demonstrated, it may be there. The answer is given by Dr. W. M. Brown¹: under mental treatment the symptoms disappear. Every practitioner is confronted with symptoms of his patients which have defied all his prescriptions and treatment; the older school of doctors were apt to lose patience and tell such a patient that his pain and symptoms were all imagination. But an imaginary pain is a contradiction in terms; if we think we have a pain we have one; it is

¹ *Psychology and the Sciences*, Lectures I and VII.

a psychological impossibility to imagine one. Imagination may induce one, but that is a different matter; we have then to look for the disease of the imagination which produces the symptoms. An illustration will help us here. I was asked to see a boy who was not doing well at school. He had got into his school with a scholarship and then somehow his ability seemed to depart; he lost his power of concentration, was taking a far lower place in the class than he ought to have done; and illness was frequent. At the beginning of term he was invariably ill, mostly biliousness and 'nervousness.' His doctor could find nothing physically wrong. It was not difficult to find that the boy who had been invariably top in the elementary class was unconsciously shrinking from the sterner competitions among boys of his own mental calibre; and there was a strong tendency to phantasy achievements instead of the hard work needed for achievement. There were also homosexual tendencies. The boy was really clever, but had been rather made too much of by female teachers in the elementary school. I saw the boy about six times; he steadily regained his place and his interest in his work. He realized what was happening and has given no more bother either as to illness or place in the school form. There are many such cases where minister and doctor can co-operate.

PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOTHERAPY, PSYCHIATRY, AND NEUROLOGY.

There is no attempt here to trespass on the sphere of psychiatry or neurology. The latter deals with

cases whose symptoms can be referred to organic disease or organic lesion in the nervous system; the former deals with the *true insanities*, such as paranoia, or the maniac—depressive psychosis; no bodily disease may be demonstrable but the symptoms are mostly mental, and are such as to keep the individual from a normal life in society. Nevertheless there is a vital connection between the work of the pastor and the minister and the prevention of the psychoses, as is shown in the following quotation from a psychiatrist writing in *The Journal of Religion*: "I have often observed that patients who blame themselves overmuch very frequently recover; and that the acutely disturbed patient is also likely to get well. In fact it often seems that the more disturbed and violent the patient, the better chances of recovery. The really hopeless case is the man who places upon others the blame for his shortcomings and failures and makes excuses for himself, or withdraws himself into a world of day-dreams. It is the Church's business to save such men, and that means to disturb their conscience in regard to the quality of the life they are living in order that they may turn and be made whole, and to do so before perhaps they develop symptoms which bring them to such institutions as ours." Hence the relation of pastoral psychology to psychiatry is that of preventing true psychoses by guiding the growing life into fruitful channels and helping that life to develop a healthy self-criticism on the moral side.

Psychoanalysis proper and psychotherapy come nearest to the pastoral psychology; and yet there is

a fundamental difference. It would be no exaggeration to say that most cases which come under the treatment of these branches of medicine evidence the failure of a true religious direction. Cases treated by either branch manifest both mental and bodily symptoms which have no physical basis, but the symptoms are such that the patient is able, sometimes with great difficulty, to control his behaviour so as to be able to live in society. Dr. Hadfield emphasizes the fact that he is called upon to deal with not merely the 'moral diseases' that lie at the root of all 'nervous' diseases, but with bad temper, sex perversions, irritability, diseases, which, as he says, are not in any way physical; for they are moral both in their origin and in their manifestation. He accounts for the fact that these people seek the physician rather than the clergyman because the physician will see to it that the patient is sick and not sinful.¹

FREUD ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PASTOR.

The closeness of pastoral psychology to the work of the physician is brought out by Freud in his introduction to Pfister's *Psychoanalytic Method*. Dr. Pfister is himself a pastor. Freud says: "The question arises whether one may utilize psychoanalysis for the purpose of education. The advantages of this use of psychoanalysis would be obvious. The educator is prepared on the one hand, through his knowledge of the general human dispositions of childhood, to guess which of the childish dispositions

¹ Dr. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 2.

threaten to attain an undesired outlet, and if psychoanalysis is of use in such errors of development, he can bring it into use before the signs of unfavourable development are established. On the other hand, he can detect the first signs of a development toward a neurosis or perversion, and guard the child against such further development at a time when for a number of reasons it would never be taken to a physician. One could conceive that such a psychoanalytic activity on the part of the educator—and the pastor in protestant countries who occupies a similar position—might afford invaluable assistance and often render the intervention of the physician superfluous.

“It may be asked whether the practice of analysis does not presuppose a medical education which must remain lacking to the educator and pastor, or whether other relations are not antagonistic to the purpose of placing the psychoanalytic technique in other than medical hands. I confess I see no such obstacle. The practice of psychoanalysis demands much less medical education than psychological preparation and free human insight; the majority of physicians, however, are not fitted for the practice of psychoanalysis. The educator and pastor being habitually associated with youth makes them better suited to have sympathetic insight into the mental life of this class of persons.

“The approach to the field of mental abnormalities will compel the analysing educator to make himself familiar with the most exact psychiatric knowledge and to take the physician into consultation

where diagnosis and outcome of the disturbance may appear doubtful. *In a number of cases results will only come from mutual co-operation of educator and physician.*"¹ This quotation would justify a much closer application of psychoanalysis to pastoral work than is general in England, and a much closer co-operation between pastor and doctor in all cases where the nervous disorder is due to some moral disease or repression of tendencies which are unacceptable to the moral consciousness. No psychotherapist goes far into the details of his patient's trouble without coming up against moral and spiritual difficulties; indeed, in not a few cases the symptoms relate to spiritual difficulties, as the loss of the Holy Spirit, the loss of spiritual interests, or the feeling of being 'lost.' But there is a deeper reason still which I suspect was at the back of Freud's mind when he penned the quotation given above. Freud and not a few psychoanalysts refuse to become moral or spiritual directors; they argue that their work is to bring the repressed tendencies into consciousness, and the patient must decide for himself as to what he is to do with those tendencies. It is very doubtful whether in practice any psychoanalyst goes as far as this.

RELIGION AND ANALYSIS.

The deeper reason for the need of closer co-operation lies in the fact that not the least important part of the analyst's work is to help the mal-adapted to sublimate his instincts or to redirect them along lines

¹ Introduction, *Psychoanalytic Method*. (The italics are mine.)

acceptable to his moral consciousness. This can only be done by helping him to acquire sentiments strong enough to control his tendencies and to give moral motives which will be sufficient to overcome all crude promptings of his instinctive nature: the young, too, must be guided towards permanent ends and unquestioned ideals. It is only within these that the instinctive self becomes transmuted into a moral self free from repression and neurotic tendencies or instability of character. To do this, it seems the educator or analyst must have moral standards and convictions which have solid rational grounds; they must be the outcome of reflection and be self-consciously accepted; for in sublimation it is the personal influence of the analyst rather than his skill as a psychologist that matters. A training in ethics as well as psychology would seem to be a *sine qua non* of the soul-doctor's equipment. McDougall, in his chapter on "Psychotherapeutic Methods," says: "It is to be recognized also that the physician may and should, as far as possible, bring to his assistance whatever of moral and religious beliefs he sincerely holds, in so far as he finds the patient capable of being favourably influenced by such considerations."¹ There can be no doubt that in all cases of moral disease the moral and spiritual prestige of the pastor or analyst has great influence, and makes possible the power of suggestion which enters into every method of analysis. Especially is this true when dealing with the difficulties of the adolescent, or in cases of anxiety neuroses, although it is true for all cases also. Not

¹ *Abnormal Psychology*, chap. xxix.

seldom the only help that one can give until one has found the root of the trouble is to tap whatever religious faith the person has, and that can only be done effectively by one who has faith. Dr. W. M. Brown goes so far as to say that a psychotherapeutic cure is psychologically not different from the religious process.² This we shall see in our last chapter when dealing with psychology and evangelism. One has to help people to make decisions and to see certain tendencies in their moral light, and it is difficult to see how one with no definite moral and spiritual enthusiasm of his own can do it. Those who know anything about nervous cases, know that many a person would have been saved much misery and ill-health if the medical man had had the courage to ask one or two questions regarding his patient's moral life. There are few doctors who care to do it; and one wonders often whether they ever suspect the moral roots of the trouble which sends the patient to them. On the other hand, there must be no attempt to impose one's moral or religious views upon the inquirer; but one's own ideals and faith may open the door to an ideal and faith which the person makes his own.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY.

There is one fundamental difference between pastoral psychology and psychotherapy. The latter deals with those who have become mal-adapted to the realities of life; the pastor deals with the build-

² *Religion and Psychotherapy.*

ing up of a spiritual personality from the beginning. The psychotherapist comes into this special branch from ordinary medicine, and as often as not has had no training in psychology in the wide sense; he may or may not have attended special lectures in psychotherapy, though he must have taken psychiatry lectures; but these take up a very small part of his training. The pastor must take psychology in all its bearings on philosophy and ethics as well as character. He has not only to attempt the cure of souls which are sick morally, but to prevent any such disease; his work is just as much to make the children safe as to save them when they go astray. He has to meet also the difficulties of what we may call normal people, for they have temptations and spiritual conflicts not far removed from those which lead to neurosis. Hence his work is wider in one respect than that of the psychotherapist. On the other hand, the psychotherapist will have to deal with bodily symptoms which the pastor may not even understand, and with the severe cases of neurosis which are beyond the time or skill of the pastor. The pastor can scarcely become a specialist in the more severe moral conflicts which demand the care of analyst or psychotherapist; but he will have knowledge enough to know that such a case needs special treatment and where to send him. Such a knowledge would have saved much misery and suffering.

Enough, I think, has been said to emphasize the need for the study of pastoral psychology by the minister and clergyman; the need for him to know

something of the movements of the soul, the basis of our dispositions which are the original content of the soul, or the material with which the soul starts on its great enterprise to win a personality. He ought to know what is instinctive and what acquired in the moral character; the place of beliefs and ideals in the attainment both of character and happiness. As pastor he has the cure of souls, and he can only build them up as he knows and understands their conflicts, their difficulties, etc. That his work comes near that of the physician we have seen; but they can co-operate without overlapping; and in cases of neurotic trouble they should seek each other's help. Medicine must come to realize that there is no such entity as a body without a soul, and the minister must come to realize that there is no such entity as a soul without a body. It is now an accepted fact that there are many bodily symptoms which are the outcome of tendencies which have become repressed because contrary to the accepted ideals of the patient; not a few are the outcome of a repressed conscience. It is just as certain that there are not a few whose loss of spiritual interests is due to moral conflicts which are the outcome of a wrong idea of bodily and instinctive needs.

CHAPTER II

STARTING-POINTS OF CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

THE question now arises as to how much and what kind of psychology we need for ministerial and pastoral work. All branches of psychology may help the pastor; for no activity of the human mind can be alien to one who has to deal with the whole man. Character and religion do not deal with fractions of experience but the whole. Even industrial psychology, which would seem at first glance to be far removed from the problems with which the pastor deals, has implications for the pastor. A little knowledge of vocational tests may help him to give guidance in the selection of a sphere of work to those leaving school; and there are few ministers who have not been consulted by parents as to what they should do with their boys and girls. Here, however, we must be content to deal with the psychology necessary to understand how the content of the soul is built up; how character and personality are acquired.

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS.

Professor Hocking, in his *Human Nature and Its Remaking*,¹ says: "For all the agencies which are now engaged in remaking mankind, three questions have become vital. What is original human nature?

¹ Chap. ii.

What do we wish to make of it? How far is it possible to make of it what we wish?" To a very large extent pastoral psychology is based on the answer to those questions; and in time ought to be able to make its own contribution to the answers. But it must be remembered that it is only within recent years that the questions have been asked and attempts made to answer them scientifically. Whatever beginnings have been made of a psychology of character and moral personality they are only beginnings. How recent the study is may be seen from the fact that the posthumous volume on *Psychology Applied to Education*, by so great a psychologist as the late James Ward, is quite without an adequate discussion of the emotional and instinctive tendencies of the child, and the phenomena of the *unconscious* are not dealt with. Whatever theories we may hold as to these phenomena of the human mind, the phenomena themselves cannot be disregarded by any educationalist or pastor. We are, then, just at the beginnings of a psychology of character. When Shand wrote his volume he could say with truth: "Such knowledge of character as we possess is unsystematic, and has grown up in ways we neither understand nor control. We did not set ourselves to master it as we set ourselves to master other kinds of knowledge. It has been derived from our own experience, from the opinion of those with whom we associate and from literature. But this knowledge is never organized. Unlike science it is also inexact, and mingled with prejudice and error."¹ As he

¹ *The Foundations of Character*, p. 6.

also points out, a knowledge of character, such as we had, was practically all stored in old fables, proverbs and maxims which had only more or less truth. On the other hand, if our science is only in its beginnings, it can claim to have revolutionized the medical approach to the functional disorders and psychoneuroses; its influence has been strong on educational method and theory; its application to industry, if only in its beginnings, promises to have far-reaching effects; while its application to delinquency will alter the approach to criminology. Nevertheless, the fact that Professor Elliot Smith could say in his recent *Conway Lecture*:¹ "In spite of the advancement of learning in the last two centuries, the claim that the most useful and least advanced of all human knowledge seems to be that of man himself is as true to-day as it was when Rousseau made it in 1754," must make us cautious in what we have to say in answer to Professor Hocking's question: "What is original human nature?" In spite of much ignorance, however, there is a good deal on which we can build, and it is reliable enough to be called scientific.

METHOD OF OBSERVATION.

The first method of all scientific procedure is *Observation*. Older psychology depended mostly on the method of introspection, or observation of conscious process itself. Modern psychology lays the emphasis on the objective method of observing behaviour, and infers from the behaviour the men-

¹ *Human Nature*, G. Elliot Smith, F.R.S.

tal process behind it. In animal and child psychology we are wholly dependent on this method. The two methods are not antagonistic, however, but complementary. However refined we make our objective method in psychology, we shall, it seems to me, be thrown back on introspection for the meaning of what we observe.

If we observe behaviour, the most fundamental thing which strikes us is that it is always purposive; some end is always being sought. It is this fact which makes a science of behaviour possible. The end our behaviour is designed to secure is not always clear to consciousness; the means chosen to secure the end may be of the most irrational kind; but there can be no doubt that to understand behaviour we must seek to know the ends we consciously or unconsciously seek. The failure of the older psychology to help us to understand behaviour lay in its refusal to stress any process but what appeared in consciousness. For a man or child to persist in a course of behaviour which was socially condemned was to incur the charge that he was either insane or obtuse in the sense that he would not allow his reason a chance to show the irrationality of his behaviour. To-day we realize that the very motives for behaviour may be hidden from his reason, and that one may be able to give *good reasons* for one's behaviour, but not the *real reasons*. To understand behaviour one has not so much to understand the reasoning that is supposed to lead to the behaviour, or the reasoning by which it is justified, but the purpose, conscious or unconscious, instinctive or

acquired, which initiated it and which sustained the energy to carry out the means of its fulfilment. We do not wish to dwell on the meaning or reality of the 'unconscious wish' now, but it is quite common to find that by means of a 'flight into disease' both children and adults attempt to realize definite ends. I have seen a boy develop serious symptoms for no other reason than to get a prolonged holiday at the seaside; 'school pains' are by no means uncommon among children; sleeplessness will get a child into the parent's bed; and students are not unknown who can 'save up' their illnesses until examination week. In all these the motives are hidden from consciousness; the illness is not a pretence; neurotics are not malingerers; but the tendency behind their behaviour is hidden.

INSTINCT AND ITS INTERPRETATION.

If we ask, then, what is original human nature, our first answer is that it is manifested in instinctive action. There are certain ends which we cannot help seeking to realize; and we are so constituted that our attention is drawn to, and interest excited in, situations in which these ends or the means of their satisfaction are presented. A child's curiosity is spontaneously aroused when anything novel is presented to his consciousness; he instinctively resents being taken away from anything interesting to him; and he will show pugnacity if his wishes are not gratified or the means of their satisfaction withheld. Adolescents are naturally interested in the other sex; and we all instinctively desire recognition from our

fellows. Instincts determine practically the whole behaviour of the young child; habits are superimposed on them; and to the end of our days instinctive satisfactions play a part in our lives. Nor must we forget that instinctive activities are always accompanied by pleasure; and we may come to seek the pleasure which instinctive activity provides. McDougall goes so far as to say that the instincts are the 'prime movers' in all behaviour; and this is true in the sense that without them we could not move at all. They provide our first ends, but not the only ends. They are the 'natural man' in the Biblical sense of the term, and because of the intense pleasure they offer, their subjection to moral control is not easy; while the fact that they are all related intimately to specific, organic, or psychic needs means that they are dynamic and not just latent elements in our being. Those which we classify as appetitive are excited within the organism, and they originate recurring desires. This instinctive side of original human nature may be over-emphasized, but it must never be neglected.

INSTINCTS NOT ENDS IN THEMSELVES.

The danger to-day, however, is not that instincts will be neglected, but that their meaning for behaviour may be misunderstood. We have to keep in mind that they are not ends in themselves; they serve the more ultimate ends of the organism and the self. They are the permanent means for bringing about the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of life, needs in whose interests they were evolved.

In themselves they can explain neither behaviour nor personality. They provide secondary, not primary, motives of behaviour, and themselves need interpretation.

Probably the greatest danger to psychological theory at the present time is the tendency to speak of instincts as though they were self-conscious entities, as when it is said they 'seek satisfaction'; or to speak of them as though they had claims in their own rights. Satisfaction is only possible to a mind; it is a mental state, correlated, it may be, with an organic condition, but never to be explained by reference to an organic condition alone. What seems to happen when an instinctive or emotional system is aroused is that the mind is aware of organic disturbance, and the end-actions in which the disturbance becomes quiescent; pleasurable feeling accompanies the awareness if there is no inhibition; and when the end of the tendency is realized, there is the further state of satisfaction which is mental. Probably there is nothing here than cannot be explained in biological terms. But in man instincts have more than a biological meaning. Biologically, instincts find their meaning in serving the interests of the organism as a whole; in man they must subserve the interests of the personality as a whole. Immediately they fail to do that, the personality becomes divided to that extent. It is in their failure to subserve the interests of personality as a whole that conflict and repression set in. Looked at from the biological point of view, instinctive activity releases organic tension, and we may use the term

'satisfaction' to describe the organic sensations arising from the quiescent state when the tendency reaches its end. But does this help us to explain all that happens psychologically? I am inclined to doubt it. Biology cannot have the last word on self-conscious beings. An instinctive satisfaction may give the organism what it wants; but we cannot argue from that as to what will satisfy a conscious mind. "Conscious life," as Professor Hocking has well pointed out, "is as much engaged *in trying to find out what it wants* as in trying to get it." We can tell what will satisfy an instinct, or to be more accurate, what will bring an instinctive tendency to its end result; but who can tell what will satisfy a self-conscious being, a mind? If instinctive pleasures always brought satisfaction to the mind, conflict could not arise, because there would be no need for repression. Take the simple case of masturbation: there is always pleasure in the act; it is the anticipation of the pleasure which creates the severity of the temptation and the great difficulty in breaking the habit.

We must be careful, then, in our interpretation of instinct; to speak loosely of instincts as though they were self-conscious entities, as McDougall seems to do, is just to go back to 'faculty' psychology. In virtue of our instincts we are enabled to meet definite situations in specific ways; they tap the energy of the organism; in satisfying them we go out to our world and the world comes into us; through them we are enabled to determine that organic needs will be attended to. They are the basis of character; but it

is in their control and in their direction by the mind that character is achieved. They have to be swept into the purposes of self-conscious beings before they find their interpretation for man.

Apart from the fact that they serve the needs of the organism their significance seems to me to lie in that they are the starting-points of our interests. It is interests which determine the richness of life, its comprehensiveness and range; and true satisfactions come when the instincts are made to subserve ends which transcend organic needs. For example, an instinctive curiosity gets us nowhere; it becomes the basis of a rich intellectual life when directed and stimulated by a comprehensive interest, as in some branch of science, philosophy or religion. Pugnacity will come to our aid when some instinctive tendency is being thwarted; but it is used at a higher level of being when directed against obstruction to moral ideals, the realization of social justice, international peace, or the advancement of one of the many moral causes in which man finds his higher life. This direction of instinctive energy toward ends which transcend organic or biological ends is called 'sublimation,' and we shall have more to say of this later. Enough, just now, if we realize that while instincts are the basis of character, or the starting-points of our conscious interests, they need interpretation and a criterion of their activities, if a knowledge of them is to help us in pastoral work, and if we are to understand the mal-adjustments to environment which give rise to mal-formation of character. But let it be understood that though I do not

believe that they are *the* determining factors in the achievement of character and personality, I do not belittle their importance. It is in their direction that the problem of character lies.

THE FUNDAMENTAL NEEDS OF MAN.

To get a true interpretation of instincts we must go behind them to the fundamental needs in the interests of which they have been evolved. These needs can be reduced to four; and if we accept Otto's account of the 'numinous disposition,' then there are five. Two of these needs are common to all organisms, and with these we may begin.

The most primary need is that of *Preservation*. To ensure this there have been evolved various tendencies and dispositions whose function it is to see that the organism receives nutrition, that waste material is eliminated, and that the means of escape from enemies are provided. Hence there is not one instinct of self-preservation only, but various instincts relating to preservation. The appetite of hunger is experienced when the organism is in need of food; to satisfy that appetite the animal must come to recognize its food and to hunt for it if a carnivorous animal; it must be able to distinguish edible from poisonous grasses if herbivorous. Hence around this one element of preservation numerous tendencies have been evolved, and indeed many structural modifications of the organism itself. We can confine ourselves, however, to those tendencies which are prominent as causal factors in human behaviour. The most prominent of these are con-

nected with danger to the organism. Faced with some danger we may take to our heels; we may conceal ourselves; we may elect to fight and become aggressive; or we may use our intelligence and find other means of escape. How far emotion is an integral element of instinct, as McDougall holds, we need not stop to discuss, psychology is far from being agreed on the point; but it is certain that on the perception of danger there is a tendency to experience fear, and as the means of escape are shut off the emotion increases in intensity and may manifest itself in collapse or terror. Conscious fear is the sign that the self is aware that there is something to be afraid of, and it is always painfully toned. Fear in man extends to much more than danger to the organism. It may extend to everything we may call mine, or me: my reputation, my children, my business, the impairment of physical or mental powers. This emotion extends much further than in primitive life, and in modern conditions gives rise to many morbid states with their consequent behaviour.

ANXIETY AND FEAR.

It will not be out of place to distinguish clearly between fear and anxiety; for the latter may become so morbid and intense as to lead to an anxiety neurosis; and there are few ministers but have in their congregations members suffering to some degree from morbid fear or anxiety conditions. Fear is a perfectly normal emotional state. When we are rationally afraid, we are conscious of the particular object of our fear; and we may meet the situation

with courage. For example, I may have to undergo a serious operation, and naturally I may be afraid of the result. I sit down and face the experience and draw upon my faith and knowledge; and then with courage face my ordeal. Fear does not normally inhibit action; it may quicken both thought and action, as, for example, in the skilful manipulation of a motor-car through a tangle of city traffic. It is when we allow fear to control our thought and action that it inhibits our normal response to the situation. The everyday fears which vex so many people are the outcome of this inability to bring thought and action to bear upon the situation; as, for example, in the fear of insomnia, fear of traffic, the fear that transforms every ache and pain into a disease, etc. These are morbid fears.

"Anxiety is the neurotic sister of fear," says Stekel.¹ In other words, anxiety is always the outcome of repression. In anxiety we are unconscious of the real objects of our fear; and the emotion may be placed upon objects which have nothing in them to excite fear, or have no relation to the real object of our fear. Examples are better than description or definition here.

A lady was sent to me suffering from fear of 'everything.' She could not go out to an evening party with her husband without having an attack of anxiety; she could not say what she was anxious about, as she found that her fears extended to almost everything. So great did the anxiety become

¹ *Conditions of Nervous Anxiety and Their Treatment*, Stekel, chap. i.

that she had thoughts of ending her life, and indeed had the impulse at a railway station when coming to see me. She could not account for her condition at all, as she seemed to have everything that is supposed to make one happy.

Another example: A gentleman was asked to see me about his condition; for two years he had suffered from an awful anxiety related to impending disasters—the death of his wife, an accident to his child, loss of his health; the anxiety deepened until life itself seemed a monster of cruelty; he could not see a laughing child, but he immediately thought of all the struggles and disasters the child would meet with the growing years. He had been a good Christian worker, a local preacher, and had as good and sensible a wife as one is likely to meet. But for months the cloud seemed to become darker and almost unbearable, and it was all that I could do to keep him from a tragic act. He prayed fervently for power to trust his faith, to leave his life entirely in God's hands; but the stark naked fear that any day might see the most terrible calamity befall him continued to haunt him. His anxiety, in contrast to that of the lady in the last illustration, was always attached to definite objects, although there were no rational grounds for expecting any calamity. Both these people show the difference from normal fear and anxiety. Fear has rational grounds; anxiety is a morbid condition arising from some danger to the self; but the real object of the fear or anxiety is hidden from consciousness; it is repressed. When

one knows the object or experience of which one is afraid one can take measures to meet it; but when that is repressed and hidden from consciousness, the emotion will attach itself to some object which should not in the ordinary course of things give rise to fear. In a subsequent chapter we shall see the causes of anxiety; it is sufficient now to realize the difference between normal fear and anxiety. We can see fear passing into anxiety in cases where there is uncertainty in regard to the outcome of some experience. For example, a woman may be normally anxious if her husband has to undergo an operation; she is morbidly anxious if she is obsessed with anxiety about the health of her healthy husband.

It should be kept in mind, however, that anxiety which is attached to objects which ought to give no grounds for fear, or which is a vague anxiety about everything, has its grounds in the unconscious. There is no such thing as an imaginary fear in the true sense of the term; there is always some real ground for it in the unconscious; it is not "all imagination" unless we can speak of the imagination as functioning wrongly; in that case we have to get at the cause of the morbid functioning. The same applies in the case of pain for which the doctor can find no organic basis. Ignorance alone can prompt a man to say to a patient that the pain is imaginary; an imaginary pain is a contradiction in terms; we cannot imagine a pain; if we feel pain there is pain; and if there is no physical basis for it there will be found a mental basis.

THE CREATIVE NEED.

The second fundamental need of the organism is *to reproduce the species*. Here, again, we have many tendencies all connected with the same need, all evolved, not for their own sakes, but in the interest of the preservation of the race. We need not enlarge on the various instincts or tendencies connected with the reproduction of the species. It must not, however, be confined to the sexual act; self-display, maternal instinct, tendency to courtship are all intimately connected with this need of the organism.

From the lowest to the highest animals these two fundamental needs are found, and in all they determine definite kinds of behaviour. As we ascend the evolutionary scale the tendencies connected with them have become more numerous and more complicated. The rise of self-consciousness meant a very great extension of the self-preserved need; while the capacity to image the end result of the sex tendency, and to make the sex object a love object, has multiplied and modified tendencies to behaviour, unknown in the world of the lower animals. What ought to be noted here is that it is these needs which give meaning to the various instincts; instincts can have no meaning except related to these needs. Hence we get a criterion of the functioning of instinct; it is the needs which have to be satisfied biologically, not the instincts; in other words, the instincts ought to be exercised not in their own right, as some writers on education seem to imply, but in

the interests of the fundamental needs of the organism. When exercised in man, irrespective of the needs they were designed to satisfy, they invariably mean a failure of character, and ultimately real weakness.

NEEDS PECULIAR TO MAN.

There is no greater danger to psychological thought than the tendency to push the doctrine of biological continuity too far. This is the great danger of McDougall. We have to account not only for the likenesses between man and the lower creation, but also the differences; and for the study of human behaviour it is the differences that matter. Evolution, itself, is understandable only on the assumption that there is a prospective aim in life. In virtue of this prospective aim new needs develop; they are built on the past, and without the past could not have arisen; but they are not to be explained in terms of the past. There is the emergence of new factors—and new needs.

In man we find two fundamental needs which do not seem to be a mere extension of biological needs, but imply the *prospective aim of personality*.¹ In man we find the need *to maintain his status in the group*. From one point of view this may be considered as continuous with the need of preservation, but it implies much more than biological preservation. It is in relation to this need that anxiety arises rather than with the instinct of self preservation;

¹ I owe the phrase to Dr. Hinkle's volume: *The Re-creating of the Individual*.

anxiety is peculiar to man, and generally arises from fears connected with the preservation of his status in the group, or fears relating to the condition of his soul or personality. To effect the satisfaction of this need the instincts relating to the herd have been evolved. These imply a great deal more than a gregarious tendency. In the herd animals the gregarious tendency to be in the herd and uncomfortable away from it are the most salient features; but in man there is the tendency to seek its warm approval, consciously to seek power in the group, or at least to maintain his status within it. To be *of* the group is the salient feature here, and it is a tendency which has great strength in a normal individual. To effect this need we have the self-assertive tendency, as well as sympathy, suggestibility, and the desire for recognition. We shall see when we study behaviour how this need determines a great deal of our social behaviour as well as our behaviour as individuals. The strong inhibitive effects of society function through this need of man.

NEED FOR RATIONAL AND MORAL UNITY.

It is not until we come to realize *the need in man for rational and moral unity* that his behaviour as moral and rational can be understood. Original human nature cannot be summed up in a catalogue of the instinctive tendencies which we have in common with the lesser creation. If we may not call man *the rational animal*, at least he has the capacity to be reasonable. Reason and intelligence are also innate; and for human beings are as fundamental

for behaviour and the achievement of character as the instincts.¹ Whether intelligence is a 'central fund of mind energy' or a group of capacities is immaterial for our purpose in this volume; but mind itself is the most striking element in the human being. Its significance for character and personality, for all that differentiates the animal from man, is tremendous; for mind in man is to be evaluated and understood, not merely by tracing its lowly origins to 'inorganic and organic selectivities.' We rightly stress, I think, the psycho-physical basis of human nature. To understand the whole we must analyse the elements as we find them serving the needs of the organism, and indeed the whole heredity structure. But just as the organism is a whole, and not the mere sum of its parts, so the self is more than its individual instincts, or its acquired tendencies. The characteristic of an organism is its organic control of its parts. In the lower animal this is so strong that when a non-vital part is by some accident removed—the limb of a newt, etc.—the organism immediately commences to renew it. We see the same kind of organic activity in the attempt of the organism to isolate some foreign body which it cannot eject, such as a bullet. The organism *will have wholeness*; the effort of the whole is towards organic harmony and completeness.

With the advent of self-conscious mind, however, organic control is not left behind, but becomes subject to psychic, moral and rational control. From

¹ See an interesting article: "Instinct and Moral Life," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, April 1928.

the very first the mind works its experiences into unities, and syntheses. It is as a whole that we first perceive objects; it is later we analyse perceptions, and realize that every percept is a construct; and that perception is immediate, independent of will and inference. The mind spontaneously works its presentations into ideas and hence into knowledge; that is, into a unity. Our experience is likewise dealt with by the mind. The child's experience is first organized round its instinctive activities and its perceptions; later, ideas become the nuclei of sentiments, and experience becomes organized within these dispositions. In every human being we find mind manifesting itself as a synthetic and co-ordinating activity.

FUNCTION OF THE MIND IN BEHAVIOUR.

From the point of view of behaviour this activity of the mind is extraordinarily important. *The function of the mind on the level of moral experience is to co-ordinate its experience and to regulate its behaviour in terms of values.* Our Lord recognized this higher function of mind: "If thine hand offend thee, cut it off . . . if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out." It is when the mind attains to self-consciousness that ethical conflict arises; and as conscious beings we begin to direct our behaviour, even our instinctive behaviour, by voluntary purposes; we are no longer subject to the urge from behind alone; but also by ideal ends; we are determined not so much by the act we performed last as by the act we hope to perform next. Especially is this true when dominated by conscious ends. We now desire objects and

experiences because they have 'value' for personality. The self refuses to adapt itself to environment, it insists on remaking its environment in the light of ideal ends; it refuses to gratify any desire until it is brought to the conscience and the bar of reason. Instinctive activities or strivings must now be co-ordinated with other motives; through the control of the mind mere self-regarding ends become subject to social ideals. Moral ends and not instinctive wants play the large part here. Self-determination and not external regulation is now fundamental.¹

This involves a plasticity and freedom which is found on no other level of being. The animal can go very little beyond the capacities and specific activities inherited from the parents and stock; its educability is of the smallest dimensions as compared with that of the child. Man is not bound down to the experience determined by his instinctive dispositions; he is creative. His literature, his science, and his social institutions and associations are all examples of those creative powers which so enormously enlarge his experience.

Now it is in virtue of the mind's function to co-ordinate its experience and to regulate its behaviour in terms of values that the rational element and conscience must be given a much higher place in the interpretation of behaviour than some psychologists are willing to assign to them. They are not static elements, as McDougall would have us believe; they are dynamic activities of the mind. They are organs of the mind, organs in virtue of which the mind

¹ See *Holism and Evolution*, by General Smuts, chap. ix.

regulates its behaviour and co-ordinates its experience. They are *the* authoritative elements in behaviour; their authority is derived from the fact that *they legislate for the personality as a whole*. But authority without power is a contradiction in terms. The mind refuses to function normally when contradictions are present; it refuses to co-ordinate experience which it cannot rationally justify. Similarly, conscience will not tolerate behaviour which contradicts its accepted standards. We may refuse to give conscience and reason their authority in theory; but in experience they take that authority. As we shall see, there is no explanation that covers all the facts of conflict, repression and their results, no answer to the question: What is it that represses? if we refuse conative energy to conscience and reason.

ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE.

I can do no more here than indicate what interpretation I give to these fundamental activities of the mind; their significance will be brought out when we come to study the mal-adjustments of character.

If we analyse conscience we find the three characteristics of all mental process—cognition, affect, and conation. We perceive moral situations within the range of our moral intelligence in the same sense and with the same degree of certainty as we perceive ordinary situations of sense experience. The recognition of a moral situation is spontaneous; we pass moral judgments as immediately as we pass judgments within the realm of our ordinary sense

experience. If we take an analogy: I recognize the birds feeding on my lawn as sparrows; I have not to stop and draw an inference; it is a perception and is independent of will and inference; these birds come within the range of my knowledge of birds, and spontaneously I recognize them as sparrows. In the same way I recognize stealing or untruthfulness as wrong; the nature of both these acts is within the range of my moral intelligence, and in the light of my moral standards I recognize them as contrary to right conduct. It may be said that all moral situations are not so simple; and that they need reflection before judgment can be passed. Doubtless this is true; but the same applies in the sphere of perception. There is another bird feeding on my lawn, but I do not know what it is. The range of my knowledge of birds is too limited for me to perceive whether it is a blackbird or a starling. There are moral situations where the same difficulty arises; the complexity of the situation is such that it is not easy to arrive at a decision. But the same is true of every sphere of knowledge. What creates the difficulty is that knowledge is not given, but only the capacity for knowledge; and that is true of all kinds of knowledge. We are born with intelligence which exercises itself in the moral sphere as well as in that of the perceptual. We are not born with moral standards; they are acquired either consciously or unconsciously; as our intelligence exercises itself with morality or moral behaviour—to keep clear of the abstract—the standards alter and change; but within the standards the individual has accepted, the moral

judgments are as immediate as perceptual. In other words, there is no innate knowledge of what *the good* is, any more than there is an innate knowledge that sparrows are birds or rats rodents. Once, however, the child has acquired this knowledge that sparrows are birds and rats rodents, the perceptual judgment is made without hesitation and with conviction; within the moral standards acquired he has as little hesitation and as sure a conviction when faced with ordinary moral situations.

It is here, it seems to me, confusion arises. In claiming authority for judgments of conscience we are not claiming the authority for innate ideas; we are but claiming that intelligence, when it works in the moral sphere, is as sure in its workings as intelligence in any sphere. Conscience is not a mere emotion; its judgments arise from the simple fact that intelligence canalizes itself along the line of moral experience as well as along other lines.

CONSCIENCE AND EMOTION.

But conscience is more than the capacity for moral judgments; those judgments are accompanied by feelings peculiar to conscience. They have subtle differences difficult to describe, but experienced by all who have any moral standards at all; and the emotions arising from a disobeyed conscience are amongst the most painful we can experience. What an experience of relief one gets when one has passed through some strong temptation without sin! The man whose conscience compels him to do the unpopular thing is sustained by the specific feeling of right-

ness, the feeling, 'I can do no other, so help me God.' The feeling may deepen until it reaches the sublime height of Kant's *Reverence for the moral law*. On the other hand, we are all familiar with the feelings of remorse; the self-humiliation when one has allowed himself to be carried away by some momentary passion to some act contrary to his moral standards; so strong may the feeling become, so painfully toned, that one may be cast into the very depths of despair. The emotion is not a species or a compound of self-abasement; it is specific. There is no analogy between the feeling experienced when one has made a *faux pas*, and when one has fallen short of the demands of conscience. Shand sums up the feelings of conscience thus: "That there is a calm joy in fulfilling the dictates of conscience, and a peculiar sorrow in our failure to fulfil them, is familiar to everyone. When we rebel against it, and persist in our evil courses, this sorrow becomes remorse. Its fear is that apprehension of punishment which follows the violation of its laws; and its anger is known as 'righteous indignation.' " ¹ It is because the emotions connected with conscience are so pronounced that some have been led to define conscience in terms of emotion; but although the emotional element is strong, conscience cannot be reduced to emotion.

CONSCIENCE AND CONATION.

When we analyse conscience further we find the third characteristic of all mental process, namely, *conation*. There is an impulse to act on the judg-

¹ *The Foundations of Character*, p. 57.

ments of conscience. As I understand McDougall, this he denies. But apart from introspection there are good objective grounds for crediting conscience with conation. How could we explain temptation were there no conative element accompanying our recognition of the good and impelling us towards the good act; or, what inhibits the evil desire to do something contrary to conscience, or delays it by conflict? McDougall believes that this is explained by an impulse awakened within the sentiment of self-regard. He says: "It is the desire that I, the precious self, that being which I conceive proudly, or humbly, more or less adequately, more or less truly, and more or less clearly, according to the degree of development of my powers, the desire that this self shall realize in action the ideal of conduct which it has formulated and accepted."¹ This ideal of character which plays such an important part in McDougall's explanation of moral experience is the end of 'synthesis or harmonized system of moral sentiments.' One is inclined to ask, what synthesizes the moral sentiments, or what shall we call the synthesis? Or what canalizes the energy along the line of a moral judgment? This is the weakest part of McDougall's system. That the fear of disapproval plays a large part in the inhibition no one would deny; Kant would have said that such inhibition was immoral. Nor does McDougall's account of the moral strength which sustains a man who withstands public opinion carry us far. He argues that such a man finds some higher court of appeal whose verdict

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 440 ff.

he esteems more highly; and it is the approval of this fictitious tribunal, or 'ideal spectator,' which sustains him. Kant's 'duty for duty's sake' seems a much finer motive, although we are not concerned here with moral sanctions, but with psychological process. It seems to me that we get a much clearer explanation, and one that gives a real psychological basis for the authority and force of the moral 'ought,' with which we are all familiar, if we infer that the mind whose very function it is to co-ordinate its experience and regulate its behaviour by the values it has accepted, works through conscience. After all, the self-regarding sentiment is acquired like all other sentiments, and it is difficult to see where it gets the authority to legislate for the whole self. As Ginsberg has put it in his *Psychology of Society*: "No doubt the self-regarding sentiment is of great importance as a correlating principle, but the unity attained through it may be very narrow and unsympathetic. We could hardly admire the person who does good in order to be pleased with himself. Greater unity is attained by devotion or emotional attachment to large ends, and these ends must be of value in themselves, and not derive their value from the fact that they satisfy the instinct of self assertion."¹

We need not pursue at this stage the position to be assigned to the self-regarding sentiment as a regulator of moral actions; indeed, all the sentiments play a part and involve an impulse towards their end; but they are concerned largely with their own

¹ Page 41.

ends. Conscience, on the other hand, is concerned with the moral ordering of the self as a whole. That it is a definite disposition to action is shown by the fact that if it is repressed, remorseful emotions are intensified, and the intensification of emotion is always the outcome of inhibition of an impulse. Many neurotic symptoms as well as definite functional disorders can only be explained by the fact that the repressed moral tendency or impulse has found a pathological discharge through them; indeed, my experience has shown me that the most severe anxiety hysterics have been the outcome of sheer repression of the conscience. Stekel goes as far as to say that every neurotic is a person who desires 'the pleasure without the guilt.' The peculiar emotion of a disobeyed conscience always contains an element of guilt. If, as Laird has argued, 'conscience has to do with the guidance, control, and regulation of conduct in accordance with the appeal of the best,'¹ then it follows that we must assign an impulsive element to conscience.

To sum up then: Conscience is that element in our being through which the mind attempts to co-ordinate and regulate its behaviour according to values or moral standards consciously or unconsciously accepted by the self. Once regulative ideas of right and wrong are operative in the child, once his intelligence is capable of dealing with and accepting moral standards, there is a spontaneous passing of moral judgments on the actions of others and on his own. The standard by which he judges will be determined

¹ *A Study in Moral Theory*, p. 130.

largely by his social group; but, as the rational processes become more dominant, the standards themselves will come under rational scrutiny. It is our standards rather than our particular moral judgments which are the outcome of reflection, as Laird has well argued. Accompanying our judgments are specific feelings peculiar to conscience; the approval of conscience and the 'pangs of conscience,' are specific emotions and are not to be resolved into compounds of other emotions connected with our instincts. Further analysis of conscience yields the knowledge that we not merely spontaneously pass moral judgments according to the degree of our intelligence, but there is also the impulse to obey these judgments; it is this impulse towards the good which conflicts with some other impulse to act contrary to our standards, and which explains why to do wrong is never easy to one who has moral standards. Because of its cognitive element conscience has authority; because of its emotional and conative elements it has power. Both its authority and power are derived from its function; it acts for the whole self.

THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF REASON.

If we turn now to a study of Reason and its place in the regulation of moral action and the upbuilding of the content of the soul, we are at first confronted with the tendency of many thinkers to see reason as no more than the instrument whereby the means for instinctive satisfactions are found. Certain schools of psychology tell us that we do things not because

we *ought* but because we *want* to do them. "On this way of thinking," as Hobhouse remarks, "the reasons we give for action are *ex post facto* formulæ for the impulses and emotions that really prompt the act. The impulses are not based upon the reasons, but the reason upon the impulses. A man may think that he loves a woman because she is beautiful, but in reality she is beautiful to him because he loves her. He says, and even believes, that he resents another's claim because it is wrong. In reality he finds it wrong because he resents it. He does this or abstains from that in conscious obedience to the will of God. In reality the effective will of God is the expression of impulses, within himself, as modified by social traditions reposing in the last resort on cognate impulses in the minds of other men. From this last case it appears that not only does a man's personal account of his personal nature rest on his personal impulses, but social theories, traditional beliefs, ancestral customs, and new departures spring, not from reasons given for them, but from impulses, permanent or transitory, of mankind."¹ To such a pass does the uncritical acceptance of much modern psychology of instinct lead us. Were instincts the 'prime movers' of all activity in the sense of the only movers, then the task of psychology and ethics would be 'to set up an authentic and proportionate list of the instincts proper to man'; and there need be not other standard than the satisfactions promised to the instincts revealed.

¹ *The Rational Good*, pp. 20-21.

We have already seen the inadequacy of instinct to explain the whole of man's behaviour, and that the satisfaction of instinctive needs does not necessarily lead to the satisfaction of conscious beings. The fact that a moral problem arises at all, and the fact that we *do* evaluate instinctive activities in the light of ideals show that Reason is much more than the faculty of finding means for instinctive ends. *Reason* and *reasoning* must not be confused any more than intelligence and the capacity for intellectual processes of abstract thought. We said that the function of mind is to co-ordinate and regulate its experience in terms of values, moral values if we think of moral experience, rational values if we think of all experience. Mind, as Reason, is the great integrator of our experience, of the knowledge by which our experience is directed into fruitful and harmonious fields. If we cannot live comfortably with a contradiction it is because the impulse towards rational integration is inhibited. Reasoning is the process whereby we attempt to find grounds for such integration; but the *reason* itself is the impulse towards the rational interconnection, towards the organized whole of experience. It is not, as Graham Wallas reminds us, a subordinate acting on the order of the instincts, but a natural principle of co-ordination and integration. It is in virtue of the Reason that we partake of universality; that our practical activities come to be linked with the interests of others, and finally become urged along the line of the universal good. As Hobhouse puts it: "Reason is an organic principle in thought, and so far as

incomplete but progressive may be termed an organic impulse. So far as reality is finally intelligible to reason it must similarly be interpreted as an organic whole, so that we may speak of Reason as the ultimate organic principle alike in thought and reality. Finally, the fact that reason, even as incomplete impulse, is the endeavour towards the whole which interconnects the parts is the basis of its sovereignty over every partial impulse or isolated belief, whatever degree of immediate subjective certitude such belief may claim.”¹

It is only such a view of reason that can give authority to any kind of moral ideals; and it is only on the assumption of such a principle that conduct can be lifted from the chaos of impulse and emotion. It is the one kind of authority which is authoritative, for it is the authority of the self. I agree with Dewey when he says: “Impulse is needed to arouse thought, incite reflection, and enliven belief. But only thought notes obstructions, invents tools, directs technique, and thus converts impulse into an art which lives in objects. Thought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit. But unless it is nurtured, it speedily dies, and habit and instinct continue their civil warfare.” My contention is, however, that although thought is always born with impulse, the impulse itself may be the impulse for rationality in life and conduct. Impeded impulse will undoubtedly lead to reflection, but there is an impulse to reflection irrespective of the instincts evolved in the interests of the animal needs. There is not merely an obligation upon us to

¹ *The Rational Good*, p. 64.

reflect, an obligation implied in law, but an impulse to reflect. Laird goes as far as this when he says: "We are inevitably and incurably a reflective species, looking before and after, and pondering invisible principles. Certainly we are not always employed in this way, or in all things, and most of us reflect very badly. But that is another thing."¹

The significance of all this lies in the fact that original human nature is more than the instincts related to organic needs. Moral and rational control has an innate basis; the moral and rational appeal may be grounded in our very nature. It is when this control is thwarted that repression arises and mal-adjustment of character begins. How far this control will be exerted will depend on the capacity of the intelligence and the content of conscience; but within these it works freely in all. To quote Dewey again: "Every moral life has its radicalism; but this radical factor does not find its full expression in direct action but in the courage of intelligence to go deeper than either tradition or immediate impulse goes." That is just another way of saying that progress in rational and moral ideals depends on the strength of the rational and moral impulses. To those who have to deal with the young, or with those to whom the appeal of the immediate satisfactions has great power, this rooting of the moral and rational in our nature means much. In attempting to guide the young to 'unquestioned ideals,' to beliefs which will have practical effect in their lives, ideals and beliefs which will issue in acts

¹ *A Study in Moral Theory*, p. 130.

of volition, we need grounds for stressing the rational and moral in opposition to the instinctive and emotional. The rational operates in the interests of the whole personality. Moral standards themselves are subject to its control; they must be consistent with the larger whole; they must be harmonized with the universal interests. It is only as the rational impulse is evoked that ideal ends for society and individual march towards realization. In this sense Socrates' dictum is true: "Knowledge is virtue"; while that of Hosea is also pertinent: "My people die for lack of knowledge." The rational is the impulse towards ever larger ends, more comprehensive harmonies. To say with McDougall, "Reason is not a conative energy that may be thrown on this side or that, in our moral conflicts," is to mistake the very nature of reason. It is reason that initiates the conflict in so far as it sets the standards of conscience; and in so far as it is the central co-ordinator of our thought and action. On the other hand, the rationally lived life is not the life unmoved by instinct or emotion, but the life in which instinct and emotion are controlled by the large, comprehensive ends towards which reason moves. It was on behalf of these rational and moral ends that the intellectual processes were evolved; that they were not evolved in the interests of the instincts is obvious from the fact that they are the great barrier to uninhibited instinctive action. As we have developed ever finer powers of discrimination and assimilation and ideation, organic control of the instincts with its almost unerring action has been

replaced by rational and moral control; and thus moral and rational personality is not superimposed upon instinctive nature, but is realized by shooting through the instinctive ends the moral and rational ends by which man lives a man's life. On the other hand, it is just the development of ideation which has made the instincts the source of so much of our temptation. We are not born with desires, but with tendencies to action; desire is acquired. Desire is defined by Hobhouse as "Impulse directed towards an anticipated end"; it is this anticipated end, or rather the impulsive element in it, which is mistaken for instincts seeking their own satisfaction. Desire is always conscious, the end of some impulse in consciousness need not be; but it is the desire of an instinctive pleasure which constitutes our difficulty; it is our desires rather than the instincts which are difficult to control. Psychologically, our instincts are functioning normally when they are bringing about some need of the organism; they can be rationally condemned when exercised merely in the ends of pleasure.

THE RELIGIOUS NEED.

Has man a religious need which motivates some part of his behaviour? It is practically accepted by psychologists that he has no religious instinct. His curiosity, his intelligence, his need for rational unity will drive him to seek meaning to life and this may lead him to the conception of God. "Given," ¹ says Professor Pratt, "a being endowed with intelligence

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 71.

and with the dozen or more specific instincts and tendencies of man, such a being is bound to be religious, at least potentially or incipiently." Nevertheless, plausible as this theory is, I find it difficult to reduce to a natural basis the fact that 'man is incurably religious.' His religious faith and beliefs have always been his strongest motivations, and have determined the depth and width of the channels in which human history has flowed. "Man's belief in a personal power ordering the universe," says Dr. Hinkle, "and concerned with the affairs of the individual, a power which he could love and to which he could appeal, has been the great stimulus objectively conditioned, which has lured and led him on to all his great achievements. Even though produced originally by his childish wish for a protecting power, there existed in him at the same time a psychological necessity for an object greater than himself and beyond himself to which he must do homage; for, through this discipline and effort at association with the unseen, the organization of definite psychic functions and processes was attained."¹ We need not discuss here whether there are any grounds for the statement that God is no more than the projection of a childish wish; the point we have to note is that God was needed for definite psychic functions to be realized. However infantile may have been the primitive ideas of God, the psychic needs remain; and these needs give rise to wishes, and thought; and so far as they are not satisfied, so far man will feel himself incomplete. "Mankind possesses many

¹ *The Re-creating of the Individual*, pp. 418 ff.

wishes," to quote Dr. Hinkle again, "but there is one great and universal wish expressed in all religions, in all art and philosophy, and in human life; *the wish to pass beyond himself as he now is*, the wish for a further attainment, for a new consciousness or a new state of being in which that greater unity and more harmonious psychic integration longed for, is achieved in reality." It is not the work of psychology to either validate or invalidate the objectivity of the God in Whom these psychic needs are realized; it has no technique for such a task; its work is to account psychologically for the fact that man everywhere has this wish to pass beyond himself and find himself in God. Dr. Crichton Miller argues that one of the adjustments to reality an individual must make before he realizes himself is the adjustment to the Infinite. How does man become aware of his need for adjustment to the Infinite? How does he rise to the conception of the Infinite? The projection theory is speculation not science; but even the fact that man projects an idea shows there was a need and something that stirred that need into consciousness. I am prepared to admit Professor Pratt's thesis that given man as he is he was bound to ask the meaning of life; but one cannot jump from that to the conclusion that he would inevitably have reached the conception he has reached, and the warm living experience of God of which so many speak. From the psychological point of view, Dr. Otto in *The Idea of the Holy* interprets the facts of the religious consciousness in a much more satisfactory manner. He argues that we have a "Numinous dis-

position" in virtue of which we may realize the presence of God, or rather of a Being other than ourselves, and experience emotions which are not to be reduced to compounds of natural emotions; there are specific religious emotions. In a worshipful atmosphere we feel we are in the presence of a supernatural Being, before Whom we experience a sense of our creaturehood, religious awe and reverence. He quotes James, who in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, said: "As regards the origin of the Greek gods we need not at present seek an opinion. But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." ¹ Unfortunately James did not pursue this line of analysis; but that such a keen introspectionist should infer, from his exhaustive study of religious experience, that there was a perception of something there, the feeling of objectivity to the Object of religious experience must add weight to what Dr. Otto finds in the analysis of his own experience.

Personally I feel that there is much in Dr. Otto's position that explains elements in my own experience which the modern psychology of religion fails to

¹ Otto's whole volume should be studied. A valuable criticism of Otto's position will be found in a paper by Dr. Oman, *Journal of Theological Studies*, April 1924.

describe; it is, too, in perfect harmony with what those who have entered most deeply into the religious life tell us they experience. He argues that in our experience of God there is an element which is non-rational, a something which is left undescribed (it may be indescribable) when we have used all the concepts with which language supplies us. That 'overplus of meaning' is felt both when we attempt to conceptualize God and when we attempt to describe our experience of Him. Thus the Holy as objective, and as subjectively experienced, is a religious category which is ultimate, and thus indefinable. The experience, however, is anything but vague to those who have had some hour when, like Moses, they felt they were standing upon holy ground; or had some moment when the sense of God's presence stole over them and enveloped them like the beautiful twilight of a northern evening. They have felt their 'creaturehood,' their nothingness, their guilt; His unapproachableness, yet the inevitable attractive power of His Being, and if at one with Him, that state of blessedness that no words can describe.

What interests us here is the contention that there is within us a *numinous disposition* whereby we may become directly aware of God and experience emotions wholly different from what we experience in any other relation of human contacts. Intellectual curiosity alone could not have sustained man's long search after God; fear of the Herd cannot account for that sense of guilt so characteristic of every religion, and which if repressed gives rise to so many neurotic symptoms of both a mental and physical

kind. Once this disposition functions, the individual's attitude to life, its meaning, its moral experience can never be the same again. Incompleteness is felt until he closes with God; guilt is sensed at the slightest hint of wrongdoing on his part, and he finds peace only when his religious sentiment is the habitual centre from which he acts. However we explain the origin of religion in ourselves, whether as the outcome of the drive of our natural instincts and tendencies or the evoking of a religious disposition, it has been the outcome of a fundamental need which we cannot outgrow without ceasing to be man.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF FUNDAMENTAL NEEDS.

I have gone into those fundamental needs in order that we may get an interpretation of instinctive and emotional activities, and that we may later understand the meaning of conflict and repression. To endow us, as McDougall does, with a chaos of instincts all eagerly pursuing their own ends, is to leave us to the mercy of chance sentiments for the kind and strength of personality we are likely to acquire. Instincts have no meaning in themselves; they find their meaning in their relation to the needs of the organism and the self in whose interests they were evolved.

Round those needs revolves the whole of our life. In the satisfaction of them thought is a tool; but it is never the mere servant of the desires generated by instinctive impulses; the needs of rational, moral and spiritual unity are basic, and alone can explain the

prospective aim of personality and the conflicts and repressions which make the achievement of personality such a hard task. Under the impetus of a need the organism becomes active, and instinct and thought combine for its satisfaction. In virtue of the moral, rational and spiritual needs which integrate the personality, our organic needs and instinctive desires cannot be satisfied anyhow; the soul will have unity. Hence the doctrine that conflicts are always within the self; 'that to alter his fate' an individual must 'alter his own psychic attitude and the unconscious forces determining it.' Biologically an instinct is functioning normally when it is being exercised in the interest of some organic need; psychologically it is functioning normally when it is satisfying a need of the self, and not merely subserving some end of pleasure; ethically it is functioning normally when the satisfactions are in harmony with the rational, moral and spiritual ends of personality. The doctrine of needs alone can give us a true criterion of instinctive and emotional action; while the doctrine of the need for rational and moral unity rehabilitates the moral and rational control, the lack of which lies behind the failure to realize personality and so many of the functional disorders of our time.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENTI- MENTS, AND THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER

IN the last chapter we saw that the most striking characteristic of Mind is its organizing and correlating activity. This activity is seen at its best in the formation of the *Sentiments*. It is to be regretted that in most of the published volumes on psychology meant to be 'popular' attention is directed mostly to the instincts and the emotions; and the sentiments are almost or entirely neglected. How important the sentiments are for the building of the soul and for the understanding of behaviour may be judged by the fact that they contain whatever virtues or vices we may possess; they determine our permanent interests, indeed, are our permanent interests looked at from the point of view of mental structure. McDougall says that our sentiments are our character. When Plato said that the two things which determine the way of life are "the road of our longing and the quality of our soul," he was really saying that the sentiments determine the way of life for each of us; for the directions in which our longings go out are determined by the objects of our sentiments, and the quality of the sentiments or their strength is just the quality or strength of the soul. It is no exaggeration to say that the sentiments are the content of the soul. It is on behalf of and at the

impulse of some felt need that thought itself is produced, and the acquired needs grow up in response to the demands of our sentiments. Hence, vital as the study of the instincts are, and the innate fundamental needs such as conscience and reason as the basis from which we start, the study of the sentiments is fundamental if we are to answer Professor Hocking's second question: What do we wish to make of human nature?

SENTIMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.

That question really involves two questions—one psychological and the other ethical. If we put the ethical question thus: what are the values we ought to seek? then pastoral psychology must be content to take the conclusions arrived at in the science of ethics in general, and Christian ethics in particular. The psychological question remains. Here we ask: What organizations of the inner tendencies to behaviour determine the values we shall seek? How do we come to be disposed towards the seeking of those values? How are those dispositions acquired?

We have noted the fact that human behaviour is always purposive; some end is always being sought; the realization of that end organizes the energies, directs them, and stimulates the mind to thought on its behalf. A child's desires arise wholly within the instinctive needs; some instinctive or emotional impulse is in consciousness before he becomes active. But little or no inhibition is seen in the young child; while an instinctive or emotional system focuses his

attention he is wholly absorbed in it, and unless his attention is changed, keeps at the same thing until the impulse or emotion is exhausted. His instinctive and emotional systems give him immediate satisfactions or immediate pains; hence the difficulty in the young child of learning to be patient. He has to learn to seek ends that will satisfy his instinctive and emotional tendencies and at the same time build up permanent systems of desire in satisfying which he gains character, stability and will. This process begins when once the child reaches the ideational stage of mental life. Ideas as well as sensations, impulses and emotions begin to play a larger part in his behaviour, and to determine the object towards which his innate tendencies will be directed. He is now at the stage of character formation. McDougall puts this aspect thus: "The organized system of these tendencies (instinctive and emotional) directed upon a variety of objects and toward the realization of various goals connected with these objects, constitutes what we call character. Character is the system of directed conative tendencies. It may be relatively simple or complex; it may be harmoniously organized or lacking harmony; it may be firmly or loosely knit; it may be directed in the main toward lower or higher goals. Character of the finest type is that which is complex, strongly and harmoniously organized, and directed toward the realization of higher goals or ideals. Such character may be attained by the individual whose intellect is relatively simple and ordinary. But the better organized and richer the intellect, the more efficiently

will character work toward the realization of its goals.”¹

It is this organization of the tendencies towards ends wider than instinctive ends which is implied in the process we have termed ‘psychological development’ in contrast with intellectual or purely mental development. Doubtless all education makes for psychological development, but educational systems lay the emphasis upon intellectual development, i.e. on the development of the capacity for perception, attention, memory, imagination, reasoning, which latter would include the power of analytic comparison, generalization and inference. This is the aspect which those who construct ‘intelligent tests’ have in mind, although it is beginning to be felt that tests to be successful must be constructed so as to measure the degree of harmony attained by the instinctive and emotional systems. One may be intellectually well developed, while the instinctive and emotional tendencies are relatively loosely knit together; the self is easily divided; the power of decision is lacking; and true volitional strength is absent. I have treated not a few graduates of universities, and professional men who held commanding positions, but who, when confronted with a moral issue demanding decision, or faced with some temptation arising from instinctive impulses or purely emotional systems, were as unstable as water. They were psychologically undeveloped. Given strong moral ideals, firmly held convictions, the better organized and richer intellect will

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, p. 417. The whole of chapter xvii should be carefully read.

certainly attain its goals more efficiently; but the organized intellect is no guarantee of character; the sentiments, the organized systems of our tendencies, are our character and we are morally safe only when intellect is harnessed to such ideals. Too many writers for teachers have written as though *self-realization* meant the exercise of the instincts and emotions anyhow; whereas *self-realization* is attained only when these tendencies are exercised in activities compatible with the moral and rational standards acceptable to the self. Psychological development, then, on which character, personality and happiness depend, is determined by the power of the mind to organize its psycho-physical tendencies into sentiments.

INSTINCT AND SENTIMENT.

From what has been said it can be seen that the sentiments are acquired. They are the real units of character. It is they which bring about order, consistency and stability in the inner life, and consequently in the direction of the conduct and behaviour of the individual. They not merely control the desires arising from instinctive needs, but they control the desires arising within their own systems. They are the unities towards which volition tends; and they are the content of the soul. They are enduring dispositions and must be distinguished from both instincts and emotion, though they involve both. An instinct is an innate tendency towards a comparatively narrow end connected with one or other of the two primary needs—preservation and reproduction

—and an allied emotion peculiar to itself, such as fear which accompanies the excitement of the danger instinct, or the wonder which accompanies the arousal of curiosity. A sentiment is acquired, and its end may involve the activity of a number of instincts and the experiencing of a great many emotions. Emotion is experienced as when we feel anger, fear or resentment; a sentiment is not an experienced fact but a disposition which may give rise to numberless conscious experiences. When we speak of a sentiment for the Church we mean that we have a disposition to become interested or for our attention to be spontaneously attracted when anything relating to the Church is presented to the mind. If someone in a railway carriage is speaking derogatively of the Church we shall feel anger and a tendency to combat pugnaciously his statements. The Church's progress will fill us with pleasantly toned feelings; her needs will urge us to activity; her ends will be our ends; her decline will mean our sorrow; to prove her doctrine true, our minds may enter on vast researches; on her behalf practically all our instinctive and emotional tendencies can become active. The instincts and emotions are now serving ends which transcend the ends of the organism as such. Hence Love of the Church is a sentiment and not a specific emotion. We may and do love the Church when we are experiencing no emotion whatever regarding her; just as we love our children, though they may be far from our conscious thoughts or feelings at any particular moment. This distinction between instinct, emotion and sentiment is vital

for those who would help to transmute the instinctive self into a moral and spiritual self, and that is the task of teacher, preacher and pastor; and it is vital for the understanding of the formation of character, the building-up of the soul-content, as well as for the understanding of the mal-formation and its healing. A relevant example may be given here: many children in our Sunday Schools are kept interested during the hour they are there; but once a certain age is reached they manifest no desire to continue or to enter the Church. What has happened? No Church-sentiment has been acquired; no enduring disposition has been left to modify mental structure in such a way as to elicit any interest in Church matters; or if one may not go so far, the disposition is comparatively weak and unstable, so that other interests easily inhibit any tendency to attend or join the Church. A successful school is one which is helping the child to acquire a Church-sentiment.

Another illustration will help us here: in our day-schools many subjects are taught. The 'show lesson' can help to make the teacher's work easy; but the function of the teacher is to give the child a permanent interest in the subject taught; in other words, the aim should be to help the child to acquire a permanent sentiment for the subject. It is only the subjects for which a sentiment is acquired which have a permanent influence on the use of the adolescent's and grown man's leisure. It is one thing to arouse the transitory interest, which can always be done by appealing to the child's instinctive or emotional tendencies; it is another to leave a permanent

interest or sentiment; it is the latter which is vital for life.

THE PROCESS OF SENTIMENT-FORMATION.

Shand was the first to use the term 'sentiment' to denote this form of character structure. McDougall has followed him in defining the sentiment as "an organized system of emotional tendencies centred about some object." The object may be a person, a cause, an abstract idea or ideal, such as justice, goodness or truth. On behalf of any object of a sentiment almost any one of the instincts may be aroused and emotion and activity follow, as we have seen in the case of the Church. There is no limit to the number of sentiments we may acquire; and the wider the ends, the more comprehensive the purposes involved, the richer the emotional life, and the more organized the activities. It is the lack of strong sentiments involving comprehensive ends which accounts for *ennui* and boredom; for in such a case instinctive or emotional systems, or weakly toned sentiments, alone can call out our energies or interest; and these are soon exhausted or satiated; they need to be continually stimulated by artificial means and these are not always ready to hand. There is profound psychological meaning in the old saying, "The devil finds plenty for idle hands to do."

The typical sentiments are those of Love and Hate. We can watch the sentiment growing through all the stages of intensity from mere interest and liking for some one or object to passionate attachment. We meet someone at a social evening and

are attracted by charm of manner, good looks, or some opinions expressed; the next day we find ourselves ready on the name being mentioned to experience a pleasant feeling, and it may be to say how much we enjoyed his company the previous evening. Later contact may find our feelings reciprocated, and as the acquaintance ripens, we find that we have many interests in common. We discover ourselves willing to go out of our way to do such a person a good turn; we experience anxious feelings if he is ill; resentful if anyone insults this object of our growing sentiment. We get a peculiar satisfaction in being with him; 'miss' him if he has to be absent for any length of time. We experience very pleasurable emotions at his success; we come to share his hopes, his defeats, his sorrows, indeed, make them our own. Thus grows the sentiment of friendship. Take again the love of country; it begins in simple associations of early childhood with our home, the village or town; there so many who made up our earliest human associations lived near us and satisfied the need of social activities. There, too, the first stirrings of the love of natural beauty may have come to us; there our first cultural interests, especially if the place had historical associations with great men or stirring epochs, are likely to have begun. A holiday but accentuated our feelings of love when we returned to the familiar scenes, faces and haunts. Gradually we recognized this place as part of a country with great traditions and a stirring history; and finally, as reflection proceeded, we came to confer value upon our country; for we saw it as having

given us the means of our moral life, as having provided for us 'our station and duties.' We became 'conscious of kind' with every citizen, and, it may be, identified ourselves with its welfare. Such a sentiment, when consciously recognized, may come to play a very great part in our life; the political, economic and international interests of our country may absorb us and sweep us into the currents of national life, until its social problems, its industrial prosperity, its 'place in the sun,' occupy a large part of our thought and direct not a little of our activity. If it is threatened with danger from within or without, the noblest qualities of self-sacrifice will be stirred on its behalf; its disruption, either by civil war or external oppression, will cause the deepest personal sorrow. Real patriotism is not a wave of emotion felt at odd times; it is a definite sentiment, a disposition of an enduring kind, to experience the whole gamut of feelings and activities in relation to our country. Our emotions, instincts and activities become organized round the idea of our country and everything pertaining to it; thought itself is enlisted on its behalf; and thus it becomes an object that can elicit our immediate interest and attention almost at any time.

The sentiment of hate practically organizes the same emotional systems except that the tender emotion is absent in regard to the object. It may begin as simply as the sentiment of love. The simple feeling of aversion or anger stirred by some act or word of another is sufficient to set the process moving. Someone may do us actual harm, and the resentment and fear will quickly organize the whole system of

emotions with their allied impulses towards the destruction or damage of the object, so that mere mention of the hated name is enough to make us experience fear, resentment and anger; the knowledge that the person has come by some harm will give us pleasure, and we ourselves may scheme to obstruct his advancement and to bring upon him the dislike of others.

The sentiment of hate is not merely organized towards persons any more than the sentiment of love. We may hate a political, economical, ecclesiastical or industrial system as truly as we can hate a person. We may hate the social conditions amid which so many of our fellow-citizens have to live. These 'hates' are at the basis of progress, especially when they are allied with or are the outcome of the abstract sentiments of justice, truth and beauty—the moral sentiments. The danger of all hate sentiments is that they are organized for destruction; but the destruction they bring often clears the way for the constructive sentiments of political, social, ecclesiastical freedom.

It must not be overlooked, however, that sentiments do not merely organize our energies or excite our interest towards their ends; that is, their positive function. They have the negative function of inhibiting or of attempting to inhibit all action or thought contrary to their ends. No stability of desires arising from instinctive tendencies is possible until the instinctive tendencies themselves are under the control of sentiments. When the desire arising from an instinctive tendency is generated it comes

into conflict with the more enduring and wider purposes of the sentiments and hence is controlled or even inhibited. The more closely our sentiments are organized the less chance there is for loose or isolated desires to lead us into temptation. It is through the sentiments the will operates; we can only inhibit impulses if we have a sentiment whose purpose the satisfaction of the instinctive tendency would endanger.

THE SENTIMENT OF SELF-REGARD.

It will be well here to say a word about the sentiment of self-regard, which plays such a large part in Dr. McDougall's theory of character; and we shall keep closely to his own account of it.¹

It is difficult to say when the child comes to realize that he is a self; probably between three and four years of age he comes to be able to consciously pit himself against others, and to feel his 'me-ness,' or 'I-ness.' It is in this pitting of himself against others and against the objects which thwart his desires that the consciousness of self arises. Once it has arisen, however, the idea of the self quickly grows more complex; the fact that he has a name and calls himself by that name, and hears others calling him by it, gives him a sense of the objectivity of his self; and when he realizes himself as an agent who is able to do things, plan and strive for self-conceived ends, his self-consciousness begins to play a large part in his behaviour. Though he may speak of his hands as 'mine,' it is in a more intimate way than of his

¹ *Outline*, pp. 426 ff.

toys. Naturally the persons in his immediate environment play a large part in helping him towards a conception of himself. He enjoys their approval, shrinks from their blame, begins to think of himself in the terms in which they have spoken of him; he comes to judge his acts in the light of their attitude towards those acts; he may become extremely sensitive to their praise or blame, and acts so as to get their rewards and to avoid their reproaches or ridicule.

This attitude to those in his immediate environment becomes extended as experience and reflection manifest to him that the attitude of those nearest to him in moral things is the attitude of the world at large. In the light of the judgments which he has heard, he comes to pass judgments on himself and others; he may judge himself in relation to others, and in relation to the traditions and moral code of his society. It is in this way that he builds up his idea of himself; he comes to have certain beliefs about himself; what one might call his 'status' is recognized by him and he will resent greatly if that status is not recognized by others. His instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement are formative factors here. In virtue of the first he may not merely insist on his status, but may attempt to increase it; in virtue of the latter he will feel abased if he comes short of his own idea of himself; humiliated, with a consequent feeling of having lost the respect of others if his conduct should lower him in the eyes of his group. When the self-assertive tendency makes him unduly conscious of his virtues or talents he is

likely to develop 'pride,' a 'guid conceit of himsel', as they say in Scotland; and when the superiorities (fancied or real) in which satisfactions are chiefly found, are of little value or of the body merely, he will be what we term 'vain.' Arrogance, selfish ambition, 'will-to-power,' or even megalomania may result if the self-assertive tendency is so strong as to morbidly and continually seek to compel the admiration, deference or homage of the crowd. But the sentiment of self-regard, continues McDougall, extends so as to cover everything that can be said to belong to the self, or with which the self is intimately connected. Probably there is nothing so humiliating to a woman as to be told that she has no 'taste,' either in the choice of clothes or in the arrangement of her home. Hence clothes and home may be said to be part of the self.

More closely connected with the sentiment is our family, our social groups, our Church, our profession, our club, our nation. With these we really identify ourselves; and the fact that we have always a particular sentiment for each of these groups, such as for family, Church, college, etc., complicates this sentiment of self-regard and gives it very great strength. The element of tender emotion becomes connected with all these personal values in varying degrees, becoming very strong in relation to wife, children, friends or Church. When we recognize that it is in virtue of our self-regard that we become so sensitive to public opinion, it is not difficult to see what a large part the self-regarding sentiment plays in the directing and ordering of our activities. The

self-regarding sentiment, then, includes this 'larger self.'

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SELF-REGARDING SENTIMENT.

The significance of this powerful sentiment, according to McDougall, is that it organizes all other sentiments about itself; each sentiment receives value and power, intensity and dominance according to its relation to this sentiment of self-regard. It is in virtue of this sentiment that there is organization amongst the sentiments, and it may determine the issue when two sentiments conflict, such as the sentiment for one's country and the sentiment for one's wife or children. He argues that it is this sentiment which acts as conscience, and through it the will exerts its fullest power; it is this sentiment, he thinks, that is the repressing agent in all cases of pathological repression or dissociation which lead to the psycho-neuroses. While there is reason to doubt this all-pervasive power of the self-regarding sentiment,¹ we need not deny that it plays a great and important part in the organization and control of the inner life of tendency, desire and emotion; where it is lacking a strong personality is impossible; and what kind of personality we shall build up will more or less depend on the conception of the self we shall acquire. It should be noted, however, that it is the idea of the self which is the nucleus of the sentiment of self-regard; just as it is the idea of the object which forms the nucleus of any sentiment.

¹ See above, chap. ii.

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER.

In the introduction to this chapter we spoke of the sentiments as containing our virtues and vices. There is probably no element of character so little understood or indeed so much misunderstood as the virtues and vices. Virtues and vices, as Shand has so well shown us, are not substantial or concrete things in themselves; they are qualities of the sentiments, qualities which the sentiments cultivate in attempting to realize their ends. The sentiment of love, e.g., has the tender emotion as its feeling attitude towards its object; its end is the good of the beloved object; hence altruistic elements in our behaviour towards the objects of our love sentiments. But this quality, so conspicuous in regard to the beloved object, may not be extended to other objects. Many a business man who is generous towards his wife and children, and even his Church, may be mean in regard to his employees. The sentiment of wealth or, indeed, any impersonal object does not involve the tender emotion; and thus if a man has only business relations with his employees the altruistic quality may not extend to them; if it does it will be because of some other sentiment. Each sentiment has its own peculiar emotions and tends to develop the qualities characteristic of those emotions. Such virtues or qualities of character as sincerity, loyalty, courage, and the forgiving spirit are characteristic of the love sentiments; while their opposites are invariably connected with sentiments of hate. Shand states the law thus: "Every sentiment tends to

acquire the virtues and vices that are required by its system." Many of the apparent contradictions which we meet with in men are explained by this law. Take the man with a strong self-regarding sentiment in which the self-assertive tendency overbears the balancing tendency of self-abasement. He may be exceedingly forgiving towards anyone who does him wrong as long as that wrong does not interfere with his delight in power or admiration. He will tend to be adamant towards all, however pure their motives, who attempt to lessen his power. The politician with a strong power-urge may be absolutely truthful in all things outside politics, but may scruple at no lie that will keep him in power. As Shand puts it: "Our sentiments not merely acquire the qualities which will realize their ends but they tend to reject and to repress any quality which is either superfluous or antagonistic." It is this which makes one, in the first place, suspect the authority which McDougall gives to the self-regarding sentiment. It would seem that the only safeguard against character becoming a bundle of conflicting tendencies is some strong moral tendency to which the self-regarding sentiment itself must pay homage.

Those laws regarding the qualities of character are of great importance for all concerned in the building up of the content of the soul. It would seem to be of little use to attempt to build up virtues in the young except by helping them to acquire definite sentiments which spontaneously cultivate them. To love one's country will mean the development of courage, loyalty, a sense of duty. It is difficult to

see how we could cultivate virtues or vices apart from definite concrete sentiments of which they are the qualities.

THE NEED FOR A MASTER-SENTIMENT.

Enough, then, has been said about the sentiments to give us an idea of their importance in the building of character; later we shall see how significant they are in the moral conflicts which tend to disrupt character and often lead to the psycho-neuroses. We can see how they help us to answer Professor Hocking's second question as to what we wish to make of human nature. Human nature from the beginning seeks ends; we must educate, train and legislate so as to help the individual to seek ends that are in harmony with the highest moral ideals; in other words, to help to guide the instinctive tendencies and emotional systems to become organized into those sentiments which will give the most firmly knit unity to the inner life and the most consistency to the outer conduct, to inculcate those permanent interests in pursuing which the great virtues are cultivated, and the most socially beneficial activities indulged in. But over and over this there must be kept in mind the need for a master-sentiment, a comprehensive purpose within which every sentiment may find a legitimate activity, and within which no instinct will be excluded. Sentiments in themselves will not give a strong unified character; it is the degree to which they are unified within some comprehensive end that determines the strength and stability of the personality. Such a master-sentiment will repress no aspect

of our human nature but will be able to sweep all the innate tendencies into the service of itself; so that in serving it they will realize themselves, much as a great business man sweeps into his purpose of business men and women of various ability, temperament and outlook, who, in turn, serving the purpose of their employer, truly realize whatever capacities they have. Such a sentiment will be in perfect harmony with conscience; it will be sufficiently rational to have justified itself to ourselves at least; and it will be sufficiently wide to produce an ever-increasing experience of richest emotion and fruitful activity. Such a sentiment, held with unquestioned conviction, can produce the well-balanced dispositions so characteristic of those whose behaviour is always consistent with itself, whose minds are free from neurotic conflicts, and whose lives are a never-ending source of inspiration. Such a sentiment affects the life as a whole; it is no mere end amongst other ends of the self; and it is no mere idea of the self though the idea of the self may play a legitimate part in its operation. We have a perfect illustration in our Lord's life: "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me." It was this end, this ruling sentiment, which gave steady direction to His life, which determined His true volitions, which made Him set His face towards Jerusalem, which compelled Him to drink the cup when once He realized that it was the will of God.

THE MASTER-SENTIMENT AND THE WILL.

From the psychological point of view it is through

such a sentiment the power of decision works. Will conceived psychologically is the capacity of the self to canalize its impulsive energy along the line of its decisions; and these are made in relation to an end self-imposed and self-accepted. Such an end, when stated, is in terms of general principles, for its very function is to give unity to all our instinctive and acquired ends. However many the ends are which I have made mine, they are never *me*; my personality is one; it is all my systems belonging to impulses, emotions and sentiments in unity; the *many selves are one self*. Will is the unifying principle, and it unifies in virtue of some general end wider than any particular system; it is not an entity which imposes itself on impulse, emotion and sentiment, or restrains their energy; its power lies in its capacity to direct the energy of every impulse or sentiment towards the end of the self as a whole. To quote Hobhouse: "The power of decision is what we ordinarily call the Will, and it seems to postulate a certain unity of our conative nature, and correlatively some supreme unifying principle, rule or end of action, setting out the real meaning of our life as a whole, just as any partial volition sets out the real value of the desires and impulses bearing upon its object. In reality, however, this unity is achieved with a measure of success, which varies very materially with the idiosyncrasies of the individual and with the social tradition which supplies the main outer guidance of his life. Where there is genuine religion, some supreme object or governing conception of life so rich and many-sided that smaller things find their appropriate

place under its shadow, the solution seems near. Where there is a definite and firmly held morality there is at least the means of deciding on particular issues. Even a resolute egoism or the absolute pursuit of a limited object gives some unity to life, though a gaunt and starved unity. If all such governing principles fail we have a being like Plato's 'Democratic man,' who decides one thing one moment and something contrary the next moment, and though he has Will, in the sense that he does make decisions, he cannot be said to have Will in the sense of any continuous and consistent direction. It will be seen that the function of the Will is to bring unity into our volitions . . . the characteristic of the deliberate voluntary action which distinguishes human from animal action lies in the formation of general principles of action which tend to correlate our behaviour from moment to moment with the purposes which belong to our life as a whole and to the lives of others with whom we are associated."¹

It will be seen that the master-sentiment is exceedingly important for the development of character; it is no less important in the healing of broken lives. It is through this sentiment that Will works and there can be no Will in the true sense of the term without it. Will is never a bare will; it has content, and that content is the sentiment to which all others must be subordinate. In many cases I have treated, my difficulty has not been to know what were the impulses, conscious or unconscious, which were disintegrating the soul and leading to all sorts of neu-

¹ *The Rational Good*, pp. 45-46.

rotic conflict, but to instil a comprehensive end which the self of the patient could self-impose, for such a sentiment cannot be imposed by another. The more clearly this general end is conceived the more likelihood of a stable, strong life; the intellectual and voluntary processes are at once enlisted on its behalf; in relation to it our partial ends are seen in their true light and are thus robbed of half their power. That the Will does not always prevail is due to the fact that the wider end is not clearly enough perceived or accepted 'with adequate intensity of feeling.' "Virtue is never safe until it is passionate." On the other hand, failure to realize one's conscious end may be due to unconscious complexes arising from repressed tendencies or experiences. These, however, we must leave until a later chapter.

THE NEED FOR A HEALTHY VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE.

So far we have dealt with Professor Hocking's two questions regarding original human nature and what we wish to make of it. Something must be said in answer to his third question: Can human nature be made what we wish? In other words, granted we want to transmute the instinctive self into a moral and Christian self, can human nature be so transmuted? It is here more than anywhere else that teachers, ministers, doctors and pastors fail. As we shall see when we come to the conflicts that lead to neuroticism and failure to become adjusted to realities, original human nature has been grossly mis-

understood and ethically misvalued. Though we have left far behind the cosmology prevalent in the first century, we still cling to the derogatory view of impulse and emotion, instinct and desire, which has characterized the Church through the centuries. The Augustinian view is still dominant in many circles, and those who have found difficulty in controlling the desires generated by the instinctive impulses have a tendency to impute evil to them. A wrong or inadequate view of human nature will inevitably mean a wrong conception of what we wish to make of it; and as a consequence of this wrong view we are likely to attempt to make human nature what it can never become. The 'unhappy holiness' which the psychologist sees in plenty is the outcome of wrong values of human nature and a too narrow conception of the ideal. Psychology cannot pass judgment on the moral ideals we desire to inculcate, or on the moral values the sentiments are organized to realize; but psychology can say that any view of human nature which involves the repression of elements inherent in human nature must stand condemned. Human nature as such is neither depraved nor sinful; a sinful nature is not transmitted; hereditary sin is a contradiction in terms. Sin is acquired. Instincts are not sinful; it is the desire to enjoy their pleasure irrespective of the effects on our character or on the lives of others or of obligation to God which is sinful. Our instinctive nature can become obedient to our rational ideals; indeed, as we have seen, it is the canalized energy of the instincts which the will can use for the larger purposes of the self.

Holiness is a happy state, and it cannot be realized if we are carrying on a false moral conflict due to a wrong view of our tendencies. The holy life is not one in which instinctive desires, or rather desires arising from our instinctive nature, are absent; such a life would not be holy but *empty*.

How such wrong views lead to failure in moral life we shall see in subsequent chapters, but it may be said now that much of the unhappiness in the world is due to the attempt to make human nature what it can never become. The instincts are our allies; it is through them we are able to realize our desires for the objects of our sentiments, it is their organization which makes up the sentiments and thus the content of the character and will. Self-assertion, as we have seen, may become arrogance and tyranny or megalomania; but without the instinct of self-assertion there could be no St. Pauls; the sex instinct can be exercised for debased pleasures, but without it there could have been no art; the instinct of acquisition may lie at the root of much of our industrial evils, but it is always a motive behind the desire to seek the things which gain by being shared. It is the purpose which is organizing our instinctive tendencies which must be morally evaluated, not the tendencies themselves.

CHAPTER IV

CONFLICT

THE discussion of the sentiments and Will as controlling factors in behaviour naturally leads us into the sphere of psychological, moral and spiritual conflict, and repression. Here we are in a realm familiar to all, for conflict is the lot of all. Temptation is the simplest form of moral conflict; but even in this simple form may cause severe struggles which leave their mark on the moral and spiritual life. All temptation arises in desires which are unacceptable to the conscious mind. These desires have a compulsive element in them; we attempt to banish the thought of the actions which would gratify the desires; but the desires refuse to be banished and 'against our will' they troop into consciousness ready to capture the focus of attention. The unacceptable desire may become an obsession, a 'thorn in the flesh,' a 'besetting sin.' Although we are perfectly aware of the desires which tempt us, we do often wonder why we should be so tempted inasmuch as we consciously desire and pray to be free from any impulse not in harmony with our spiritual ideals.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT.

To grasp the nature of conflict we must first realize that all conflict is 'endo-psychic'; it is within the mind itself; the conflict is always between tendencies within the self. It is never a conflict between a

man and his environment; environment is never more than the opportunity for some tendency within man to act. The desires may arise from some primary instinct which has no opportunity of a legitimate outlet, or because the instinct has never been well controlled. On the other hand, the desire may arise within a sentiment: the love of a man for his invalid wife or child; the desire to provide the means of treatment may make him an easy prey to temptations to steal. Whatever form the conflict presents to the conscious mind, the conflict itself is always between tendencies, with their resulting desires, whose ends, or goals, or motives are inconsistent with each other. It is not so much a conflict of ideas as a conflict of tendencies whose end-actions are incompatible with one another. Illustration will help us here better than abstract definition.

Take, first, illustrations of tendencies whose desires are conscious. There is the simple case of a minister or teacher who is interested in football. It happens that on the same day as there is an important Church meeting his favourite team is playing a cup-tie. The desire to see the game is strong, and the desire to fulfil his duty is also strong. Such conflict is temptation in actual being. It would probably matter little if he stayed away from the meeting and went to the football match; but it would matter a great deal to him. Unless he can absolutely repress his sense of duty, or conscience, for the time being, it is unlikely he will enjoy the game. He will find his mind wandering at every odd minute to the duty unfulfilled. Indeed, all the time he is at the

game he may do little else than wish he had gone to the meeting; whereas if he goes to the meeting he will find his mind wandering to the game and wishing he was there!

In this illustration we see desires arising from the tendency for relaxation in a pleasant form conflicting with the sentiment of duty. Both desires are conscious, and both are legitimate. Had it not been for the clashing of the dates both desires could have been legitimately satisfied. A man with a well-developed sense of duty will have little difficulty in controlling the desire for recreation, though he may regret that duty and pleasure clashed. Common as such conflicts are, they lead in most cases to nothing more than hesitation between desires.

From conflicts of that simple type it is easy to move to the more distressing conflicts in which the desires are incompatible with our moral standards. Here the conflict may be terribly severe. The offending desire or desires are conscious but immoral, and indeed the tendency from which they spring is also conscious; and a man accustomed to self-examination may be aware that he is selfish, sensual, ambitious, pleasure-loving, or whatever the tendency is that gives rise to his peculiar temptations. There is the man or woman with a strong desire to be thought somebody within the group, or who has the feeling that he or she is not esteemed enough. It is astonishing how easily such can fall into lying; not seldom the lies go so far as to damage people who happen to be more esteemed, or who stand in the way of such a person's advancement. I have had to speak

to people who found this tendency very hard to overcome, and who were perfectly conscious of the motive underlying their exaggerated stories, and their unscrupulous lying. Apart from anything touching their prestige they were generous, good people, and their sins in this other respect gave them great trouble. In many liars, however, the motive is hidden, and their sinful conduct 'rationalized.'

A very large number of our temptations here arise from the sex instinct. It is computed that the percentage of boys and adolescents who pass through a masturbating stage ¹ is very large; and the percentage of girls would probably astonish those who have never studied the question. In the vast majority of boys the self-abuse habit is realized as wrong, but the fight with it is one of the greatest mental struggles of adolescence. More severe still are temptations arising from some perversion of the instinct. A minister asked me to see a married woman whose symptoms were a feeling of utter dullness in the head, lack of concentration, severe depression at times. My questions soon revealed a very strong sex perversion. She had no normal sex feelings, and normal sex relationships excited feelings of loathing and disgust—the very feelings, in fact, which her perversion would excite in a normal person. For years she had fought fiercely to overcome her temptation; she had prayed earnestly for its removal and felt she was not asking God too much to make her

¹ See *Youth and Sex*, by Scharlieb and Sibly. Also *The Struggles of Male Adolescence*, Read.

normal. When she came to see me her faith and religious beliefs had been undermined, and prayer seemed to give neither strength nor comfort. Nevertheless she retained the hope that she would become normal. In spite of her conscious detestation of her perversion, there could be no denying the tremendous grip it had; and when she was recounting certain impulses which accompanied the perversion, I could see something of the almost fierce pleasure the perverted acts must have given her. Here we are far removed from the simple conflict between two legitimate desires which happen to clash or even from the temptations which arise in our desire to impress our group. We may be inclined to laugh at the person who is foolish enough to think that he can impress us by his tall stories, or who thinks he can displace his rival from the affections and esteem of others by unscrupulous lying. But we never laugh at the pervert; indeed, normal people experience disgust and the tendency to condemn very strongly anyone with a perverted tendency. In this woman, as in all perverts, the conflicting desires were both conscious: the desire for the pleasure which accompanied the perverted act, and the intense desire to be normal, strengthened by her own instinctive disgust. The fact, too, that she had a fear lest her growing daughter should learn of her failing intensified the conflict. Her symptoms were easily explained. The attempt to repress the tendency accounted for the dull headache, and energy expended unsuccessfully in combating the desire when in consciousness would account for the lack of concentra-

tion. The severe depression preceded a fall, and then remorse followed it. In cases of masturbation we are often presented with the same kind of symptoms. The important thing to note here is that both desires are conscious but incompatible; they lead to opposite moral goals.

There is another type of conflict, however, in which the motives are hidden from the conscious mind; or, if 'hidden' is too strong a word, then 'masked.' It is this type of conflict which leads to what is popularly called 'nerves,' or to kinds of behaviour which the friends of the unfortunate victim, as well as his minister or doctor, cannot understand. Not seldom the mental distress is accompanied by physical symptoms, and this often helps to mislead doctor and minister as to the real cause of the trouble. Sometimes the conflict issues in vague feelings of anxiety, a tendency to depression, restlessness or sleeplessness; often, however, definite conscious impulses to do wrong are present, although they may never be mentioned except to someone whom the patient can take into his or her confidence. From very recent cases I have seen I take the following: murderous impulse towards his wife, and in the same person an almost irresistible impulse to suicide to save him from harming his wife. Another informs me that until he came to me he had a strong impulse to take anyone he met by the shoulders and force them down. "I knew," he says, "it was wrong and irrational, but it caused me endless struggle." One poor woman had the impulse to take the lives of her children, and indeed had reached the stage when

she felt that God was commanding her to do it. A graduate of one of our universities had to struggle against a tendency to assault sexually the first woman he met. Yet, apart from this tendency and its accompanying symptoms, he was as fine a young man as one would wish to see in the Master's service. The outline of a specific case will be more helpful than the enumeration of symptoms.

I was asked to see a young teacher who was very anxious to get his certificate, but could not concentrate on his work. There were various neurasthenic symptoms—restlessness, continuous headache, and the usual depression—which was put down to his inability to work for his examination. As a teacher he was unable to enforce discipline and this worried him greatly. When I went more deeply into his symptoms I found that he had once or twice succumbed to an impulse to go to London; but he had no idea as to why he had wished to go. He was exceedingly irritable with his father. Curiously enough, although he found it impossible to concentrate on books connected with his examination, he could read for hours on psychology and remember what he read.

Here only one set of motives was clear to consciousness—the motive to recover his health, to regain the power of work. As one talked over all his troubles with life, the hidden tendencies came to light. He had a certain physical impairment which was rather obvious, and this, as Dr. Adler has well shown, leads to a fear of being thought inferior, and not seldom an over-compensating self-assertive tend-

ency in behaviour—a tendency which was very obvious in this case. Not a little of his desire to read all sorts of stuff was the outcome of this motive—what better way to compensate for his impairment than a display of knowledge? To go deeper still, the lad was psychologically fixated on his mother; there was a strong tendency to regress to the state of dependence. There was a history of masturbation and of frustrated sex excitement. The impulse to set off to London at a moment's notice with no clear idea as to the object of the journey revealed clearly the strong sex repression which lay behind a great deal of his trouble. He had once been accosted in Piccadilly and was strongly impelled to let himself go; the desire was never faced, it was repressed; indeed, he had forgotten almost entirely the incident, as was now manifest in the irrational impulse to set off to London in times of depression.

Here we have motives hidden from consciousness: the strong promiscuous sex desires were entirely hidden, as was the fixation on the mother; his very great irritability was the outcome of his inferiority complex (those with an inferiority complex are always exceedingly 'touchy') and was accentuated by his repressed sex.

This young man gave a very delightful display of the 'unconscious motive' during analysis. After I had helped him to realize his various unconscious motives—his sense of inferiority, his sex interest, his desire to be dependent—and his various neurasthenic symptoms had all but disappeared, I reminded him that his cure and future now lay in his own hands,

and he alone could settle whether these motives were to be his dominating interests or whether he would choose motives likely to make him into a man. Neither minister nor psychotherapist can make moral decisions for others. I had pointed out ways in which certain of his tendencies could be redirected and sublimated, and naturally attempted to guide him towards some kind of social or church work. About a month afterwards he came to see me with a whole list of objections to creeds, ministers, and churches. I recognized that these were 'rationalizations,' produced by motives which were still active. Unconsciously to himself he was producing *good* reasons, but not the *real* reasons against the religion which placed restraints upon the uncontrolled direction of impulse and emotion.

THE NEED OF CARE IN THE USE OF THE TERM 'UNCONSCIOUS.'

Without entering into the meaning of the unconscious at this stage, I must warn my readers against too wide a use of the term 'unconscious.' It would be more accurate to speak of the motives in the last patient, or some of them, as 'masked' from the conscious mind. The real motives underlying his symptoms and behaviour were not *repressed* sufficiently to become *dissociated* from consciousness, but enough to allow him to accept a *rationalized* account of his behaviour. The nearest to 'unconscious,' in the true sense of the term, was the motive to run to London and the refusal to face responsibility arising from his fixation on his mother. On the whole his motives

were obscure, unrecognized, and then became disguised by the rationalizing process. There are, however, motives which are wholly unconscious, and which produce behaviour and symptoms which would never lead the patient to suspect the presence of such motives; indeed, an individual may use his symptoms to prove he has not the motives. Where a sex tendency is entirely repressed, e.g. there will be no sex desire as such; there may be anxiety or physical symptoms which wholly absorb the patient's conscious mind. At present it is enough to recognize that in the great number of people with 'peculiarities,' as, e.g. touchiness, nerves, neurasthenic symptoms, or purely physical symptoms which have no organic basis, the motives behind their troubles are hidden and disguised rather than truly unconscious. Repressing forces are at work to keep the motives or tendencies from consciousness, and to the degree in which they are successful the motives become unconscious. It is the repression, rather than the conflict, which gives rise to neurotic symptoms; energy is used up in keeping the offending tendencies from consciousness; hence the lassitude so characteristic of neurasthenics. The attention seems to be drawn involuntarily towards tendencies which are not successfully repressed, or concentrated on the symptoms, and thus we have the explanation of the lack of power to concentrate on the ordinary interests of life. All this, however, will be better understood later.

ORIGIN OF OUR CONFLICTS.

Although conflict is the lot of all, and some seem

to have much greater difficulty in winning a truly unified life than others, nevertheless our conflicts need not undermine our physical, mental or spiritual health, or religious faith. The work of minister and pastor is to help his people to recognize the motives at work in their conflicts, and to assist them in fighting them. This is no new task for the Church; always she has insisted on some degree of self-examination, and the appeal of many devotional books is simply that they do help to make clear to our minds, and give expression to tendencies and desires which we too easily push into the background of the mind. It is not the conflict we have to fear, nor the motives; it is the mind's unconscious tendency to repress whatever is distasteful or unpleasantly toned. "It is doubtful," says McDougall, "whether conflict without repression can give rise to a condition that may be properly called one of neurotic disorder." It is for that reason, I suspect, that he insists so strongly in his latest volume on the need for a healthy self-criticism as the best safeguard from neurotic trouble. From my experience I should say that in many cases, one incurable, there would have been no illness had this self-criticism been exercised. It may be painful to admit that one has dispositions which involve certain types of temptation, that one has indeed fallen far short of the glory of our Lord, again and again; but only along the lines of such acknowledgment does mental health lie. The worst forms of functional mental disorder arise from a repressed conscience. Hence my insistence on the minister and pastor helping his people to see

their conflicting motives in their true light; and hence the need to help them to resolve their moral conflicts along lines which will make for spiritual health. It was Jonathan Edwards who hazarded the remark that he found that his most successful sermons were those which dwelt on the benefits of the Gospel rather than its duties. One would not contend that the duties of the Gospel should be minimised, but sermons in which our congregations see something of the nature of the conflicts which disturb their faith and peace, sermons which show them how their conflicts can be met by the Gospel will produce an attitude in which responsibilities become privileges. Many of our best (from the intellectual point of view) sermons fail, because they are irrelevant to the conflicts which are absorbing the thought and energy of our people. Conversely, the crude sermon has often been effective because it helped some soul to realize his conflict and to face and resolve it. The conflicts of our people are psychological rather than intellectual; their conflicts are neither conflicts of ideas nor opinions, but conflicts of tendencies striving towards opposite goals of behaviour and satisfaction.

If we turn now to the origin of the conflicts which lead to temptation we find it to lie in desires arising from specific tendencies whose satisfaction is unacceptable to the conscience, or which would reduce our status in the group because the particular behaviour is contrary to the conventions or moral standards of our group. Just because our instinctive tendencies are the means whereby the needs of the

organism are satisfied, their satisfactions produce a maximum of pleasure by relieving the organism of tension. We may, as we have seen, desire that pleasure. The tendencies themselves are dynamic, and enter consciousness as impulses and may thus generate desire and thought. The organism must be preserved, the race must be continued, the individual must maintain himself in society. We cannot help seeking those ends; man, however, cannot satisfy his tendencies anyhow. The self is more than its instincts or sentiments. The instincts in themselves cannot explain conflict. Any of the gregarious animals can show the same three needs, at least some gregarious animals show a fairly strong tendency to maintain status in the group, and all show the other needs with allied instincts. Nevertheless neurotic conflict is not characteristic of animals; they show no signs of repression. There must be other elements in our make-up whose function it is consciously to control our instinctive and emotional tendencies, else conflict and repression could not arise. We have already seen that in man there is the need for moral and rational unity; organic control is as far as the animal can get; moral and rational control is as innate in man as his instinctive tendencies. Man is not satisfied to preserve the self; it is a definite kind of self, a moral self, a self in conscious relation to society that he attempts to maintain. As Freud found when he brought back lost memories in those who had failed to become adjusted to the realities of life, those memories were always accompanied by painful emotions; and the painfulness mostly

depended on the fact that they were incompatible with the patient's moral or æsthetic standards. Just because there are elements in man, dynamic in nature, making for the moral control of his tendencies and desires, conflict is inevitable.

THE HERD INSTINCTS AND CONFLICT.

It must not be overlooked that the standards by which conscience attempts to co-ordinate and regulate our desires and behaviour are derived from our society. There is no innate standard. In virtue of our suggestibility we accept the moral standards of our group, and in virtue of our tendency to maintain our status in the group there is an inhibitory impulse against disobeying the standards. Hence it is not wrong, from the psychological point of view, to see conflict as originated by the so-called Herd Instinct. That instinct determines that we shall be gregarious, i.e. that we shall not be comfortable outside of the group. But it involves a much stronger tendency, or rather one that has much to do with our conflicts, namely, that we shall seek its warm approval, its recognition, its rewards, its good opinion. It must not be construed, however, as if some external pressure was brought to bear upon us to conform to its standards. The pressure is endo-psychic. The tendencies to be *in* the group and *of* the group have been evolved in the interests of the need to maintain our status in the group. It is an inner pressure that is brought to bear upon us to conform to group standards, for we instinctively fear its disapproval or condemnation. When those standards have been

rationally accepted and incorporated into the content of conscience the pressure exerted is exceedingly strong; hence the innumerable conflicts between the strong self-preservative and sex instincts and this inward pressure of the herd instincts. In war-time the conflict between the need for preservation and that of maintaining the approval of the herd resulted in severe functional disorders in many soldiers. But the behaviour occasioned by this tendency is just as obvious in peace-time. To gain the good opinion of our group we assent to its opinions; we wear the dress fashion prescribes; we gaily repress conscience in order to sin its sins; and there is probably no day on which we are not tempted in some manner to repress our individual judgment in deference to our social circle; and indeed by the process of rationalization we may convince ourselves that its opinions are correct. Not seldom the exception proves the rule here. Many who seem to flout the conventions of society in dress and opinion are but unconsciously driven to eccentricities and idiosyncrasies in order to attract the attention of the group. Not every young woman who smokes her cigarette enjoys it; not every young man who takes his cocktail likes the taste of it. Many cannot face the position of the odd man out.

It is mostly in adolescence that this tendency to be *of the herd* leads to conflict. The youth enters college or factory with the ethical and religious ideals of his religious home; but he has also the desire to gain the approval of his college chums, workmates or social circle into which his new circumstances have

thrown him. When in Rome there is a strong tendency to do as Rome does. It is here he may expect his first temptations to drink, to break loose from church associations. Quite unconscious of his motives he will find *good* reasons as to why there is no harm in a drink; he will argue that he can spend his time more profitably outside the Church than in it; he will quickly find that his old-fashioned parents were narrow in their views of religion and morality. If his aim is to be the centre of the group, he may go to any length. I have seen not a few who have developed a neurosis through the repression of ideals, strongly held in early adolescence, for the sake of winning the applause and approval of the group. Much older people may tamper with the ideals of a lifetime to gain an entrance to a 'new set'; and not a few get 'nerves,' to say nothing of financial trouble by attempting to keep up a social position which is beyond their means. It is nearly impossible to over-estimate the pressure of this innate tendency. One of the most interesting of the young men I have treated was a graduate who sacrificed much of his moral and spiritual views of life to win social and debating distinction at one of the ancient universities. He did win these 'prizes,' but at the price of a very serious breakdown and a tendency to indecision which nearly ruined his career. When we remember that society provides the means of all our satisfactions, it is not to be wondered at that this tendency to win its approval at any price is so strong.

Its pressure, however, is seen best in its restraining

influence on the strong acquisitive and sex tendencies. We shrink from its displeasure, and fear its ostracism, and thus we are held from many anti-social acts, although not from anti-social desires.

Now in regard to no other tendency in man is social opinion so strong in its restraints as that of sex. From the very earliest times the exercise of this instinct has been surrounded by taboos, customs, special rites. The result is that it is subject to more repression than any other tendency; and when we remember that its repression has had religious sanction behind it we shall understand the more easily the place it occupies in any discussion of the conflicts and repressions which lead to a failure to become adjusted to life. It is by no means necessary to accept the Freudian interpretation of the sex tendency in order to give it the primary place in the factors leading to repression and conflict. In the great majority of the psycho-neuroses and in practically all neurasthenic or anxiety cases, as well as in those who find sanctification no easy process, a sexual root will be found. I should hesitate to give the wide definition of sex which Professor Freud has seen fit to give, but it is more than we mean by love and is not to be identified with lust. I doubt also whether the phenomena of infantile sexuality lead to all the later repressions; but whatever interpretation we give to the facts there can be no doubt sexual activities of childhood wrongly dealt with by parents can lead to neurotic and character disturbance which may be very serious and painful in later years. Morbid sex curiosity of later years which has humiliated many a

strong man is nearly always due to a fixation of this instinct on sex in early years. In any case we must not forget that even McDougall, one of the most conservative writers on the relation of infantile sexuality to morbid disturbances of character and health of later years, admits that *we have much positive evidence that the sexual instinct first awakens in the majority of mankind about the eighth or ninth year.* Whatever the ultimate interpretation of the sex instinct may be, there can be no doubt of the driving power of this tendency in man. "The strong impulse of the sex instinct," says McDougall, "is a primary fact of our innate constitution—i.e. like every instinct, the sex instinct of man involves as its most essential constituent a strong tendency or impulse to bodily and mental activity, a conative disposition, a strong spring of psycho-physical energy."¹ This driving power has been strengthened by the unnatural repression to which it has been subjected on every hand. That the instinct must be trained, refined, controlled, and modified to meet the conditions of modern civilized life, and indeed of any kind of social life, is self-evident; but is it not one of the tragedies of life that the following quotation from Dr. Yellowlees is profoundly true: "The immense majority of children, at the time when puberty is reached, have had it firmly and indelibly impressed upon them that the whole matter of sex is something only to be spoken of or thought of covertly and in the absence of parents and teachers"?² When we

¹ *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, Appendix I.

² *Manual of Psychotherapy*.

remember that it is the creative instinct, *par excellence*, the basis of sexual love, and in its sublimated forms the driving power behind a great deal of art, scientific and philanthropic activity, surely we should see it not merely as linking us with the animals but with the Creator. Fortunately this state of matters is changing; but much needs to be done if this dynamic tendency in our nature is to be seen in its true perspective, and its energy used in the higher interests of personality. To impress on the minds of our young people that these perfectly natural tendencies are shameful and wicked, and that sexual relationships are an unfortunate necessity of married life, is to undermine the happiness of the marriage relation; it is to give them a false sense of guilt and fear which will inevitably discolour their whole view of life. The sex instinct has not merely a biological function; psychologically it generates the tender emotion between husband and wife; and its natural and legitimate functioning does far more than the parental instinct to bind the husband to wife and children. I have had the doubtful privilege of looking into the relationship of many married people; in the great majority of cases there would have been no cleavage, no unhappiness had the woman had a sensible view of sex relationships. Many a woman has broken down because of a false sense of shame regarding them; while many a man who really loved his wife has drifted because the instinct never received psychological satisfaction—a statement which is true of the woman also, though unsatisfied sex in her case more often leads to an anxiety neu-

rosis than marital unfaithfulness. In the psychology of marriage, sane, healthy sex relationships are of the first importance. I have never yet seen an unhappy marriage where these relationships have been normal, and where they were love acts, in which the wife was wooed.

SELFISHNESS.

It should be noted that although sex and herd instincts may be prostituted for selfish ends, they are means to a richer social life for the individual and a stable life for the community. Biologically the end of the sex instinct is social or altruistic, and in its interests the parental instincts have been evolved. From the psychological point of view these instincts give outlet to our energy and in doing so result in intense pleasure which, as the instincts become fixated on wife and children, give rise to sentiments which in turn mean happiness. In the same way the herd instincts are essentially social; they are the first innate movements towards the social whole we call society—society, which in turn provides the means of the moral life of the individual. As the individual develops the corporate mind and attitude he does not leave behind him his instincts; their activity becomes hallowed; the self grows by being socialized. But here lies temptation. As we contribute to social ends the warm approval of our fellow-men is given, and we may seek social ends for the warm approval of the herd instead of for their own sakes. The herd instinct first makes us seek the warm approval; but as intelligence and the need of moral

unity become stronger we should grow up and come to evaluate those ends for their own sakes. If we remain in an infantile attitude to sex and society, seeing both as means to our own pleasure in the one case and means to our own aggrandisement in the other, selfishness inevitably results, and personality, which is always a blending of individuality with sociality, is impossible. Such a person who sees sex or society as a means to his personal gratifications comes to be in love with himself. His wife and family he will never see except in relation to his own desires; social responsibilities he will avoid except in so far as they minister to his own selfish ends. This selfishness can become pathological. The desire to win the approval and rewards of the herd may make us ambitious, selfishly ambitious, unless this natural tendency is socialized. From the moral point of view and from the point of view of the development of personality, there is no safety until we develop the passion to be praiseworthy. As McDougall ¹ has very finely pointed out, ambitions, in spite of all they have done to forward mankind's progress, are always dangerous, as their motive is always to win the praise of the group; an ambition is only safe for the growing youth when it is harnessed to an ideal whose essential driving power is the desire to be praiseworthy whether he wins the praise of men or not. This is where many break down. Unconsciously driven to win the praise of men, many an individual has gone into public activities; but when instead of receiving gratitude he received

¹ *Character and the Conduct of Life*, p. 60.

ingratitude, criticism instead of praise, he has become soured, cynical, or pessimistic, and always unhappy.

In a similar way we get the explanation of much 'vanity' and unhappiness among women. Innate in the growing adolescent girl is *the desire to be desired*; it lies behind the interest in dress and personal appearance which appears at puberty; it is connected with the unconscious urge to maternity; it lies behind some of the most delightful characteristics of young women; and when uncontaminated by consciousness and furthered by natural beauty, produces the charming, chaste and modest woman. But the interest in personal appearance may come to absorb both the maternal and sex energy and direct it towards that end. The result will be a woman who is sexually anæsthetic and maternally deficient; it is her appearance she desires her husband to love, not herself; but the marriage relations, as can be easily surmised, are never happy; her husband's natural advances will be considered 'cruel,' lustful and wrong. There is no remedy here but to help her to understand what has happened.

Apart from this pathological side of self-love, the desire to be desired leads many girls and women into temptation. I have had two cases recently. One woman was married to a husband lacking in all the finer courtesies and demonstrations of love which a woman loves. When he was kind and considerate, she knew what he was wanting. She was one of the best of mothers, had sacrificed much to give her three children a good chance in life. When her minister asked me to see her she complained of

depression, anxiety and sometimes a fear of insanity. It was only after months that I got to the root of the trouble, so strong were her resistances. A man whose wife was ill and for whom she had done many kindnesses began to play upon her feelings by subtle hints which appealed to this desire to be desired. Never for a moment did she realize where flattering words might lead her; she was somebody to someone. But one day he made sexual advances and at first she gave no resistance; but quickly she recovered herself before any real wrong was done.

I was asked to see a young married woman who had suffered from sleeplessness and loss of interest in things. I found that she thought her husband neglected her a good deal. When I got to the deeper causes it was to find that she had married on the rebound from a disappointment from an early love affair. She had never really been able to give herself to her husband, although she had borne him three children. Her rather sad and plaintive countenance attracted apparently a man who was accustomed to be strolling through the park while she was taking the children for a walk. He got into conversation with her, got to know some of her married difficulties. She felt drawn and yet feared for she had been well brought up. One day, however, he went so far as to steal a kiss and the whole tendency of her *libido* was turning towards him, when the symptoms sent her to me. I helped her to understand what was happening; how, in all probability, because she had still hungered at first for the early lover she had been unable to give herself to her hus-

band, and to him would appear 'cold.' She very quickly responded to analysis, and when I last saw her it was with difficulty I recognized her, so changed in appearance, in smartness and in the happy look of her face. The first case, however, has responded but slowly to analysis. Fortunately the depression and anxiety yield; but no one can lift the shadow on her soul resulting from the memory of how near she was to unfaithfulness. It is a lifelong tragedy when we cannot forgive ourselves. The real preventive here is to help the young growing girl to cultivate the *desire to be desirable*. Just as the ambitious youth must go farther and make his own the ideal that will make him praiseworthy, so the young woman must cultivate the ideals which shall make her desirable. This is not a matter for the psychologist, and psychotherapy fails; it needs to be supplemented by the pastor, the teacher in moral training. It is not enough to condemn sex aberrations, selfishness, or the sins committed under the impulse to win a place in our group, as wicked; we must go farther and help the unfortunate to understand what has happened; and then, by instilling unquestioned ideals help them to cultivate the psychological functions through which we grow up. All failure, whether it results in open sin, neuroticism, or simply indifference to the higher reaches of life, is failure to grow up. Instincts need control, and direction in the interests of the personality as a whole; they must get outlet either in a natural or sublimated form, otherwise there will be conflict leading to failure to win a will, personality and hap-

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piness. Later we shall consider the more difficult conflicts which lead to functional disorder; enough now if we realize that the conflicts which make the spiritual growth hard for many who would be called normal are the outcome of conflicting tendencies whose goals are opposite and whose behaviour the conscience cannot co-ordinate or regulate.

Nevertheless we must be careful to note that though the incompatible desires originate in our instinctive tendencies, it is the self which is in conflict; it is the self that becomes divided; it is the self which is tempted. The self does not stand outside the conflict as a spectator; it is because the self recognizes the incompatible motives as its own that the distressful emotions are possible. It is perfectly true that the unfortunate victims of impulses or habits which are contrary to society's standards are afraid of the opinion of the group; but that does not account for their inner shame; the inner struggle to overcome their impulses. The herd instinct does no more than account for the fact that there is a tendency to inhibit tendencies which are contrary to social standards; it helps us to restrain, or modify, these tendencies to meet modern conditions, but it is not itself the repressing factor. We must never lose sight of the fact that it is the self which is in conflict and which is the repressing agency.

CONFLICT AND 'PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES.'

So far we have been discussing the conflicts arising from the difficulty of controlling the tendencies which give rise to desires and impulses incompatible with

our conscience. These tendencies are *particular* tendencies which are aroused by definite situations. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have concerned themselves almost exclusively with the elucidation of these particular tendencies, their repression, their aberration, and sublimation. Without belittling for a moment the importance of these tendencies, or the contribution to the science of behaviour which their study has made, we soon find that something more is needed if we are to understand mental conflict and the failure to win a character and personality on the part of many. There is great need for concentrated study of the *psychic individual as a whole*. We may know that a man has an inferiority complex, a sex complexity, or a herd complex; and we know how these will make him react to particular situations in which they function; but what is the man's fundamental psychology? How does he react as a whole to life? One may react to a particular situation in an infantile way, and yet react to all other situations in a perfectly normal manner. On the other hand we find many who react to life as a whole in a perfectly infantile way, and we can predict how they will react to any situation. We meet definite types of individuals as well as definite types of complexes. The ancients recognized this when they attempted to classify individuals as sanguine, melancholic, phlegmatic, or choleric. This classification has long been considered inadequate, although it is not even now altogether useless. It was a real attempt to understand the individual as a whole.

It is this problem, the problem of types, which Dr. Jung has done so much to bring to the notice of psychologists, and to which a real contribution has been made by Dr. Beatrice Hinkle, in her volume, *The Re-creating of the Individual*. We must never forget that each individual is peculiarly unique. Physically, physiologically, and psychologically, he may, by analysis, be reduced to the same components, but the integration and the reaction of the individual as a whole is peculiar to himself. A man's failure to become adjusted to reality may be the outcome of a failure in his psychology as a whole; his failure to control his particular tendencies, to direct their energy towards objects and interests which unify his life, may be due, not to the strength or repression of any particular tendency, but to a weakness in the inner unifying principle of his being. General Smuts, in his *Holism and Evolution*, has called attention to the need for a 'science of personality,' a science which will take account of the analytical contributions of psychology, the researches of endocrinology, and other human sciences; but the personality, as a whole, which reacts as a whole, is a study by itself. He says: "It will be found that each Personality is a psychic biological organism, an individual whole, with its own curve of development, and its own series of phases of growth."¹

I cannot but think that the deeper study of the personality as a whole will be by far the most fruitful advance of psychological science, and the most helpful for educationist, social reformer and min-

¹ Chapter x.

ister. What has militated against the acceptance of psycho-analytical methods and theory is not so much the emphasis on sex as the sole driving power of the individual, but the feeling in most of us that, granted we have the complexes which the psychoanalyst sees in every dream and symptom, we are more than our complexes. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are very largely empirical; they follow the fatal method of medicine through the centuries. Hence one welcomes the contributions of Jung and Hinkle to this fascinating side of psychology, as they throw light not merely on the incidents, repressions and experiences which make life difficult for so many, but the nature of personality itself. As the integrating element of personality becomes better understood, as we work synthetically as well as analytically, our science of human nature will become synthetic and thus the basis of ethical thought, and possibly a new approach to the metaphysic of the soul.

One thing is certain: psychological science cannot stand on a purely objectively determined individual; and this is where psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are at the present time. To them, as Dr. Baynes has well pointed out: ¹ "Man is nothing but a *singe rate*, a mere mechanism that gets out of order, and by an appropriate use of the correct method can be put right again." In the long run it is not what happens to us that matters but how we react to our experiences. What is it that determines the way in which we react? What do we mean when we say that an

¹ See his introduction to Dr. Jung's *Psychological Types*.

individual has failed to become adapted to reality? Surely we can only mean that the prospective aim of personality has been obstructed, has failed to realize itself, and neurotic illness has manifested itself as a result. The creative urge in the individual must not be construed in biological terms merely; man strives for more than the expression of *libido sexualis*; the driving forces of his being cannot be reduced to a seeking of the crude biological satisfactions. If we could not find a deeper interpretation, then, indeed, we should be at a loss to explain conflict, for that is only possible if there is more than a regressive tendency in the individual. Man innately seeks to achieve individuation, to co-ordinate and regulate the various elements in his being, to create not merely offspring but a personality. It is in creating that personality that as by-products we get his creations in art, science, philosophy and religion. When this prospective aim of his personality is balked, there is regression, and thus a failure of character; if this regressive tendency is obstructed by the dynamic urge to completeness, or personality, then may follow the neurotic breakdown, but always conflict.

To discuss the problems implied in the last paragraph would lead us too far afield. We must be satisfied to see something of the psychology of the individual as a whole, to see the individual reacting as a whole according to his type of psychology. It is their type of psychology which creates the problems of many, their difficulties in personal relationships and in becoming adapted to reality.

INTROVERT AND EXTRAVERT.

Jung and Hinkle have attempted to classify individuals according as to whether they have a tendency to go out to the world of objects and external affairs or whether they tend to become preoccupied by their own thoughts and emotions. We are all familiar with the shy, moody, self-conscious individual, easily upset, and with a tendency to withdraw from participation in affairs. He does not easily go out of himself, is afraid to let himself go; he generally thinks before he acts. In the realm of thought such *introverts* are more occupied with general principles, with the construction of *a priori* principles than with the observation of phenomena; in the realm of behaviour they are of the calm and collected kind unless they have to face situations which demand extraverted action. They are apt to see and feel about the external world as it ought to be rather than it is. Theories rather than facts, feelings rather than actions occupy them; their feelings do not easily pass into activities. They react to their thoughts or their feelings rather than objective realities. They are apt to feel out of it when in a crowd, apt to be morbidly self-conscious, and thus to experience a sense of inferiority.

The extravert, on the other hand, becomes dominated by the external object. He never gets out of touch with the objective world; his personal relations are easy; he quickly adapts himself to his company; and, as a rule, has no difficulty in acquiring interests in the external world. Because of his

adaptability he is the 'practical man,' the opportunist, the intuitionist, who reacts to the objective problems at once. The introvert must think things over; his own views, or his feelings, seem to interpose between him and the external situation. The extravert reacts wholly to the object; the introvert reacts to his thoughts, his subjective values, or his feelings. It is not that the introvert is slower in his thought, but his thought always carries him away from the immediate situation; the extravert seldom goes beyond immediate consequences, and is, as a rule, prepared to take a risk that the introvert would fear. The extravert is always orientated by the object; the introvert by his thoughts or feelings. A quotation from Jung may make the distinction clearer: "In the one case an outward movement of interest toward the object, and in the other a movement away from the object towards the subject and his own psychological processes. In the first case the object works like a magnet upon the tendencies of the subject; it is therefore an attraction that to a large extent determines the subject. It even alienates him from himself; his qualities may become so transformed, in the sense of assimilation to the object, that one could imagine the object to possess an extreme and even decisive significance for the subject. It might almost seem as though it were an absolute determination, a special purpose of life or fate that he should abandon himself wholly to the object.

"But in the latter case, the subject is and remains the centre of interest. It looks, one might say, as though all the life energy were ultimately seeking

the subject, thus offering a constant hindrance to any overpowering influence on the part of the object. It is as though energy were flowing away from the object, as if the subject were a magnet which would draw the object to itself.”¹

Dr. Hinkle illustrates the two types by contrasting the extraverted Roosevelt, and the introvert Woodrow Wilson; there could not be a better illustration: “Contrary to Roosevelt’s warm responsiveness and quick action, Wilson is slow in action, with a famous policy called ‘watchful waiting.’ He is not in direct contact with the object, but draws it towards him to consider it carefully and abstractly before committing himself. He is called unemotional and cold, is unable to pick men, and fails to grasp the all-around facts of a situation. On the other hand, he can construct an international and world vision or a religious philosophical theory; he is a student and thinker, but when action is demanded of him he is found lacking in the power his theories would lead one to expect. He has referred to himself as having a single-track mind, meaning that when his thought is occupied with one idea he cannot easily adjust it to include another and, having once thought out a path of action, he must unswervingly follow it, no matter what new aspect of the situation arises which demands a change or a quick adjustment. . . .”


I may complete Dr. Hinkle’s account by quoting the succeeding paragraph: “In another way we may say briefly that the extravert puts the accent on the object, and the introvert on the ego or subject.

¹ *Psychological Types*, p. 11 f.

The extravert grasps the actual situation and, feeling his way, acts according to the demand of the time. The introvert thinks in and about, as it were, able to act effectively only after a fully worked-out line of procedure in which the subject is first and the object is second. He normally waits to be attacked before he can satisfactorily take action.”¹

It must not be thought for a moment that the extravert does not or cannot think; on the contrary he does think and thinks quickly, but his thought is determined by the object or situation, not by subject-values or principles to which the object or situation must be made to conform.

These illustrations, however, give us what we may call the simple types. There are many gradations between the simple extravert and simple introvert. We all have the capacity to extravert or introvert, and indeed most use both capacities. Hence Dr. Hinkle modifies Dr. Jung's classification by distinguishing between the subjective, objective and emotional types of both sexes. Altogether she distinguishes six types which she diagrammatically represents thus:



Reproduced from *The Re-creating of the Individual*,
by Dr. B. M. Hinkle.

¹ *The Re-creating of the Individual*, chap. v.

I cannot do better than quote her descriptions: "I have called the subjective persons *subjective extraverts* when the major movement of the libido is outward towards the periphery, towards the object; and *emotional introverts* when the major movement is inward towards the centre, the ego. In the name 'subjective' extravert I express the distinguishing attitude which separates this type from the simple extravert whose conscious interest is turned wholly to the outer world and its objects and who is but dimly aware of the subjective factor. Likewise, I use the name 'emotional' introvert in the same way to emphasize the particular quality which distinguishes this type from the simple introvert, whose behaviour and manner are noticeably lacking in outward emotional expression and impulse.

"The distinction in behaviour and character traits between the subjective and objective groups of the same main type is so great as often to be more apparent than the distinction between the extravert and introvert, and hence, from a descriptive point of view, I refer to these groups as the subjective and objective types. In each of the subjective types is found something of the nature of both extravert and introvert with an alternating centripetal and centrifugal movement of the libido, first one and then the other predominating. This tendency produces a marked instability and duality in the psychic organism, for, since the subjective functions and attitudes play the dominant rôle, there is difficulty in obtaining a true perspection of the outer reality." "The objective types, dividing them as I divide the others

according to the dominating mechanism of extraversion or introversion, are the absolute antitheses of the subjective types. They possess little or no differentiation of the subjective functions of feeling and intuition, but are limited to the simple sense perception of things, apperception playing a minor rôle, and are quite unaware that values exist of which they have no comprehension."

These quotations and the diagram will show that it is no easy matter to classify individuals; and yet we are all aware of the broad distinctions between the extravert and introvert, the subjective types and objective types. The world looks differently to each; the pure types are at a great loss to understand each other, and when working together soon find themselves in absolute opposition; it is not that they approach the same problem from different points of view; the problems are different! Their worlds are to a large extent different, and under the strain of trying to accommodate themselves to each other or their environment they break down, feel they are failures, and lose heart. Imagine an introvert woman married to an extravert man! It is this problem of type psychology which explains so much of the heart-break of ministers and probably not a few of the breakdowns among them. The same thing explains the difficulty some parents have with their children; the introvert child is likely to be quieter, and is encouraged in that which is his danger; whereas the extravert, always wanting to be active, may by unreasonable parents be curbed too much; hence disobedience or resentment on the part

of the child, which may become unconscious and then assert itself when older. There is the auctioneer who wants his introvert son to take up his profession; the minister who will have his son take up a university career when his extraversion leads him the other way. The problem of education is not, as so many think, a mere matter of getting the instincts exercised; that is part of the problem, although the obvious part; education should help the growing child to become adapted to reality not merely by the function of sensation, or feeling, or thought alone; all should be functioning.

It is when middle-age comes that the lack of these functions are felt most, although they may cause problems and difficulties long before. But at middle-age the introvert and subjective type may begin to feel that their life is inadequate; they find it difficult to make contacts with people; they get out of touch with moving reality and external affairs. Depression, moodiness, irritability, and, as a rule, an inclination to be selfish set in; there is an inner instability which makes them uncertain and which often drives them into all sorts of difficulties and maladaptations; and all sorts of functional symptoms may result.

The objective types, on the other hand, present as difficult a problem. Unpleasant experiences have to be faced; responsibilities, which cannot be shirked or passed by on the other side, have to be met; and the thought and feeling functions are now needed. But this is just the sphere in which the extravert is not at home; where action can meet the situation he

is in his element; but when the situation demands feeling or thought to function, or when some contradiction at the hands of life has to be endured, he may break down.

The significance of all this discussion for the pastor lies in the fact that to understand the types is to understand his people and the peculiar difficulties the type psychology thrusts upon them. It will help the minister to understand himself, for if he is an introvert he will see the difficulties of the moral and religious life from the introvert point of view; and may not be able to understand why he does not 'appeal' to certain people. To recognize one's limitations is to correct them; and a much wider ministry is open to the man who realizes that both types are likely to be in his congregation. This knowledge, however, will be of inestimable value in dealing with those of his people who are finding difficulties in life, with their personal relationships at home or business. He will help the introvert to see the objective situation as it really is; the extraverted he must compel to face the unpleasant task, or the emotions which some experience has aroused in terms of thought. He may find that the real difficulty is that an introvert is attempting to react in an extraverted manner or vice versa. I can only urge here that the pastor will be well advised and well repaid if he turns to a study of the types as these are presented in the volumes of Jung and Hinkle.

MASCULINE AND FEMININE TYPES.

It is exceedingly difficult to say how far the types we have considered are determined by heredity.

Education and upbringing seem to me to have much to do with the development of the functions with which we adapt to the world of objective and inner reality. Whatever be the case in regard to introversion and extraversion, whether one will develop a masculine or feminine psychology or both is determined almost wholly by early environment and especially by the influence of the parents on the children. That influence cannot be over-emphasized; and the reaction of the children to their parents in early life has much to do with their reaction to the world at large. Psychologically we are all bisexual, that is, the self-assertive or masculine tendencies, and the protective or feminine tendencies, are latent or active in us all. The masculine side of us goes out to meet the world, to conquer it; the maternal side generates the more tender qualities. In the normal male self-assertion or the elements which it generates should play a dominant part in his reaction to the world; in the woman the maternal qualities of protection, sympathy, care of the weak, etc., should predominate. It must not for a moment be thought that I am arguing here that the place of the woman is the home or anything of that kind; or that self-assertive tendencies are unbecoming in a woman; or again that the protective elements in man are a sign of weakness. Just the contrary. What is meant when we speak of masculine and feminine types is that one-sided development may occur and a failure to become adjusted to reality result. I see not a few whose whole trouble has arisen from the lack of the necessary tendencies to meet their situation in life. A boy may become so

dominated by the fear of his father, because of the latter's harsh demands, that he shrinks to the protection of the mother and never develops the masculine tendencies which are needed to play a man's part in life. A woman in the desire for a business career or in revolt at her womanhood may develop the self-assertive tendencies at the expense of the maternal and the need to love and be beloved. Here I could give many illustrations. I gave one of the young man who could not meet life, who projected his own unconscious picture of the harsh father on to life itself so that he saw life as tragic on every side and consequently shrank from it. He was ever seeking unconsciously the protection of the mother. He shrank from every situation which demanded the acceptance of responsibility. I have another who broke down after he went into business; I found that he could not take a single step without the fear as to what his father would think about it. When he launched out in any way on his own, he was in fear and trembling until his father had passed his opinion. On the other hand, I have seen women who seemed quite self-sufficient until middle-age, but who developed a neurosis, lack of interest in everything, after their children had grown up. They had given up everything to the exercise of the maternal tendencies, and their own personality had never been allowed to develop. Dr. Hinkle¹ has given in her volume two or three exceedingly interesting cases of business women whose self-assertive functions were well developed, but whose experience had lacked the exer-

¹ *The Re-creating of the Individual*, chap. vi.

cise of the protective functions. There was no case here of any particular complex; it was the failure to bring into being definite psychological functions; nor was it the case that crude biological satisfactions were unconsciously sought; the woman who has borne children may develop the same symptoms as the woman who has borne none. Recently I have had to help a man to develop functions which he ought to have developed at adolescence.

This is a very different type of conflict from that which arises from a fixation on the mother on the man's part, or the fixation on the father by the woman. I cannot doubt that the 'Œdipus complex' is a reality in some cases; but I am convinced from experience that it does not play so large a part as the Freudians would have us believe. A boy may shrink to the protection of the mother without becoming fixated on her; and he will seek a world which renders him the same protection, and the masculine tendencies never develop; and a woman may emulate her father in the business world without being fixated on him, but she will have a tendency to repress tendencies which are dynamic in her being. On the other hand, she may realize her business career and yet in a thousand ways exercise the protective functions and find enough love to satisfy her whole being.

The home training as well as the school training should develop both functions; for both are needed by both sexes in our modern world. One-sided development can lead to all sorts of difficulties.

THE INVERT.

A little must be said on a type that the minister may not meet often and yet it is probably a type that is commoner than is sometimes realized. They create a serious problem to themselves and to the community. This is the *Invert*—the individual who can be sexually attracted only by the same sex. A minister consulted me about such a case just recently, and he was at a loss what to do. There is a little volume published, with *The Invert* as its title, to which Professor Thouless has contributed an introduction, in which the writer tells of his inverted tendencies and the conflicts and struggles through which he has had to pass. There is real difficulty in determining whether the tendency is innate or acquired. But the invert, with his tremendous temptations to actions which outrage the moral sense of society, needs to be understood. There are many cases where an Œdipus complex explains the condition, and in such a case analysis will cure; but there are others which apparently remain impervious to analysis. In such cases there is nothing for it but to help the victim to realize that the impulse can be controlled. Here the development of the self-regarding sentiment, a strong conscience, and sublimation alone can help. But sympathy must always be shown; for even if the condition has been acquired, it was in very early childhood, and quite unconsciously. The *pervert* must not be confused with the *invert*.

CHAPTER V

THE MEANING OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

No introduction to Pastoral Psychology would be complete without some discussion of the 'Unconscious.' Indeed, it is impossible to understand the various physical and psychical symptoms to which conflict gives rise without a thorough grasp of the meaning of unconscious mental processes. It is true that the concept has given great offence to those brought up in an older school of psychology, and is very liable to be wholly misunderstood by the layman. The notion, however, is not unfamiliar to students of philosophy; and those interested in the history of the term can scarcely do better than turn to Mr. Levine's volume on *The Unconscious*, where a brief summary of its use, from Leibnitz to James, is given.

DIFFICULTY OF DEFINITION.

The difficulty, as far as psychologists are concerned, is that of definition. There are some who refuse to recognize any process as mental unless it is in the narrow field of consciousness; and hence 'mind' and 'consciousness' are identified. Impressions and memories which have been in consciousness are assumed to leave traces on the brain and nervous system and hence the possibility of recall. To such, an 'unconscious motive' or 'repressed idea' is a contradiction in terms; the only mental facts which they

recognize as dynamic are conscious phenomena. A not dissimilar view is that the mind consists of not merely the present conscious processes but includes all that has been in consciousness; past impressions, ideas and memories are said to form mental dispositions and are considered to be part of the mind; but out of consciousness they have no dynamic power.

The fundamental criticism of these views lies in the fact that they are based on physiological or metaphysical conceptions of the mind and are not psychological at all. Psychology has a right to form its own concepts; and as a science it can only progress in so far as it is allowed to explain psychological phenomena by psychological concepts. Being a biological science it cannot be indifferent to biological law, and to some extent must be subject to it; but nothing but stagnation can result from the attempt to 'physiologize' psychology or to treat it as a branch of metaphysics. Dr. MacCurdy¹ has put the matter thus: "It is impossible to discuss psychological phenomena in other than psychological terms; the mind is in a separate category from that of the body. It is as idle to seek for the specific origin of mental phenomena in specific physiological processes as it is to look for the origin of the electro-conductivity of a salt solution in the properties of water and salt. When they combine in solution new properties arise that can be discussed only in terms of a special science, physical chemistry. Similarly, when the organ functions as a whole we get 'mind,' and mental phenomena can be discussed only in terms of

¹ *Dynamic Psychology*.

what is mental, not in terms of the functions of isolated organs or groups of organs of the body."

PROBLEM OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

In a volume like this it is impossible to go very deeply into controversial problems. We must assume, as the psychology of medicine assumes, that the mind¹ is an entity, the seat of processes which follow their own laws, and that these processes can dynamically affect bodily functioning and the processes which lie behind character. Those desirous of going more deeply into the validity of the concept will be well rewarded by reading the symposium on the unconscious in *Mind*, of October 1922. The fundamental problem of the unconscious is, *whether past impressions, ideas, or experiences, or tendencies arising from the instinctive dispositions which have not entered consciousness as desire, are dynamic*. In other words: can we be motivated by tendencies, emotions, etc., whose real nature is hidden from consciousness? The facts which the concept of the unconscious attempts to account for are denied by none; it is their interpretation that is in question.

A great deal of the difficulty has arisen by a fallacious identification of consciousness with mind, or mental process. My own view is that consciousness is not a constitutive element in mental process; nor should we think of consciousness as an entity within the organism or self. It is rather that function of the self in which the self is aware of what it is experi-

¹ See *Psychology of Medicine*, by T. W. Mitchell.

encing. Just as there are many organic processes going on in our body of which we are unconscious, so there are many mental processes going on of which we are not conscious. If I may put it another way: we experience many bodily symptoms of which we have no knowledge of the cause; they may be vague or acute sensations coming from the heart or lungs or any of our organs. We are conscious only of the discomfort, and it may be vague fears as to what is wrong. Medical examination helps us to interpret the symptoms; we are now conscious that the symptoms are due to this organic cause or that. We are now aware, not merely of the symptoms, but of their cause or meaning. In a similar way, a man may be conscious of a strong impulse to do something quite contrary to his conscience, as for example, the patient I saw who had a murderous impulse towards his wife; or another with an impulse to steal; or another with the impulse sexually to assault someone. The unconscious motive does not mean that there is nothing in consciousness in the way of symptoms; there always are. The man suffering from the idea that he is being followed, or the woman with paralysis of the lower limbs, are conscious of these symptoms, but not of the repressed tendencies to which they are giving an outlet. Illustration here will be better than definition.

Two of the illustrations I owe to a doctor, and both came under his notice in his general practice. The first one shows how the conscious wish can influence bodily processes. It is that of a nurse who had married rather late in life. She was anxious

for a baby. In due time all the physical symptoms of pregnancy were present, and when the time of the expected deliverance came she went into one of the nursing homes. It was decided to give her an anæsthetic. When the anæsthetic had taken away the function of the main brain, that is, when consciousness had disappeared, the abdomen immediately began to collapse; it was a case of false pregnancy.

The other illustration shows that emotion may be repressed and thus become unconscious, and yet manifest itself. It was that of a man with a fairly highly-strung nervous temperament who had to have an eye removed. He apparently braced himself up for the operation; but when he entered the operating theatre the surgeon noted from his gait, etc., that there was fear. The artist repudiated the idea. Immediately the main brain was dissociated by the action of the anæsthetic the emotion of fear became intense in its manifestation, so much so that there was great difficulty in controlling him at all. Fortunately, as the surgeon said to me, the anæsthetist knew his job thoroughly, and he said: "Let me sink him further"; and he gave enough ether to dissociate the hind brain, the seat of the emotions; and at once the patient subsided into calmness, and the operation was successfully performed.

Here we see that the emotion was unconscious; whatever the man felt in his conscious mind he refused to interpret it as fear; with the dissociation of the main brain the controlling pressure was lifted and emotion at once revealed itself.

An illustration of a wholly different type may be given. I was asked to see a young woman who was obsessed with the idea that her soul was dead; that the Holy Spirit had ceased to strive with her. She was in terrible distress. She had continued her work in the church of which she was a member, but could feel no zeal in her service; none of Christ's promises seemed to avail, and she had the further feeling of awful wickedness, and that if people knew what a bad woman she was they would shrink from her. I found that, on the contrary, her conduct was exemplary, and the numberless little faults to which she confessed could not have caused her sense of 'lostness.' There was very severe depression, headache and backache. Her local doctor had recommended her to occupy herself with a little more dancing and social enjoyment; but an attendance at a dance increased enormously her condition.

Analysis showed that when she was about eight years of age a labourer had attempted to touch her and she repelled him. The incident had been quite forgotten; but apparently it had aroused sex curiosity—why should he wish to touch her?—and at the same time a fear of sex matters. Until puberty there was no sign of any damage; but at that time she heard her relatives speak of one who had given birth to an illegitimate child; and this gave her great fear, and she could remember going upstairs and crying. She began to be afraid of anything relating to sex, afraid, too, that she might do anything that might bring the same condemnation on her. But she was quite unconscious of sex feeling; although she had

found herself terribly curious about such matters; and not seldom thinking about them and discussing them with other girls; but always with a sense of the terrible wrongness of her curiosity. Then a local preacher had given a sermon on the Holy Spirit ceasing to strive with men; and from that day the symptoms began and finally became so distressing that it was thought she would have to be sent away.

The condition is not difficult to explain. She refused to allow her natural tendencies to enter consciousness and become desire; in other words she repressed the tendency to interpret the feeling and sensations entering consciousness. The result was feelings and sensations without meaning; hence the depression and anxiety; the same symptoms which come to us when we have bodily symptoms which have their source in vital organs, but their cause unknown. She was in reality afraid of herself; afraid as to where such tendencies might lead; and the dancing apparently roused the tendency; hence the increased anxiety. There was nothing for it but to lift the repression, and help her to see her tendencies in a true perspective; to make the conflicting motives conscious.

Now let us look at the psychology of the matter. As we have seen, the idea of mental process outside conscious awareness is not new. Various terms have been used at one time or another to denote these processes. To understand the field of consciousness itself, perhaps, the best and most familiar illustration is that of the field of vision. An object is focused when the rays of light coming from it are

striking the fovea. But we see more than the object focused; more or less clearly we see the objects around it, but as we go farther towards the margin of vision there is less clearness, we see objects with 'the tail of the eye.' In the conscious field there is always some presentation at the focus; but as we draw away from the focus the impressions are less clear. We may be dimly aware of other presentations or impressions mingling with those to which we are giving conscious attention, and it will be possible to bring them consciously into the focus. On the other hand, we may have gone to business leaving a little child at home seriously ill. We must give our mind to business, but at the margin of the conscious field is the idea of the child, and emotion connected with it. Immediately the conscious attention is relaxed even for a moment, at once the idea of the child and the emotion connected with it takes its place at the focus. An emotionally toned idea is not latent, but dynamic. We are able to keep the anxiety concerning the child at the margin by holding our attention fixed on the necessities of getting through our work; and, indeed, we may try to forget the child by forcing our attention to other things. But beyond this margin altogether there may be other impressions too weak to enter consciousness—such as a fly on our hair, the contact of our clothes on our skin, etc. These are generally termed *subliminal*, they are beneath the threshold of consciousness; sometimes they are called subconscious. Further, we can voluntarily recall experiences of yesterday, our holiday last summer, and we may, if we

try, find that we can bring back to consciousness many past experiences. We speak of these with Freud as being in the foreconscious, or preconscious. But there are many experiences we cannot recall; these can be brought into the conscious field only by special means such as hypnotism, or free association. That these experiences, however, were not colourless or emotionally negative is proved by the fact that when they are recalled there is always a degree of emotion attached to them, and many were of vital importance in the formation of character and outlook. They did not 'fade away'; they were actually repressed because they were in some way painful to the self; or to be more accurate still, they could not be integrated with our normal desires or moral standards. This is Freud's 'unconscious' and Jung's 'personal unconscious.'

Another way of classifying mental phenomena in terms of consciousness is by the degree of difficulty with which we can bring past experiences or active tendencies into consciousness. There are experiences which seem to be entirely dissociated from the conscious field. Dr. Hadfield, in a recent lecture, gives a good example: "A man is carried into the consulting-room, having suffered from paralysis of both legs for two years. He has been the round of the neurologists, whose treatment along physical lines has had no effect whatever. He is treated along psychological lines, is induced under hypnotism to recall the experience in which he was buried and nearly suffocated under a huge tent in a storm, and in ten minutes time he gets up and walks out of the

room." In this patient the memories were apparently entirely dissociated from consciousness and the fear repressed.

Next to these entirely dissociated complexes, which give rise to symptoms which often seem so mysterious to the physician or the layman, come those where the repressed elements become alternately conscious with the normal consciousness. Dr. Morton Prince's fascinating volume, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, gives the classic case of Sally Beauchamp. Those subject to *fugues*, the tendency to lose the memory of their own personality for a time, are the victims of repressed complexes which can suddenly force themselves into consciousness and completely control the personality for the time being; when they subside the patient has no memory of what he has been doing; he is at a loss to find a reason for being where he is.

We come to other types in which the repressing forces have not been so successful. In these, the offending tendencies come into consciousness but are not allowed to generate their constituent desires and emotions. These are by far the most common, and the pastor is likely to meet with them often. Take the alcoholic; his alcoholism is almost invariably a way of escape from impulses or emotions which he has repressed. In one person I found that the first time he touched alcohol was in France, when he was advised to take it for an acute pain in the solar plexus. On investigating further I found that this pain had come on after behaviour of which he was ashamed; the behaviour was repeated and the pain became much worse and, indeed, was diagnosed as

arising from duodenum ulcer; but he stopped short of an operation! As a matter of fact, the man was suffering from a shame complex, and the drink got him out of a painful conflict for the time being. But it invariably led to the hated behaviour, and thus a vicious circle was created. I had another whose alcoholism allowed him to indulge in promiscuous sexual activities which in sobriety he would have repudiated. In this latter case I was able to cure the man completely. In these cases the tendencies were not allowed to produce their natural ideas, desires or moral reactions. In the first the tendency to shame was not allowed to enter consciousness and appeared as pain; in the second the compulsive tendency to promiscuous sexual activity appeared as a compulsive tendency to drink; in that state normal standards were abandoned, and the sexual tendency had free play. When sober this man was an exemplary husband.

Bernard Hart gives a case which is of special interest to ministers, where repressed resentment motivated a scepticism which was very thorough. "One of my patients, a former Sunday School teacher had become a convinced atheist. He insisted that he had reached this standpoint after a long and careful study of the literature of the subject, and, as a matter of fact, he really had acquired a remarkably wide knowledge of religious apologetics. He discoursed at length upon the evidence of Genesis, marshalling his arguments with considerable skill, and producing a coherent and well-reasoned case. Subsequent psychological analysis, however, revealed

the real complex responsible for his atheism; the girl to whom he had been engaged had eloped with the most enthusiastic of his fellow Sunday School teachers. We see that in this patient the causal complex, resentment against his successful rival, had expressed itself by a repudiation of the beliefs which had formerly constituted the principal bond between them. The arguments, the study, the quotations, were merely an elaborate rationalization.”¹

Dr. Hart does not tell us whether the patient was conscious of the resentment. I should think that he had tried to convince himself that he “did not care” about his fellow teacher eloping with his fiancée; in other words, he repressed the resentment; which then got an outlet by undermining the bond between them. On the other hand, he may have been perfectly conscious of resentment; in that case the resentment was unconsciously extended to everything connected with the successful rival.

The case brings forward a type of unconscious motive which plays a very large part in behaviour and anxiety cases. I have found again and again that the experiences, emotions and desires which motivate anxiety-neuroses, fear complexes, loss of interest, habits which lead to various forms of immorality, and inferiority complex, while not forgotten are not connected with the symptoms of which the man or woman complains, or with the particular difficulty he or she is having in becoming adapted to reality. A man may be perfectly conscious that he hates his father, but may never dream of connecting

¹ *Psychology of Insanity*, p. 71 f.

his craving for drink, his dogmatic political views, his antipathy to religion, with his hatred. Nevertheless, it would be found that all his behaviour is just the opposite to that which his father would approve, and the opposite of the behaviour his father manifested in his life. It is much more comfortable to convince ourselves that we have rationally reached our political, religious, or moral views, than to recognize that they are unconsciously motivated, and are thus rationalizations. Often the resentment itself is unconscious, or masked by rationalizations.

My experience leads me to the conclusion that the term 'unconscious' is too wide to cover all the motivations of conduct or mental or bodily symptoms with which the psychotherapist or pastor is asked to deal. There are degrees of awareness even in the conscious state; in any total state introspection will show that some elements are more conscious than others. So in the unconscious motivations some are more deeply repressed than others; some are masked by defence reactions of the mind, rationalized until they are hidden from consciousness altogether. It would be more accurate, perhaps, to speak of those which are entirely unconscious, or split off from consciousness, not as motives at all, but as tendencies connected with one or other of our primary instincts, which are barred from becoming conscious 'wishes' by some cause in the past life, which has to be unearthed. When the patient realizes the cause and removes the repression, the tendency is then allowed to produce normal feelings and desires. An illustration will help us to understand the nature of the 'unconscious

wish.' When the organism is in need of food, that need enters consciousness as specific sensations and these generate the desire for food. We interpret the sensations as 'hunger.' But when the same need enters the consciousness of an infant it does not appear as a conscious wish or desire; it does not appear as hunger. The infant simply has a sense of discomfort and cries. It is not until the child is able to recognize the connection between this feeling and the satisfaction of it by its bottle that it consciously desires its bottle; it is not until intelligence is somewhat developed that the child can interpret the sensations as 'hunger.' The 'true unconscious' of Freud, or what he calls the 'unconscious wish,' is just one or other of these primary dynamic tendencies pressing into consciousness, but unable to become a conscious desire. The fundamental difference between the unconscious wish and the conscious wish, or desire, is that in the latter we can image the end action in which the tendency becomes quiescent, or becomes 'satisfied,' and then desire it; whereas in the former the tendency is inhibited from becoming a conscious wish for some reason or another painful to the conscious mind. The 'unconscious wish' is in reality the same tendency as that which gives rise to our conscious desires or wishes, *but stripped of the meaning which it receives when it enters normal consciousness.*

THE MEANING OF A COMPLEX.

It will be relevant here to go a little more into detail regarding the complex and its origin. It will

already have been understood by those who have followed the previous chapters that the 'complex' seems to be able to determine specific desires, emotions and impulses towards action. In its structure it does not materially differ from that of the sentiment, and, indeed, by Bernard Hart the terms 'complex' and 'sentiment' are used synonymously. If we may seek a difference, we should find it, I think, in the fact that in a sentiment, the object of the sentiment is the directing element, or to be more accurate still, the idea of the object; whereas in a complex, the instinct, or repressed tendency, if it is a morbid complex, is the dominant element. A child's experience is first organized round its instincts; then later ideas come to play a part, and round them instinctive and emotional dispositions are organized. If we conceive the aim of psychology as "The ascertaining of the causes of the flow of our consciousness,"¹ then those causes are to be found in the complexes and sentiments. These are structures of the mind and are not themselves conscious, though they give rise to our conscious feelings and desires. Anything for which we have a sentiment we are said to have an interest in, and this is also true of complexes; the interest may be positive or negative. Hence we speak of a morbid interest, and this is due to a complex. Most writers thus reserve the term 'complex' for the cause of morbid interests or impulses; and that is the sense in which I use the term in this book. It should be perfectly understood, however, that all morbid complexes are not hidden from conscious-

¹ Bernard Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*.

ness; many of us have complexes of which we are perfectly conscious; but being conscious we have the far better chance of controlling them; we know whence the morbid thoughts, feelings, or impulses come; such complexes give rise to our temptations, but not necessarily to mal-adaptation to reality, or to a nervous breakdown. Hart defines the complex as "a system of connected ideas, with a strong emotional tone, and a tendency to produce actions of a certain definite character." This is the simplest of definitions, and Hart uses it to express the nature of a hobby, a sentiment, or the cause of some morbid condition of the mind. It is better, I think, to reserve the word for the complexes which have been repressed, or which are subject to repression; for repression as we have seen is of many degrees.

We may watch a morbid complex growing. The case of the young woman who thought the Spirit had ceased to strive with her gives a good illustration of the instinct of curiosity being aroused in regard to sex; this opened the way for the attention to be easily drawn towards anything relating to the subject. The sense of wrongness then produced what are called ambivalent feelings towards the subject, i.e. a feeling of being drawn to the subject, and the opposite feeling of being repelled by it. Finally she managed to banish the subject by repressing the complex and with it the instinct whose nature and activities had aroused the curiosity. When some stimulus excited the complex, it would naturally attempt to determine the flow of consciousness and find an outlet; when this was inhibited the result in conscious-

ness was intense depression, anxiety, and finally the belief that she was 'lost.'

Here is an interesting case of a little chap of six and a half years of age who was brought to me because he had attempted three times to set the house on fire; had hid a knife beneath the carpet to commit suicide; and whose nightly visits to the larder when all were asleep created great distress in the minds of his parents. He would tear up anything belonging to his step-mother or sister, and indeed it would take pages to write of all his 'faults.' He professed to love his father, mother, and sister, and while lying sleepless for hours would continually tell himself that he would not rise and go downstairs. On the other hand, when I asked him why he did those things which upset his father and mother, he answered that something came into him and he just had to do it, and then he was immediately sorry.

The origin of the trouble was simple. For three years after the mother died he had slept with his father and they had become great friends. Then he is told one day that he is to get a new mother, and he must be the little gentleman and show the new mother what a fine boy his daddy has. It was easy to bring back to the boy's mind vividly the first night the mother came; how he repressed his anger at both because he was sent into another room to sleep and that he could not have his daddy to himself. Six months afterwards the trouble began and grew more serious; but as I got everything back to his mind and helped him to understand, the impulses ceased and the last I heard was that he was doing well. First

the complex manifested itself in little disobediences, etc., but as he got punished it grew in strength and extended to everyone who was a rival for the father's affections; and the idea of committing suicide was to punish both father and mother—they would have remorse and feel punished if he was dead. (This is a much commoner motive for suicide among young people than is sometimes realized. I had a young man who had contemplated suicide and had made the arrangements. He told me that his idea was to die and leave a letter that would throw the blame on the father for his act.)

The complex then, whether we are conscious of having it or not, has this power of determining the content and direction of the flow of consciousness. If it is very strong then the impulses connected with it become obsessive, and the same applies to the emotions which it arouses in consciousness. The object of the complex may come to be symbolized, and when this symbol is presented to consciousness will fascinate the attention and arouse emotion or lead to impulsive action. I had one person fascinated by a club foot, and this stirred definite emotions and led to definite actions. There was another who dreaded summer because the mere sight of a butterfly filled her with terror. Neither of these persons had the slightest idea why these objects should arouse such feelings.

It is often the case that the experience in which the complex originated is entirely forgotten and only the emotion similar to that first experienced comes into consciousness when the complex is stimulated.

Here the memory of the experience is repressed. I used to have the peculiar feeling after I had had a happy day anywhere that some evil was likely to befall me as a consequence. It was a most unpleasant and irrational feeling, but it was sufficient to make me miserable. One day I attempted to analyse it; and found my memory carried back to a very happy day we had spent together when children at home. I could again remember our laughter; and then into my consciousness came the incident at the root of my irrational misery. I could remember distinctly that in the midst of our hilarious laughter my mother stopped suddenly and said: "I wonder what will happen to us for all this laughter"; and she became so sad about it that our happiness ended there for that day. The reassociation of the emotion with its original experience was sufficient to cure me of the irrational and miserable ending to happy days.

Again we find the experience remembered easily and the original emotion connected entirely dissociated or repressed. This leads to behaviour which manifests the emotion, but the emotion is absent from consciousness. I had one man who had not left the house for years except after dark and had to be accompanied by his sister. If one went into the room where he was he would immediately hide his face and get his sister between him and the intruder. Every action denoted fear; and when at length I persuaded him to come out with me he trembled all over, but insisted that he felt no fear. Here I got back to the incidents which must have

caused both intense shame and fear, but he could speak of them without a trace of emotion, indeed, as though they had been entirely indifferent. I was never able to reassociate the emotions with the original experiences; and consequently made little impression on him.

All this digression on the complex will help us, I trust, to understand better the meaning of the 'unconscious motive.' I know it is very difficult for anyone who has never attempted an analysis to realize fully the reality of the 'unconscious wish.' It is the discovery of this 'unconscious wish' which is Freud's great contribution to the study of both normal and abnormal behaviour; and without it as a concept it would be impossible to understand much which is quite simple once the concept is accepted as a working explanation.¹

I said that many are conscious of having complexes and are thus able to control their activities, and thus have no breakdown in health although they may be subject to much temptation. There are others who are conscious of their complexes and yet break down. Stekel argues that many anxiety cases are due to the fact that many with complexes whose outlet would lead to behaviour either contrary to their conscience or to the standards of society, desire the pleasure such complexes can yield, but not the guilt. Many of the most severe cases I have seen arose out of the desire for the pleasure without the guilt. They put little or no effort into the control of their complexes; the conscience or fear of the herd is inhibited in rela-

¹ See Holt, *The Freudian Wish*.

tion to it, and then repressed fear aroused by conscience or herd becomes displaced upon objects which in the nature of things should cause no fear. When one knows that certain activities are reprehensible, he is wise if he faces the moral issue and then determines to realize that he has the control in his own hands. The first principle of mental hygiene is a healthy, active conscience, or capacity for healthy, moral self-criticism.

We shall later see how the unconscious complex determines a certain type of thinking altogether different from ordinary logical thinking; it is enough for the present if we realize how these unconscious complexes give rise to emotions, and impulses quite contrary to our conscious desires or standards. What the final formulation of the unconscious will be it is difficult to say; but that it explains much in our behaviour which was a mystery to older psychologists and psychiatrists and all interested in education cannot be denied. It is as necessary for the explanation of behaviour as the theory in physics that we must assume a medium to explain action at a distance.

THE UNCONSCIOUS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Not a little of the difficulty in accepting the concept of the unconscious lies in the belief that somehow it undermines the concept of moral responsibility; and doubtless, not a few psychoanalysts with more zeal than ethical or philosophical training have given grounds for such a belief. But there is nothing in the concept of the unconscious that logically implies such a position. Indeed, the psychoanalyst

undertakes the analysis of a patient on the tacit understanding that the unconscious complexes he expects to lay bare, will, when brought into consciousness, become capable of control by the conscious mind; otherwise it is difficult to see what use there is in mental exploration. The patient comes to the analyst because he has found difficulty in controlling his impulses, and because he *does not feel free*; he comes in order to be made free from the irrationality of his own impulses. He does not come merely to be told that he has complexes but to be free from their domination. He comes according to Jung that he may win individuation, a personality, to be an individual. "Individuality," says Dr. Baynes, "is the central co-ordinating principle of this (inner) realm, analogous to the principle of royalty in the nation; and, in so far as this co-ordinating will achieves an effective command of the diverse and conflicting elements which constantly tend to disrupt his kingdom, we are justified in speaking of a differentiated individual."¹ In other words, to gain individuation is to gain freedom to control the disruptive tendencies in our being. Moreover, not a few analysts maintain that although we are not responsible for our unconscious complexes, we are responsible, if we are conscious of mental disturbances and the lack of freedom, for seeing that we seek help in understanding what is upsetting our mental and moral balance.

We need not trouble ourselves here with the extreme psycho-pathological cases; no one would

¹ Introduction to Jung's *Psychological Types*.

dream of attributing moral responsibility to the man with delusions. Nevertheless I have had the chance to dig deeply into three such cases, and in all three the trouble was rooted in behaviour which at first was realized as wrong; the moral fear generated by it was repressed and then expressed itself in the delusion of persecution; in all cases the behaviour was continued over a time always with the fear of being found out. A healthy and active self-criticism would have saved them from the disorganization of the intellectual processes. These cases we can leave, as moral responsibility has been bartered away. But what of those who are the victims of unconscious tendencies whose impulses lead to acts which, judged morally, are wrong? The repression which gave rise to the tendencies may have occurred in childhood, and we need not ascribe responsibility for them; but the impulses are not unconscious, and the acts cannot be morally justified; and as Laird argues it is the justification of acts with which ethics deals. At the very utmost the existence of an unconscious complex as the cause of an immoral act can only explain the act, nothing more; it can neither excuse nor justify. This fact must be kept thoroughly in mind by the pastor. The victim of a perverted tendency never really believes that his acts are justifiable; his own moral standards condemn them, hence his distress. He may feel that his impulses defeat him; he may feel that he cannot help it; but this is just to acknowledge that he is suffering from a moral disease, not to admit that moral standards must be abrogated for him. Unconscious

complexes, then, help us to understand our difficulties in achieving a personality; they cannot justify our moral failures.

Again, it must be borne in mind that even the victim of a compulsive tendency is not without power of restraint. When the impulse is in consciousness and the individual knows what the end action of the impulse is, he can then control its outlet into deed. Such a victim does not fall every time he feels the impulse towards his besetting weakness. This is an aspect which I have taken special pains to investigate with various sufferers. A doctor sent me a lad who had twice been before the magistrates for exhibitionism. Before I got to the root of the trouble I had to help the lad to restrain himself; for not only was the complex active, but he was in continuous fear of falling again. In the course of analysis I found that immediately preceding his acts his mind was very active in finding a justification that would remove the natural moral restraint of his conscience. I went thoroughly into the two occasions which had brought him before the law and found that the same mental processes preceded the acts; and the processes took on one occasion a very long time; in the other about twenty minutes elapsed between the time he saw the girl and exhibited. On both occasions he convinced himself that the girl was very desirous of exhibiting herself, and wanted him to do it so that she could do it also to him. He projected his own desire upon the girls, and his restraint was undermined. This same mental process was well shown

in another case—a compulsive tendency to touch the other sex. When I saw this man he was certain that women would love him to do it. My first task here was to bring home to the man his own mental processes lest he might do that which would ruin his career. In another case of anxiety-neurosis there was an almost irresistible desire to give up work; visit after visit, letter after letter, was filled with all sorts of rationalizations attempting to justify the handing in of his resignation or asking for a long holiday. Each time I patiently explained what was happening; and although there were periods when the impulse was intense, he never gave way to it. It is perfectly true that immediately the complex becomes active the tendency to rationalize begins, and thus tends to weaken restraint; but once this process is understood control can be firmly established. The simplest proof of this power of control is open to most of us. A man may know that he gets easily irritable; he may have no idea as to why he should be so; but he can restrain himself from accepting the flimsy reasons on which his outburst is based. He can refuse to say the irritable word, or show the irritable action. Emotions can be controlled and are controlled by many who are beset by weakness of the flesh, though ignorant of the causes of their irritability. On the other hand, the pastor will not be slow to realize that the strain of holding a compulsive tendency is very great and the wise and sympathetic pastor may find an excuse for the victim; and he will use this to keep the sense of guilt from becoming

remorse and depression; he will use it to encourage the victim to realize how much he needs to lean upon God.

MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM.

It should be perfectly clear that psychological determinism is not to be identified with ethical or philosophical determinism; nor does it imply the latter. All that psychological determinism implies and demands is that in the psychical world, as in the world of physics, causes precede events. It is true that a man cannot determine which word will come to consciousness as the response to the stimulus of another word; but he can determine whether he will utter it, and not necessarily because of the past. All that the psychologist can logically maintain is that there is no act, thought, desire, or idea which is not preceded by a mental process, and that mental process is sufficient explanation of the tendency to the particular act, idea, desire, etc. But he cannot logically go from that to argue that the tendency must issue in that particular act. Indeed, as we have seen we may repress the natural tendency of a complex to thought or desire as well as act; and repression is both witting and unwitting as Rivers puts it.¹ That our past experience and that the dispositions built up in that experience are vital factors in our active response to situations cannot be denied; this is the basis of every attempt to build up any character, otherwise why lay such stress in educational theory on helping the child to acquire permanent systems of

¹ *Instinct and the Unconscious*, by Rivers, chap. iii.

interest or sentiments? Once moral self-consciousness is reached, our sentiments and complexes explain our tendencies to act in definite ways, but not the final choice to act. My curiosity will compel me to pay attention to anything novel or strange, it may arouse the intense desire to know what the object is, but it will not compel me to an immoral act to obtain my knowledge. When the temptation becomes conscious, and a deliberate choice has to be made, the whole organized moral self becomes involved. It is not the strength of the individual impulse or that of the sentiment which determines that choice, but the capacity of the individual to canalize his conational energy along the line of his choice; this in turn seems to depend on the degree of organization his emotional and conational systems have obtained, and the degree to which he can bring rational reflection to bear upon the alternatives, but to what degree psychological analysis cannot say. What is the analyst's task if not to free the patient from the lack of organization amongst his impulsive and emotional tendencies and to give him the power of reflection so that he may unify them by some self-accepted principle which forms the content of his will? Freedom, if I shall not be misunderstood, is acquired, it is not given; the task of pastor or educationist is to help the growing life, or the one which has lost grip of itself, to attain freedom to act along the line of his self-accepted principle or will; to obey the thought which his conscience and reason set him. Hence the question of the ultimate responsibility is not settled by the assumption of psychological

determinism; indeed, psychology has no technique by which it could determine the ultimate question of freedom. Psychology is able to give us a basis of ethics, but cannot itself be a substitute for ethics. Psychology can describe and it may be account for the content of the moral consciousness, it cannot validate or invalidate that content. It can tell us whether we do seek pleasure and whether we can seek any other objects; but it cannot tell whether we ought to seek pleasure. It can tell us that a dominant purpose will unify the contending elements in the mind or personality, but it cannot evaluate that purpose in terms of its moral worth. Ethics cannot be reduced to psychology.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

IN an earlier chapter we saw the importance of understanding the processes whereby the instinctive self becomes transmuted into a moral and spiritual self. It is no less important to understand the conflicts which hinder the process, and the manner in which these may be resolved so as to allow the prospective aim of personality to reach its end—a strongly integrated and well-knit personality. In such a personality the conflicts have been resolved in such a way that the self is adjusted to reality; and on the inner or psychological side there is what Hobhouse has well termed, ‘a harmony of experience with feeling.’ Put in another way, this means that the activity of the self, its conative striving, will be in harmony with its ethical and spiritual ideals; the self will *want to do the things he feels he ought to do*, and what is even more important, will be able to do them. A failure of personality may arise in one of two ways: either the individual does not want to do what he ought to do, or knowing what he ought to do and desiring to do it, finds within himself apparently compulsive tendencies which prevent him. The tendencies, as we have seen, may be unconscious or conscious; in either case we get conflict and a difficulty in becoming adjusted to reality.

In attempting to elucidate the difficulties in attaining a personality we used what may be thought very

abnormal cases—cases for the specialist rather than the average pastor, although it may be admitted that there are few pastors but meet not dissimilar cases. But these cases have been introduced because it is only by the study of abnormal functioning that we come to understand how the tendencies function in a normal character. McDougall tells us with truth that a well-balanced disposition under the influence of unquestioned ideals, and a master-purpose, results in the achievement of the strongly integrated and well-knit personality. But at the present time we are fairly ignorant as to how this unquestioned ideal comes to be incorporated into the mental make-up; it is much easier to understand how we have gone wrong than to explain how we have kept on the path of righteousness, or how it is that our tendencies have come to find satisfaction in objects which are in harmony with the ethical ideals of the community and the prospective aim of our personality. But if we understand how we go wrong at least we are helped to prevent mal-adaptations in the growing generation. We have no instinct or intuitive faculty by which we can as children tell what is the good; our tendencies have to be directed. The tendencies underlying the mal-adaptations of character are not different from those functioning in normal character; it is their fixation on undesirable objects which leads to failure; and the recital of these cases is meant to be illustrative; they are introduced not so much for the purpose of helping the pastor to deal with such cases, but that he may be able to recognize the incipient tendencies to such abnormal

behaviour, and thus prevent their development. There is nothing in medicine or in education which has done more harm than the idea that the 'child will grow out of it.' A child does not naturally grow out of such tendencies; they become more deeply rooted. How many a child's stammer has been left without attention because the doctor or mother said, 'he will grow out of it'; and then when the child has become adolescent the impairment has become worse and complications set in. Had the tendency been rationally treated in childhood it would have ceased fairly quickly, whereas when left to adolescence or later it is one of the most difficult things to get rid of. The same is true of character-tendencies; the child with a tendency to be shy, secretive, self-willed, unstable in his emotional reactions, is not likely to grow out of these and the prognosis of these tendencies is always bad. In those cases I have introduced, my main purpose is to illustrate how the tendencies go wrong; that is why I have dealt with their origin. To understand the significance of behaviour which makes life a misery to the individual and all belonging to him, we must see its simple origins, which most people are apt to neglect or to excuse. Every student of medicine has to witness operations which he will never be called upon to perform, but unless he had seen them his ability to treat the cases in their incipient stages would be appreciably less; and even more important is the fact that because he has seen them in their incurable stage, he takes their first symptoms seriously. The vogue of preventive medicine to-day is due to the greater emphasis on prog-

nosis; our religious work will become more effective when we see our work among the young not as attempts to *save* them but to make them *safe*. Every specialist knows to his sorrow that many cases over which he has to shake his head could have been easily dealt with had the doctor or pastor taken the serious view of the first symptoms when they arose. The physical, moral and spiritual health of the community depends not on the specialist but on the general practitioner, and the average pastor and minister. It is true that the ordinary pastor will not be called upon to treat cases like some of those I have used as illustrative material; but it is equally true that had a wise and understanding pastor seen the first symptoms the last stages would never have arisen. We know what principles can build up a character; that has always been known; but how does the mind come to accept such principles, to love the behaviour which is right, to want to do the things he ought to do? That is no easy question to answer.

THE RESOLUTION OF OUR CONFLICTS DETERMINES CHARACTER.

McDougall has finely said: "Happy is the man whose character is formed from a well-balanced disposition under the influence of unquestioned ideals and of a supreme goal or master-purpose. His self-respect and ideals to which he is attached (i.e. for which he has acquired abstract sentiments) will supply him with dominant motives in all ordinary situations, motives strong enough to overcome all crude promptings of his instinctive nature; he is in little

danger of becoming the scene of serious and enduring conflicts; especially is this true if he has learned to know himself, has learned by his reflection and frank self-criticism to understand, in some measure, his own motives, and has formed a sober, well-balanced estimate of himself, of his capacities, his purposes, and his duties.”¹

That is the ideal, but how few have attained to it! To the great majority such harmony seems afar off. Few can say with our Lord: “The prince of this world cometh and findeth nothing in me.” In other words there was no disposition in Him to which evil could appeal. He had settled all His earlier conflicts in the light of His conscious vocation; and whatever His later conflicts they were never struggles with inner rebellious dispositions and His conscious goal. But one must remember that even He had His conflicts, and it was the manner in which He resolved His conflicts which determined His supreme character. With all men conflicts are numerous, and the integration of their conflicting elements, so devoutly to be desired, is the most difficult of tasks. Doubtless an inherited unstable nervous system may make it more difficult for some to attain this harmony; but character and personality are not seldom achieved in spite of an unstable disposition. It may be that research into the influence of the endocrine glands upon character and temperament will reveal a close relation between body and soul, and a deficiency of moral energy traced to a deficiency of adrenalin or thyroid; indeed, we may get a ‘chemistry

¹ *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 216.

of the soul,' as one enthusiast has put it, but this will raise no new problem for ethics or pastoral psychology. The congenital idiot presents no problems for either science; and in so far as failure of function on the part of the endocrines is shown to be physical in origin, the unfortunate victim will be a-moral and character or personality will scarcely be expected. On the other hand, it is not too much to assume that the function of these important glands can be disturbed by purely mental processes or moral conflicts in the same way as the higher centres of the brain or any of the organs of the body; and conversely, these functional disorders can be remedied by resolving the conflicts. In any case our task here is with the disturbing factors which lead to a failure to resolve the conflicts in a way which will lead to character and personality; and these conflicts can always be traced to incompatible tendencies within the self, and the lack of strongly held ideals or sentiments which would resolve the conflicts on the conscious plane along rational and moral lines. Character, then, personality, and happiness are achieved in the resolution of our conflicts. Innate tendencies are dynamic and must get outlet; everything depends on whether they get an outlet in harmony with social and moral reality.¹ For the self to disown its tendencies is to invite repression, and we have seen some of its results; merely to express our tendencies irrespective of the effect on our moral character, social usefulness, or harmlessness is to undermine the pos-

¹ For an interesting discussion of the meaning of social and moral reality, see Levine's *Reason and Morals*.

sibility of either personality or happiness. Conflict is not merely inevitable from time to time, but in early childhood is continuous, and spiritual education will aim at the resolution of the conflicts of childhood by directing the tendencies into channels in which they get satisfaction and at the same time develop the character and personality. "Childhood," says Rivers, "is one long conflict between individual instinctive tendencies, and the social traditions and ideals of society. Whether the outcome of this conflict is to be a genius or a paranoiac, a criminal or a philanthropist, a good citizen or a wastrel, depends in some measure, we do not yet know with any degree of exactness in what measure, on education, on the direction which is given by the environment, material, psychological and social, to the energy engendered in the conflicts made necessary by the highly complex character of the past history of our race."¹ In other words, it is how we learn to react to life that matters for character and reactions are determined by the manner in which our conflicts are resolved.

REPRESSION.

One of the most important ways in which the mind deals with its conflicts is by repression. This is the tendency of the mind to keep out of consciousness one or both of the conflicting motives. The tendency itself, it should be noted, cannot be repressed; if it cannot get an outlet in behaviour in which the tendency is recognized, then it will find a mental or

¹ *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 157.

physical pathway of discharge, which may or may not be acceptable to consciousness.

Probably the best way to approach the subject of repression is from the point of view of normal forgetting. There is much forgotten experience which has no pathological significance. Much of my knowledge of Hebrew and mathematics, and other subjects which I took at the university, I have forgotten in the sense that I am unable to recall it; and likewise there are many experiences of a commonplace kind which have suffered the same fate. Hebrew and mathematics were useful in getting my degree, and while they served a purpose of the self were in constant use and relatively were easy to recall. Similarly many pleasant experiences of week-ends are forgotten; they were useful in the sense that they kept time from hanging on my hands; for a few days I might recount them, but quickly they passed from consciousness, and only with great effort could I recall elements in them now. This is normal or ordinary forgetting, and is beneficial; for if past experiences kept repeatedly coming into consciousness there would be no possibility of new experiences. The tendency to forget what is not needed is perfectly natural. But *forgetfulness* as distinguished from forgetting is quite a different process. Forgetfulness is a dynamic activity of the mind; it is volitional though not necessarily conscious. What Dr. Rivers calls 'witting' repression is a common activity experienced when we attempt to 'push an idea out of our mind.' We may experience some humiliation which worries us, and we are told to forget it; we deliber-

ately try to keep it out of the mind. What we do not want to remember because it is painful to the self is likely to be forgotten. Hence active forgetting whether conscious or unconscious is a defence reaction of the mind against unpleasant memories, ideas, or desires. As Rivers puts it: "Active forgetting is thus a protective process or mechanism, one by which consciousness is protected from influences which would interfere with the harmony essential to pleasure or comfort." It is not difficult to find in everyday life many examples of active forgetting of which we may be totally unconscious; Freud's volume on *The Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life*, gives numerous examples. I had a good example the other week. I preached in a church three or four years ago, and never wanted to go back for definite reasons which I can perfectly recall. A year afterwards I was asked to go again, but the Sunday asked for was already engaged; and I was asked to give them the same date the year following; but I got out of this, I forget how. They then wrote asking me to give them that particular Sunday on the first year I had it free; and I gave them three years later than the first Sunday for which they asked me. I am exceedingly careful about putting down the dates in my book, but this one I never put down, although I knew I had promised to preach; and when reminded casually by a member of the church that I was to preach again, I said that I remembered I had to come in 1929; this person insisted that it was 1928. Under ordinary circumstances I should at once have looked up my files, but instead I took no

notice. Then I received an official reminder from the secretary and my card confirming the date was returned to me. Then I found that I had not merely not made a note of it anywhere, although I had the letters relating to the engagement, but had actually fixed to preach in another church.

What we have to realize about repression which leads either to abnormal functioning of the mind, body or behaviour is that it is spontaneous. If we try to forget anything, it is likely to become more fixed in the mind. Rivers calls true forgetting 'unwitting'; it is 'unconscious' to use Freud's expression; but it is nevertheless active. "By repression," says Stekel, "we understand an apparent forgetting when from motives of displeasure we do not wish to think of a particular idea."¹ Experiences when repressed in this way seem to carry their affect with them; and it is surmised that the emotional element is dynamic. There is much which seems to prove that the emotion when repressed is actually in being. The case of the artist operated on for eye-trouble points this way; and I saw many times a shell-shock patient who would tremble violently if compelled to go out on to the street; yet he assured me again and again that he felt no fear. Whatever the content of the repressed complex, there can be no doubt that repression does take place as a way of getting rid of painful ideas or memories or emotions.

The importance of this lies in the fact that it is the act of repression that leads to abnormal functioning of bodily organs, mental processes or abnormal

¹ *Anxiety Conditions and their Treatment*, chap. ii.

behaviour. In all conflict there is probably a tendency to repress one or both of the incompatible desires; but as long as we recognize the motives which lead to conflict and deal with them by voluntary control and decision there is no danger to physical or mental health, or to the conscious ideals which control our behaviour. To the degree we are able to repress an idea or emotion, to that degree it becomes unconscious, split off, and relatively independent in its outlet. For reasons which we need not detail here a woman became afraid of everything—her husband, a social evening, knives, etc. In analysis I found she had given birth to a stillborn, deformed child. When she had recovered from the anæsthetic, the foolish nurse (I suppose with the idea of comforting her) told her the kind of child it was and what it would have been like if it had lived. The woman after she came out, remained perfectly normal; but soon after a second pregnancy the fears arose and became so intense that she became a danger to herself. For long she kept from me the fact that she had been delivered of the deformed child, and merely said in answer to my questions regarding her first child that she had had a miscarriage. At last, owing to my failure to relieve the woman of her fears, I harked back on her experience in the nursing home, and then the whole thing came up. Her fears were now easily explained; she was afraid that her unborn child would be mentally defective, although she had had an operation to prevent a recurrence of her first experience. Her fear was repressed, or rather she refused to acknowledge the

nature of her fear, and the result was that it became displaced upon all things which had the remotest association with the future of the child. The mind was thus freed in consciousness from the actual fear—a deformed child—and the irrational fear of things which would not in the ordinary course of things give any fear kept her from having to face what was her real fear. I give the illustration to show the tendency of the mind to shut out, to refuse to acknowledge, what is essentially painful to the self, and the means the mind takes to keep the actual fear out of consciousness. It is worth noting also how this woman illustrates what I said about the impossibility of having an *imaginary* fear. Although there was no cause to be afraid of the things which she did fear, there was the actual fear in her unconscious mind which became displaced upon those things. The memory was not repressed, but the emotion which the memory evoked was dissociated and then displaced. It is exceedingly seldom that repression is entirely successful. When it is entirely successful we get true dissociation resulting in multiple-personality, conversion-hysteria, fugue, etc. But something very similar can be seen in many people who would not be called abnormal. I refer to people who seem to be able to keep their religious and moral ideals in what Bernard Hart has well called 'logic-tight compartments.' Even our intelligence can be cut off or dissociated from beliefs rooted in emotional attitudes. We are all familiar with the man whose prayers are those of a saint, but who feels no sense of contradiction when he does

a mean, despicable, or shady act. This is the kind of man who talks about 'Business being business.' He is not a conscious hypocrite; his self is split to the extent that his religious and moral ideals never interact; the former are not allowed to influence the latter. Again, we are familiar with the man whose intelligence is of the highest; who must sift all evidence; who can accept nothing unless it is rationally grounded; he senses at once a contradiction in most spheres; but immediately you touch his religious beliefs his normal intelligence becomes shut off; he can accept the most crude and groundless judgments; he can keep in his mind two systems which actually contradict each other; both function but never together. It is in such people we see the process of rationalization at its subtle ways of reconciling contradictions. It is in the study of such people that we realize that a complex or sentiment not merely determines that we shall have certain ideas and reactions, but that these determine also what ideas and functions shall be inhibited. The natural moral reaction in the one case, and the intelligent reaction in the other, are simply inhibited. When our religion is a sentiment and not a complex the mind will have freedom to deal with every situation, moral or intellectual, which affects it; whereas when it is a complex it works in isolation from the total self and becomes narrow. It is really astonishing what contradictions we can fall into when our religion and morality are inhibited from moving freely throughout the whole mental life. If I can dissociate my religion and morality from my intelligence

and actions, I am saved many conscious conflicts of a moral or intellectual kind; and the very function of repression, as we have seen, is to keep the conscious mind from unpleasant feelings or unpleasant reactions.

It is here we may see the origin of many symptoms of a functional kind, both physical and mental. A woman may punish her husband by becoming ill, and the husband the wife; the student unwilling or afraid to face an examination may produce physical symptoms which deceive the eye of the most wary. These are what are called compromise solutions—they allow both the incompatible motives to function. The student can say: "I should have loved to take the examination had it not been for this tonsillitis," or asthma, or whatever the symptoms express; in reality the symptoms are produced that he may avoid the examination; but of that he is unconscious. He is thus able to retain his self-respect in consciousness, and also the tendency to shirk the examination. It is in such cases the doctor becomes helpless. He cannot understand why the symptoms do not yield to treatment; and there are certain symptoms which are unusual; he may be perfectly sure in his own mind, as in many cases of neurasthenia, that there is nothing organically wrong. It is here that analysis comes to his help. In the great majority of these cases where physical symptoms are present and where anxiety-attacks are frequent there has been a compromise solution of a conflict; and a repressed conscience, fear, resentment, or some idea, lies at the root of the trouble. In anxiety cases a moral conflict will be found as a causative factor. Indeed, Stekel

goes as far as to say: "An anxiety neurosis is the disease of a bad conscience." This probably is an overstatement; but it is because neurotics have a conscience that their 'nerves' are possible. The tendency to do wrong is there nursed in the unconscious, but hidden from the conscious mind; it is repressed because it is incompatible with conscience.

It is sometimes argued that repression is necessary in a civilization like ours. I think that in this statement there is a confusion between 'repression' and 'control.' Repression is always harmful; it is always tending to hide the conflicting elements and motives behind our behaviour. A resolution of a conflict by means of repression is never beneficial in the long run; it relieves us from the unpleasantness of a conscious conflict for the time being, but long after the situation which called for repression is altered the symptoms may remain. I had occasion to note this in my own experience some time ago. A member of a committee of which I was a member said something which rather reflected on me; and I remember that at the time I was very angry and very resentful. I forgot about the incident, but found myself on every available occasion ready to contradict this man, and even when I was perfectly conscious that he was putting forward a good proposal I found my mind shutting out what could be said for his proposition and seeking how I might argue against it. I then realized that I was reacting to this man emotionally, and not rationally. It was not difficult to root the thing out by facing the first experience fearlessly and dealing with it in a rational

manner. I have had no temptation since to react in that irrational manner to this particular individual, although we have met on committee many times. A repressed emotion or tendency is to that degree out of control of the conscious mind, but will show its presence in many other ways long after the particular circumstances which gave rise to it have gone. Many soldiers who had strong conflicts between the sense of duty and their desire to do it, and the instinct of self-preservation, developed functional disorder to repression; and in many the symptoms have remained.

SUBLIMATION.

The very opposite resolution of a conflict by repression is that termed *sublimation*: this is what happens with many tendencies which in childhood would be looked upon as normal, but which, when carried into adolescence or manhood, are morally condemned. In sublimation the energy of the instinctive tendency, and the energy generated by its conflict with other tendencies, is directed towards ends other than the ends in which the tendency would find its natural satisfaction. Sublimation occurs as the unconscious resolution of a conflict. The maternal tendency becomes sublimated in nursing. The young woman with a passion for nursing is not conscious of any desire to care for a baby, but she feels impelled to nurse the weak and helpless; she loves her work and the source of the energy to do her work is derived from the maternal tendency. It is this kind of sublimation which lies behind great

achievement in many spheres. As Rivers puts it: "Many lines of evidence are converging to show that all great accomplishment in human endeavour depends on processes which go on outside those regions of the mind of which we are clearly conscious. There is reason to believe that the processes which underlie all great work in art, literature, or science take place unconsciously, or at least unwittingly."¹ When the conflicting impulse is swept into the purpose of a sentiment it is the object of the sentiment of which we are conscious; it is the sentiment which dominates the activity and not the impulse. The propagandist depends for his forcefulness on his self-assertive tendency, and yet he need not be self-assertive; the preacher depends on his tendency to 'show off', and yet he may be the humblest of men. The surgeon depends on his sadistic tendency to sustain his nerve and his interest, yet he may be the kindest of men. Sex curiosity, which might have become morbid, may become perfectly sublimated in the gynecologist. These people enjoy the work, *not merely the end for which they work*. On the other hand, a man may enter the ministry because he is dominated by the unconscious self-display complex; if so he will confine himself to work in which this complex is satisfied, and will probably not accomplish much. It is the difference between the man whose self-display is swept into the purpose of the Gospel, and the man who is unconsciously using the Gospel to display himself.² It is the differ-

¹ *Instinct and the Unconscious*, chapter on "Sublimation."

² See an interesting volume, *Morals for Ministers*, chap. i.

ence between the scientist whose curiosity has been swept into the sentiment of truth, or knowledge, or service, and the scientist who seeks to satisfy a morbid curiosity. A boy's natural curiosity as to how things are born may get perfect sublimation in natural history, geology, medicine, etc. The very secret of character lies in this capacity to sublimate the natural tendencies; for in sublimation there is no morbidity.

SUBLIMATION IS AN UNCONSCIOUS PROCESS.

I was inclined to think at one time that we could consciously sublimate. I doubt if we can. I have found that there is a great difference between the redirection of conscious tendencies and their sublimation. The latter seems to be entirely an unconscious process; it takes place, says Mitchell,¹ "automatically when a suitable opportunity presents itself." It is distinct from what Rivers calls 'witting' direction of instinctive energy. In this latter the sufferer from some prohibited tendency which lies behind his 'nerves' or temptations is made conscious of his tendencies, and the psychotherapist or pastor attempts to help him to use the energy of the instinct in pursuing some cognate end which is acceptable to conscience and socially useful. He may, however, be subject to periods of temptation even though he become interested in the tasks in which his repressed tendencies have received a legitimate outlet. Theoretically this conscious redirection of instinctive energy may result in a true sublimation; but in any

¹ *Psychology of Medicine*, p. 88.

case whatever temptations or conflicts the offending impulse may give rise to, the conflict will be on the conscious plane, and no return of neurotic trouble or abnormal behaviour is to be expected. The redirection of the energy often means the creation of a new interest or the intensifying of an old one and thus gives outlet to the energy of the instinct which otherwise would be repressed, and also to the energy generated by the continuing conflict.

For true sublimation childhood or adolescence is the best period, and thus we see that education becomes doubly important, and especially moral and spiritual education. The function of all education should be to help the growing mind to acquire sentiments within which the impulses may be truly sublimated; that is, to help the child to become interested in ends which are social, beneficial, or at least harmless; ends through which the impulses get outlet without themselves being the motive for the activity which the end involves. It is to be noted that the activity in which the tendency is sublimated is always allied to the tendency itself. The sex instinct may be sublimated in any creative activity; the pugnacious instinct in activity roused by the thwarting of some ideal end of a sentiment; the acquisitive tendency in collecting stamps, antiques, etc. In attempting to redirect or sublimate the tendencies of those who have had difficulty in becoming adjusted to life, one must ally the offending impulse or tendency with some other interest than that of merely getting rid of the conflict. An increased outlet of energy in play, e.g., does not sublimate the sex instinct

although the interest in games will occupy the mind of the adolescent so that the natural feelings and sensations of the period of tension are kept from becoming an obsession.

Sublimation, then, is the real solution of conflict. Being an unconscious process we know only what is done and not how to do it. Nevertheless the wise pastor when he has to deal with repressions in any of his people, of which they may be unconscious, will by suggestions attempt to present opportunities to the mind in which the process may occur. I had one young woman whose life was being thwarted by a father fixation, and with a strong tendency to phantasy. Quite casually I suggested attempting to write some short stories. Within a few months more than one story had been accepted. I had another with an inordinate tendency to be the centre of the picture which became sublimated in lecturing. Often, however, the pastor will have to be satisfied to lay bare the unconscious and repressed tendencies and help the person to become interested in objects or causes in which much of the energy will get an outlet. Such 'sublimation' is second best, and a certain amount of conscious temptation may remain. But such re-direction of energies which cannot be sublimated is not to be despised; and the lifting of the repression gives the opportunity for character to be achieved and adjustment to life made. To know where one's weaknesses lie is to know what one has to pray for. There is nothing so tragic as the prayer to remove symptoms which cannot be removed until the cause is removed. Re-direction or re-education is a great

therapeutic and spiritual agency which the wise pastor will not be slow to use.

RATIONALIZATION.

There are other resolutions of conflicts which are sometimes called *defence reactions* of the mind against painful ideas or tendencies. These help the repressing forces. The process known as *rationalization* is one of the most important and perhaps the best known. We are all familiar with the tendency to justify our actions or statements. We come downstairs in the morning in a 'bad mood,' and before we are aware of what is happening we have found fault with our breakfast, or with the maid, or our wife or children. Once we have spoken the angry word the mind spontaneously works to justify what we have said or done. It is not easy to admit to ourselves, let alone our wife or children, that we are bad tempered. We find *good* reasons for our conduct, not the *real* reasons. I have sometimes seen it stated that rationalization means finding bad reasons; as a matter of fact, it is because the reasons found for our actions have some little basis in fact that they can deceive us so easily. It is in virtue of rationalization that we are able to live comfortably with thoughts and tendencies to behaviour quite contrary to our acknowledged standards; the real motives for such being hidden from consciousness by the process of rationalization. It is not likely that the man whose eyes are unimpaired would care to admit even to himself that his monocle is worn to make him look distinguished. I have known more

than one man who attacked the headquarters of his church 'on principles,' but who was in reality trying to 'get his own back' because of some trivial slight, or the fact of being overlooked by the officials.

Rationalization plays a very extensive part in the building up and the maintaining of our political, economic, moral and religious views. All these first come to us through suggestibility from our group; they are accepted uncritically. The time comes, however, when they may be questioned; and by the process of rationalization we may convince ourselves that we have reached these beliefs by independent thought; no one cares to think that he has any belief which he has not built up by logical reasoning. This process is exceedingly active in those who have repressed complexes or who may have peculiarities; and in the truly neurotic is exceedingly subtle. Its main purpose is to hide the real tendencies or reasons behind the symptoms, and thus helps the repression. The adolescent, e.g., passing through a period of sex tension, may convince himself that he is reading sex novels because he is a realist when he is in reality ministering to his tension. It is not uncommon to find those who have found the restraints of morality or religion too strong for them manufacturing *good* reasons against either conventional morality or religion, the *real* reasons being thus masked. The process in these is quite unconscious or spontaneous. Ideas or reasons are generated in the interests of some end of the self, and this perfectly normal process becomes swept into the pur-

pose of maintaining the tendency which the conscious mind refuses to acknowledge.

A knowledge of the process will help the pastor to understand and to deal with many a 'queer' member of his congregation. Sympathetically he will look for the unconscious motive behind the *reasons* for disagreeing with this policy or that policy of the Church; and he will not fail to look into his own mind and see the process working there. It is so easy to convince ourselves that this or that subject needs tackling from the pulpit when in reality we are hitting unconsciously at someone we do not like. It is little use arguing with those who are rationalizing; the only thing to do is quietly and sympathetically to suggest that there may be other motives for their position than the ones put forward. In any case the pastor will remember that the process is unconscious to some degree at least, and this will keep him from judging too harshly any member of his flock.

PROJECTION.

Another not uncommon defence reaction is *projection*. Were it not so tragic it would be amusing. In virtue of this reaction a person is able to abuse in others his own faults, sins, etc., without having to reproach himself. He rails against his own sins when he has projected them upon others. The ill-tempered husband can condemn his own weakness by projecting it upon his wife. A man consulted me about a post he was offered; he said he would have taken it had not his wife an aversion to moving. As a matter of fact, his wife told me she would

have just loved to have removed! There were certain egoistic reasons for this man to stay where he was, but he could not bring himself to acknowledge them.

But projection is one of the most dangerous reactions of the mind; and in anyone with a tendency to neuroticism has a very bad prognosis. "The morbid sense of guilt to which the neurotic is so prone may result in his thinking that people stare at him in the street, that they talk about him, or refer to him in some way."¹ That sense of guilt may be thus repressed and hidden from the conscious mind; but the repressed conscience returns to him from the outside world. He is kept from facing his own guilt by becoming preoccupied with the imaginary reproaches of the world. Some of the worst types of true psychoses are maintained by this process; and it is very doubtful if the delusions can be undermined. The significance of the mechanism lies in the fact that it is the invariable sign that the criticism of oneself is non-existent; the moral life is cut off from healthy contact with conscience. When one is projecting his difficulties upon the world, there is little chance of getting him to realize that to alter his fate it is his own inner attitudes which must be altered. The growing child should be trained to find his difficulties in life within himself, to criticize fearlessly himself.

RESISTANCES.

All defence reactions help the resistances which

¹ *Struggles of Male Adolescence*, Read, p. 123.

repressed complexes or defective traits in character exert against removal. If we try to acknowledge some fault to another, or to apologize when we know we have been in the wrong, we shall find it hard; there is resistance felt. It is in reality the repressing tendency looked at from another point of view. I knew one woman who instead of apologizing to her husband when she had been irritable, etc., used to put flowers in his study. It is because of the resistances which seem sometimes to defy the will that the pastor will be patient with those who come to him with difficulties. Indeed, the real work of the pastor when dealing with such is the overcoming of the resistances, which is the same as lifting the repressions. To overcome them sympathetic understanding is needed, but the time and thought spent are worth it all. It is the *cure*.

There are other forms such as conversion-hysteria, paralysis, contractures, and the various functional diseases of the organs which are all defence reactions. These the pastor will not be called upon to deal with; and hence I need not dwell on them here. In nearly all these cases fear is a causative factor, although the fear itself is repressed. I cannot agree with the ultra-Freudians that the fear of sex is behind most of the symptoms of functional disorder; the war neuroses proved up to the hilt that conflicts engendered by tendencies other than sex could produce the hysterias, etc. Nevertheless it would be foolish not to acknowledge that the fear of sex plays an enormous part in the production of all degrees of nervous disorder and failure to

become adjusted to reality. The unconscious fear of *coitus* in women has much to account for in the matter of functional disorders, and may create a chronic invalid; and nowhere does the wrong perspective of the matter play such a tragic part.

It will be well here to bespeak a word of sympathy for persons suffering from neurasthenia or anxiety-neurosis, as Stekel calls the trouble. In these cases, apart from the lack of the power of concentration, and the feeling of general tiredness, there may be no sign of physical disorder. The doctor pronounces that there are no symptoms of organic disease, and relatives are apt to think there is nothing the matter. In all such cases, however, there is a conflict; tendencies are being repressed and energy is being used up in resisting the entrance into consciousness. The mental stress becomes very great; sleeplessness may arise, or the night is spent in restless dreaming, and the unfortunate victim gets up more tired than when he retired. Unfortunately such cases cannot show that stress or conflict as easily as one can show a broken arm or a discoloured tongue. If there are few outward symptoms suspicion may arise in the home that there is malingering. The minister can do much here to alleviate the lot of such, and alone or in co-operation with the doctor may help the sufferer to see what is happening. In these days of birth-control there are many who practice *coitus interruptus*—a prolific cause of neurotic conditions. A simple, straightforward talk with the husband is often sufficient to put such people on the way to happiness again, and not only happiness, but real use-

fulness. In any case this method of birth-control is nearly always harmful to mental health, and almost invariably to the relations between husband and wife. If ministers remember that sex relationships have a psychological function and not merely a crude biological function they will see the question of birth-control in its truer perspective, and will be able to guide their people in what to many is a difficult question.

To sum up, then, conflict is inevitable, though not necessarily harmful. On the contrary our achievements will depend on how we resolve our conflicts. To become a corporate individual in which the self is realized and yet lost in the group activities, and in pursuing large ends in which the individual tendencies to selfishness become sublimated, is not an easy task, and yet along that line is true development which results in 'harmony of experience with feeling.' Apart from conscious and moral control of our tendencies the individual will take the line of least resistance, and thus miss what Emerson called the great enterprise which God has set man—the winning of a personality. Repression may for the time being relieve us of conflict, but in the long run it disintegrates the personality to some degree, and sometimes to a degree which makes normal adaptation an impossibility. Whether the heart is desperately wicked may be doubted; but that it can be deceitful above all things is scarcely to be doubted by those who have studied the subtle working of rationalization, projection and the defence reactions of both body and mind to painful ideas, memories, or

emotions. To lay bare the conflicts, and to help his people to face them, will often be the task of the pastor; but in any case he ought to know something of the conflicts which rage consciously or unconsciously in the souls of his people. Religion is the great sublimator, and with its decay neurotic conflicts have multiplied.

CHAPTER VII

PASTORAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUE

SOME time ago a doctor, in sending me a difficult and distressing case, wrote: "I have an idea that the cause lies in some experience of childhood or youth, but how to get at it or what to do with it if I did get at it, I do not know." In practically the same words ministers have spoken to me when discussing some of their pastoral difficulties; even when they have a shrewd idea what is behind the failure of adaptation to life in this person or that, they can find no avenue of approach. "How can we get them to open their minds? How can we start them to talk over their difficulties, obsessions, impulses, or whatever it is that our people think their trouble? How can we help to create the desire for the unquestioned ideal which would unify their inner life and issue in behaviour which would mean unending happiness and usefulness?" When one remembers that in all these people there are repressing forces at work, repressions which lie behind their irritability, moods, depression, lack of energy and interest, and the very impulses which threaten to wreck their moral life, one can realize that a clumsy approach or hasty advice may cause these persons to shrink into themselves rather than open their minds. Nowhere is the sympathetic, tactful, personal touch needed so much as in attempting to build the souls of the young, or to heal a divided soul.

PASTORAL WORK IN GENERAL.

The deeper aspects of pastoral method are best approached from the side of pastoral work in general. Real pastoral work will always be more than formal visitation; it is much more than spending a pleasant evening occasionally with our richer people, or looking in to see our poorer members. The true pastor becomes interested in every family connected with the church, gets to know the growing children and quietly gains their confidence. He intuitively becomes aware, through his sympathy and interest, as well as his knowledge of human nature, of the hard and perhaps peculiar struggles of some and the temptations of others; he is quick to encourage the boy or girl with legitimate ambitions, and knows how to help mothers and fathers to make a sacrifice for the children above the average in intelligence. Knowing the adolescent mind he can often prevent misunderstanding between parents and the growing lads and lasses; for when the latter seem to be asking freedom they are, in reality, unconsciously driven by the prospective aim of their own personality towards psychological differentiation from the parents, and towards the winning of their own individuality. To the adolescents themselves he can be as the shadow of a great rock in that weary wilderness of temptations, indecisions and unformed ideals which that period presents to most adolescents of both sexes. The sorrows, joys and interests of his people will be shared by him. I was once asked by a young graduate in medicine how he could acquire the

'bedside manner.' The answer was: "Get interested in your patients and the bedside manner will look after itself." Indeed, it is only as the medical practitioner becomes interested in his patients that he is likely to get a thorough knowledge of the various diseases to which the body is liable; otherwise his knowledge is likely to remain of the textbook type. The medical profession is analogous to the ministry. One gets to know the souls of his people only as he becomes interested in them. Especially is this interest needed in sick visitation. There can be nothing more nerve-racking than visiting sick people in whom one is not interested; and it is doubtful if one does any good. Sick people sense our attitude like children; to 'run in' spontaneously for five minutes on hearing that some member of the flock is ill is of more value than half a dozen formal visits. Especially is it needful to remember the temperament of the sick person. There are some people whom one has to laugh into health, and others that one has to pray into health; to offer prayer at one bedside is to make the sick person think that his end has come; while to offer it at another is to create the very attitude which makes the doctor's task easy. There are special occasions when the strength of faith is needed. A doctor friend of mine usually gives a cocaine injection to still the nerves before administering an anæsthetic; but what about stilling the emotions, which are even more important here? Professor James, who knew both medicine and psychology, once said: "How can it possibly fail to cool the fever, appease the fret and steady the

nerves, if one is sensibly conscious of the fact that one's life, as whole and not as a part, is in the keeping of one whom we can absolutely trust?" However much we may feel the absurdity of the metaphysics underlying Christian Science, there you have their method, and even Lord Dawson of Penn has a word of praise for its successes; successes which also Dr. Rivers was not slow to admit. An operation, the coming of a baby, and especially the first baby, the experience of symptoms of a bodily kind which generate underlying fear, may all be met without undue anxiety, and thus endured in the best state of mind, through the understanding encouragement of a minister whose own personality re-enforces faith. I can never be too thankful to a doctor in the village where I had my first pastoral charge, who seldom failed to call at the manse and tell me of such cases, with the hint to pay a visit and to offer prayer.

All this pertains to general pastoral work and needs neither emphasis nor elucidation. Nevertheless, it is only as the minister is a good general pastor that he is likely to have much success in cases which need a closer contact with his people, and which demand strong confidence and respect for the pastor if the intimate things which lie behind difficulties are to be disclosed; indeed, it is only as he has the pastoral interest that his people, especially the young people, are likely to approach him in time of special difficulty. I know there are some who argue that there is a special *pastoral gift*; I am inclined to think that this is a rationalization; in any

case, much of it can be acquired. Of this I am certain: the true pastor preaches in an atmosphere of affection and his feeblest efforts will seem good to those whom he has helped in their homes; and his sermons, though losing nothing of their intellectual quality, will gain in their human richness. His work, too, will be more satisfying, for he will have the consciousness that he is building a church and not merely drawing an audience.

PASTORAL METHOD.

It is the more difficult cases which the pastor meets that need elucidation. Already we have said that the object of all analysis, mental exploration or autognosis, or by whatever name we choose to call the method, is to get into clear consciousness and true perspective the inner difficulties behind malformation of character, or mal-adaptation to life itself. We put it simply by saying that the object is to *talk over and talk out* the causes of mal-adjustment, the fear behind the anxiety, the lack behind the depression, or the difficulties in controlling impulses which are perfectly conscious.

One of the earliest applications which I made of the new knowledge was in my ordinary pastoral work. A young soldier had been reported missing, and then killed. The mother seemed to lose all interest in most things and finally developed neurasthenic symptoms, and indeed the doctor said she was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. I talked the matter over with the father and asked him whether he spoke much to his wife about their dead

boy. He answered that he never referred to it and did his utmost to keep the subject out of conversation; he could see no use in keeping the wound open. I advised him to talk as much as possible about the lad, and visited fairly often myself and never missed an opportunity of speaking to her about him who was always nearest her thoughts. I do not suppose that either father or mother knew what I was trying to do, and what influence I had I am not prepared to say, but the mother began to pick up and before long she came to speak of the boy in a perfectly healthy way, and indeed came to feel the joy of having had him so long instead of the sorrow of having lost him. In attempting to repress her emotions and thoughts she kept herself always on the verge of tears; she was using up strength; and just because she was repressing her feelings and impulse to speak about her boy, the mind could not get a chance to go out to other interests.

That experience of mine illustrates the difference in method with which one would approach a similar state of mind now from what one was accustomed to think the best method—that of turning away the mind from the ideas or emotions which were painfully toned. McDougall has an illuminating passage which brings home this method better than any words of mine: “A common method of attempting to forget and one frequently recommended is to busy oneself with other things, to fill every moment with activity, to golf, fish, or hunt, or take a trip round the world, or plunge into one’s work. But, as we know, this method often fails of success. If the

patient can develop a keen interest in such activities, well and good. Every activity tends to inhibit others in proportion to its intensity, to the amount of energy concentrated in those channels. But the difficulty is that in many cases the patient cannot develop any interest in his work or play. Jung would say that his *libido* refuses to enter those channels; I would rather say that his energies are so much concentrated, fixated, on the problem, the sorrow, the remorse, the humiliation, that all other modes of activity are inhibited, cannot obtain a sufficient supply of energy to enable them to be carried on with zest and interest; and the conflict continues. In such cases a facing of the facts and a re-valuation of them is the true indication.”¹ This sums up admirably the defects of the ‘forget method’ and the real value of helping our people to face their problems, sorrows and conflicts in a true perspective; we bring the difficulty into the open. There is no comfort like the truth, just as there is no emotional disturbance so distressing as that which we are attempting to repress. There are financial losses, sorrows, disappointments, and many contingencies in life which have a very unsettling effect on our religious outlook and faith. The pastor will help his people to see that what really matters is not the experience itself, whatever it may be, but how they react to it. Sorrow may deepen and enlarge life as well as narrow it; financial loss has not seldom meant spiritual gain; and even to begin life again at middle-age is by no means a hopeless task; there are some burdens which

¹ *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 225 f.

even God cannot remove; but He may broaden the shoulders and strengthen the heart to carry them bravely and courageously. These are commonplaces, I know, but each generation of pastors needs to repeat them.

There are many cases where these commonplaces amount to impertinence, and which demand a much deeper understanding of the human soul. There is seldom a week but I have letters from pastors about anxiety cases who are perhaps not bad enough to be sent to a psychotherapist or who have not the means to pay for a long course of treatment; and psychotherapists are at the present time few and far between; there are other cases with neurasthenic symptoms rather than neurasthenia; many with moral diseases hidden behind spiritual difficulties or physical symptoms. Not seldom the pastor is asked to speak to alcoholics who are the despair of their friends and not seldom of themselves; and he may be consulted by parents about the delinquency of their children. To most ministers at some time or another people of both sexes will come with their temptations and it may be with perversions or troubles arising therefrom. No mere commonplaces can help here; nothing but intelligent sympathy, patience, and an intense desire to help can be effective in those cases where the conflicting tendencies are masked or unconscious. Hence the first need of the pastor, as has been evident from the preceding pages, is to understand human nature, the instinctive and emotional basis of character and behaviour, the innate needs and the manner in which these are satis-

fied. If prevention of mal-adaptation lies in helping the growing life to acquire well-balanced dispositions, the abstract moral sentiments, the unquestioned ideal, then from the beginning parents, teachers, and ministers must attach these in the first place to the already existing innate interests. It is a great mistake to lay emphasis on *being good*; rather it should be laid on *being happy*; and the child will come spontaneously to realize that happiness and naughtiness do not go together. There are some things we can only learn by experience; and the fundamental thing to keep in mind is that the child has to learn from experience that wrong actions are wrong in themselves and not because we say so. Happiness comes when the instinctive tendencies are linked with permanent interests, or sublimated because serving a sentiment. Permanent interests in which the instinctive needs are being satisfied keep the mind spontaneously occupied and spontaneously inhibit morbid interests.

There are three things to be kept in mind by the pastor when he is confronted with some moral defect or some failure to become adapted to reality.¹

First, he must diagnose the whole situation. It is not enough to pass moral judgment upon it and then comfort oneself that duty has been done. There was the case of the little boy with a whole catalogue of faults. The doctor could find no mental defect; yet he had attempted to set the house on fire three times; came downstairs in the night and did all kinds of damage; lost no opportunity of destroying any-

¹ See a recent volume, *The Teaching of Ideals*, by Charters, chap. i.

thing belonging to an elder sister or to his step-mother; he had hidden a knife beneath the carpet to commit suicide, and he was only six and a half years of age! He had been punished severely and, indeed, all manner of threats had been made. Nevertheless, the situation was not difficult to diagnose. After his mother died, while the child was just three, his father took him into his bedroom, and for three years he was everything to his father. Then suddenly the child was told that he was to have a new mother. The child could vividly tell me all about the first evening his new mother came; how he was sent to another room; how his father had primed him to show what a fine boy his daddy had. What did he want with a new mammy? He resented her, but dare not show it. Six months afterwards the trouble began and continued until the parents were in despair. I helped him to understand what he was doing and why he was doing what he prayed not to do night after night; I brought back the repressed feelings and, as Dr. W. M. Brown would put it, 'abreacted' them. He has since given no trouble. But the diagnosis did not finish with the boy. I quickly found the parents' attitude was all wrong; the step-mother was so anxious to be thought a good mother that she mistook her attempt to make a good mother for affection for the child! The father was so anxious to show his second wife what fine children he had that instead of being sorry for the boy's failure he felt humiliated before his wife! It is probable that the change in the boy was as much due to the changed attitude of the parents after I had

talked to them as anything I said to him; although he gave one or two signs of having grasped his own attitude. In the *American Journal of Sociology*¹ is given a very fine case of a boy who had been exceedingly well-behaved and suddenly developed a pugnacious strain which brought him into violent collision with the school authorities. The mother, a graduate of one of the universities, was at her wits' end to know what to do with him. It was found that the boy had failed in arithmetic and had been put into a class which was looked upon by the other boys of the school as fit for subnormals; and apparently the other boys used to throw this at him. His self-assertion was roused and he fought one after another. When the social worker found out this cause of the pugnacious phase he at once suggested it would be a much better thing to put fight into his difficulties with his arithmetic, and thus show that in intelligence he could beat them all, and he further promised to come and give him private tuition. The fighting ceased and the boy was making capital progress when, alas, he came home one night with a damaged face. He felt the boys had to be shown that he was not feeble-minded and a "licking" was the only language they could understand. After three months' hard work he had made good progress and the delinquency had practically ceased. How many would have put the boy down as vicious, bad, etc., instead of attempting to understand him, and get at the roots of the trouble. In this case an opportunity was found for using the energy generated by his

¹ May 1923.

self-assertion and self-abasement to get on with his arithmetic. There was no fighting for mere fighting's sake; the lad was attempting to maintain his status in his group as well as in his own mind. One might multiply cases; it is enough if we realize that each case of difficulty needs careful diagnosis and the whole situation must be carefully surveyed.

Second, the next thing is to help the individual to desire the traits of character he lacks. This mostly applies to the young. In older people the desire to get rid of their difficulties is already there; but not always, by any means. It has to be borne into the minds of many that if they are *to alter their fate, their psychic attitudes and the unconscious forces from which these proceed must be altered*.¹ It is so easy to project our difficulties upon the environment of others, that this is often a very hard task. We must remember that the symptoms, whether bodily or mental, are giving outlet to some tendency of the body or mind which attempts to maintain itself. Nothing at all can be done until the individual realizes that the main difficulties are within himself. We may recall the case of the youth who had great difficulty in his personal relationships with his father; until he realized that his whole behaviour towards his father was motivated by resentment one could do little; once it was realized that the difficulty lay in tendencies within himself, the rest was easy; and the good qualities of his father produced their natural response.

¹ See *The Re-creating of the Individual*, chap. viii.

The third point the pastor has to keep in mind is that his object must be *to integrate the inner tendencies and dispositions of the individual*. He must see himself in the light of general principles, principles he has now accepted. We cannot stop with a few abstract principles; nor can we stop until somehow we have helped him to some ideal purpose within which his conflicting tendencies are finding a legitimate outlet.

I have only been able to touch on these aspects in a broad and general way; but they are vital; and I trust that as we proceed with the description of particulars they will be brought out more clearly; and in the end that it will be shown what a strong integrating principle religion is.

DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM TENDENCIES OTHER THAN SEX.

It is usual in psychoanalysis writings and in much writing devoted to psychotherapy to begin and indeed to end with sex difficulties. So much is this cause emphasized that it is easy to overlook the fact that a failure to satisfy or to take wrong methods of satisfying the other needs of our being is just as fatal to the achievement of character and personality. My own finding is that although sex difficulties lead to more neurotic trouble than any other kind of difficulty, failure in the satisfaction of the other needs is the more prolific cause of failure to win character, personality and happiness. After all, happiness depends a great deal on personal relation-

ships, and sex is by no means the main cause of disturbance in them. The neurotic symptoms which result from the failure to understand, control or sublimate sex arise from repression as we saw; but the repression itself begins owing to the tremendous sense of guilt which sex activities can arouse in our minds. A man with a strong unsublimated self-display complex will have little sense of guilt attached to it; and his friends are amused, bored or irritated by him; they may even be repelled by him, but they scarcely think he is immoral. But let an exhibitionist be mentioned in a company and there is a shudder. We laugh at the powdered, painted, vain woman or the monocled dandy; but the poor victim of a sex complex would be shunned. Yet the latter is the more to be pitied. Apart from this particular complex he may be the best of citizens, the most affectionate of husbands and fathers; in all probability he has struggled heroically and silently with his compulsive tendency; in probably all other ways the victim of a sex complex has grown up, whereas the man or woman with a power complex or self-display complex will be infantile in all their reactions. I am not now pouring scorn on the man or woman who is the victim of a compulsive tendency to be the centre of the picture, to be thought somebody; he or she may be perfectly unconscious of it; but I do think we should try to see them as just as harmful and just as 'bad' as the victim of a tendency which probably was rooted in childhood and which probably is the outcome of ignorant teaching. Whatever the cause of the failure is we, as pastors, must manifest sym-

pathy. But let us turn to the different types of failure the attempts to satisfy the different needs are likely to produce.

Connected with the need to maintain our status in society and the desire for recognition is what is known as the *Inferiority Complex*. The true inferiority complex is more or less masked and is, as often as not, entirely unconscious; and we recognize it by the behaviour it produces. It nearly always manifests itself in undesirable forms of behaviour, for the behaviour is a form of overcompensation for the repressed inferiority. The sufferer is quick to turn the speech or actions of others into criticisms of himself; he takes any opposition to his views or actions as personal attacks; and generally retaliates in biting language. His own views are likely to be stated dogmatically; and as a rule he will be found quoting experts. Obsessed by the repressed fear that he might be thought to know nothing of the subject under discussion, he will get on his feet, or interrupt with remarks or a speech, relevant or not does not matter. The fact that the sense of his limitations is repressed inhibits him from the possibility of learning—he knows it all, and can be taught nothing. Generally in such people there is real limitation of culture, education, or capacity. It might be better to speak of the complex which motivates the above kind of behaviour as *a fear of being thought inferior*; this differs from the inferiority complex on which Dr. Adler ¹ lays such stress by the

¹ See Dr. Adler's *The Neurotic Constitution* and *The Psychology of the Individual*.

fact that the inferiority complex of the latter is said to be due to a real inferiority of one or other of the organs of the body; whereas the fear of being thought inferior is always rooted in a limitation, fancied or real, of culture, education or polish; and is seldom altogether unconscious. The urge to power is obstructed by knowledge of obvious limitations, and this knowledge is kept out of consciousness to some degree.

On the other hand, the same kind of behaviour is seen in those possessing a true inferiority complex; that is, one motivated by the unconscious wish to compensate for some organic inferiority. There is always the tendency to hide the feelings regarding the inferiority in some activity which draws the attention of the world from the impairment—the slightly deaf will develop volubility both to keep them from having to listen, and also to ward off attention from their deafness; the small statured Napoleon develops a power complex; the deformed cripple often becomes the bully. Often the compensation for an inferiority complex has been of real importance to the world. Not seldom the motivation behind the feverish scholastic activities of one who has risen to high position has been due to the unconscious drive to compensate for social disabilities arising out of the fact of having been brought up in a poor home. Whatever the cause of the complex, nothing can be done unless the victim of it comes to be conscious that his failure to make or keep happy personal relationships and to co-operate with others is somehow due to himself. He must

become adjusted to his impairment, his past history, his present accomplishments; in other words, he has to accept himself. Once he has done this he is able to realize that no one judges him by his stammer, his deformity, or whatever impairment lies at the root of the complex; and the same is true of those with cultural or educational defects, or who have had to struggle up the social scale from poor beginnings; and, indeed, in the latter cases it is astonishing how quickly once they accept themselves they come to be at their ease in circles which they dreaded; and personal relationships become smooth. The wise pastor, when he sees someone who is really militating against his usefulness because of a complex of this kind, can sometimes awaken a realization of it by a suggestion. It is not difficult, however, to help if the sufferer comes with his difficulties. A word may be said here of the shy, or easily embarrassed type. They are characterized by great 'self-consciousness'; indeed, they are morbidly so. This self-consciousness originates in all sorts of ways—the feeling in a girl that it was a boy her mother or father wanted; not seldom it originates in some humiliation endured at the hands of an inefficient teacher, who had no other means of keeping discipline in class but by fear of humiliation. Whatever the origin, the instinct of self-abasement is over-active, and the consequent tendency to 'feel small' is dominant. There may be some habit or a tendency to obsessive thoughts unacceptable to consciousness. An effort should be made to get at the root of the 'shyness' and the tendency to self-asser-

tion ought to be stimulated. It may be that the root cause is just a feminine psychology and the masculine side of personality should be encouraged.

One of the causes of many minor failures to achieve character, usefulness, or happiness is an inordinate or morbid desire for recognition. It is not to be identified with the self-display complex, although self-display plays a large part. There is the desire to be the 'centre of the picture'; to be thought somebody. Such unfortunate people do all sorts of things to draw attention to themselves and they are the most delightful adepts at rationalization. They are quite unconscious of their craving, and although they are amusing they are both unhappy themselves and cause much unhappiness. The wife or husband who must be the centre of the picture of the home may become jealous unless she or he gets all the attention of the children; or one may become jealous of the attention given to the children. It is more serious when such link themselves with great movements as a means of getting this morbid complex an outlet. We are all familiar with people in our churches who tell us that they never want to see their name in the magazine, but they cannot understand why so-and-so gets his or her name in so often. They never dream that unless they wanted to see their name in the magazine they could not miss it! We see the same tendency in the ministers who must have a note in the papers every time they utter a word, and thus manifest to the discerning that besides being anxious to preach the Gospel they are not less anxious to show the world

how well they can preach it. All motivated by this complex are very difficult to co-operate with unless they happen to be in the chief seats of the committee and taking the parts which will be seen; they are good givers if there is a public subscription list; but everything or everybody that tends to throw them into the shade becomes a rival and raises resentment or criticism. If it gets no expressions the complex is apt to motive self-pity and there may be functional pains, etc.

It should be understood that recognition is a legitimate need, and has, in the form of ambition, meant a great deal of achievement which has been of value to many great causes. The desire for appreciation is not necessarily morbid; and the appreciation of our loved ones or group is a legitimate motive. We see the same desire in the hymn: "The Master praises what of men." The flower does not go all over the house seeking moisture, but it dies if it does not get any. It is morbid desire for recognition which causes failure, not the desire for recognition itself. The difference between the morbid type and normal desire is seen in the distinction between ambition and the ideal; the former always has the desire for praise in it, however good the ambition may be; whereas the latter always implies the desire to be praiseworthy. In the latter case the praise is enjoyed as in the former, but it is not the motive of the achievement. To be worthy of praise, whether we get it or not, is the ideal to be instilled; mere ambition will not sustain or give happiness.

As in the case of the inferiority complex, nothing can be done in a direct way unless some sign of inadequacy of motive is realized; the rationalizations can hide the real motives here so effectively that even indirectly little can be done. Certainly if physical symptoms of a functional kind arise, then these may give the opportunity for the psychotherapist but not for the minister unless the doctor has pronounced that he can find nothing organically wrong; and even then the minister must move as though he were walking upon gossamer threads. It is always open to the minister to use the power urge or desire for recognition for good ends, and thus the tendencies in his people do not hinder the work. Until those with unconscious complexes become aware of their motives they cannot be converted, and the only thing left is to circumvent them. It should be kept in mind that it is impossible to re-direct tendencies which are active motives though unconscious, until they are brought into consciousness; and the using of the power urge, or the desire for recognition for ends which themselves are good, does not cure the victim, but it may save him or her from an actual nervous breakdown.

When, however, these people do come to the pastor, or when he skilfully manages to get them to talk about their difficulties in personal relationships, etc., he must attempt to get at the origin of the trouble. It is impossible here to catalogue the causes of an inferiority complex, or the fear of being thought inferior, or the craving to be the centre of the picture. It may be taken for granted, however, that

the origin lies in childhood. The desire for recognition in its unhealthy forms may have arisen in the unhealthy atmosphere of praise with which the first child is generally surrounded. When a child is continuously being told he is clever, good, beautiful, and what not, it is not unlikely he will come to think so, and go through the world behaving as though he were all that his adoring mother and father told him he was. On the other hand, the desire for recognition may have arisen when the child was pushed aside by the coming of a brother or sister; behaviour may then have been motivated in order to attract the attention to his poor neglected self; and that motive may continue long after the infantile need for it. I had one case of an undergraduate who broke down in his second year at the university. He had lost all interest in his work; had definite neurasthenic symptoms. I found that at the public school he attended he had come out *dux*. When I began to explore his school life I soon found that his work had been motivated by the desire for recognition and not any real interest in the subjects in which he had done so well. Going back farther still I found that he was the only offspring of a late second marriage and had been held up as a little paragon to the much older children of the first wife. He could not bear to take any place in the class but the first, and that is not so easy at a university; and he broke down under the strain. As we drew from memory with free association incidents and motives which dominated his childhood and schooldays, we were able to see them in their true perspective and he steadily

regained interest and health; and to-day is doing as well as his ability will allow him.

In cases where the pastor believes that some humiliation or neglect, real or supposed, is at the root of the fear of inferiority or 'shyness,' then by free association of ideas he may get back to it. If some past experience lies at the root of the trouble, whatever it is, then it must be brought back to memory and thus become the person's own again. It can then be seen in a true perspective, and the emotion connected with it abreacted.

It must not be forgotten, however, that these past experiences must be related to present motives, i.e. it must be seen by the sufferer how these past experiences and repressed emotions account for his present tendencies to react as he does. Merely to build up a sound hypothesis as to what happened may be very clever and interesting, but it does not change the poor victim of a complex; he must realize it was so; and that can only be done by helping him to bring the causes into consciousness. He must re-experience before he can realize; and once he realizes the causes of his trouble all his tendencies can be integrated with his conscious ideals. A lad with repressed resentment to his father, the church, or to definite ethical ideal, must be led to realize that this repressed resentment is determining his present reactions; what he thinks are the causes of his attitudes or reactions are occasions, and then are used by his tendency to rationalization to justify his present attitudes. It is in the elucidation of the unconscious tendencies that the patience, skill, sympathy and

wise understanding of the pastor are needed. There is no way by pure appeal to reasoning by which one may become convicted of an unconscious tendency; the tendency must become conscious. As we have seen, there is what Freud calls, 'a knowing and a knowing'; and Hadfield speaks of 'recognition' and 'realization.' It is the difference between knowing that 'we have all sinned' and knowing oneself as a sinner in the sense of Paul, or the Psalmist: 'My sin is ever before me.' Psychologically there is no difference in process between the bringing to consciousness of an unconscious tendency which is leading to neuroticism and the 'conviction of sin.'

A word may be said here about the tendency among certain types of adolescents to introvert, that is, to shrink into themselves and to become preoccupied with their own feelings, thoughts or phantasies. In its acute stages this becomes what is known as *Dementia Præcox*. There are different opinions as to the causal factors; some attributing it to degenerative brain changes; some to glandular secretions; and others to a hereditary inability for adjustment so that at adolescence, when adjustments have to be made to reality, there is a breakdown. There can be no doubt but that certain people have a strong tendency of a natural kind towards introversion; to become pre-occupied with their own thoughts, phantasies, feelings, etc., and to shrink from situations which demand extraversion. We all exhibit pure introversion in sleep, when the mind is drawn into itself and becomes occupied with its own creations. In the dementia præcox case the mind is almost

wholly withdrawn from external reality; but this extreme stage is only reached after years of steady withdrawal of the mind into itself. It is the incipient symptoms which the watchful pastor or doctor should recognize and deal with. Seclusiveness, undue tendencies to day-dreaming, great difficulty in making friends should be recognized as dangerous in the early adolescent; and strong efforts should be made to get at the day-dreams and to encourage extraversion. Strong resistance will be set up by anyone with a tendency towards this dread disease of adolescence to the attempts of parents, doctor, or ministers to arouse extraverted tendencies; but patience, understanding and firmness which are allied to intelligent sympathy will win the day, if the condition is the outcome of mental conflict; and the tendency of all schools is to recognize the mental factor in the disease. My own method with such cases has been to get at the day-dream, and to work from that to the original experiences of conflicts which gave the original tendency to introversion its added strength. In the later stages little can be done; and should the first stages show signs of increase, the specialist in psychological medicine should at once be called in. The general practitioner cannot give the requisite time, nor has he the qualities for such work. In one case I saw, now in an asylum, the two doctors, who were partners, became irritated when they could not get the patient to speak; and finally declared they could do nothing until he spoke. Apparently they did not realize that their job was to get him to speak! All I am plead-

ing for here is that the early tendencies should at once be dealt with; an attempt made to understand why there is such undue introversion; and the attempt made to get the extraverted functions active.

It is needless for me to enter here into the various causes which lead to unsocial behaviour in the wide sense of the term; selfishness, pride, sensuality, urge to power, are all easily recognized by the minister or pastor as also their motives. The minister's task here is to bring home to such the defect of the personality as a whole which such characteristics denote; for selfishness is not a complex, it is a quality of the personality as a whole, just as the others are; they are qualities of the soul rather than isolated tendencies. The Church has justifiably spoken of such qualities as the 'deadly sins,' the very opposite of the cardinal virtues. The tendency of present-day preaching to ignore the doctrine of sin is psychologically unsound, and from the purely scientific point of view is to be deprecated. It is just as necessary to reveal our congregations to themselves as to attempt to reveal God to them. If their sinfulness creates no conflict, there will be no distress and no neurotic symptoms; indeed, personality of a type will be exhibited; but all the finer elements which characterize the true Christian will be lacking; and the possibility of religious experience which is the true source of the Church's life as well as the dynamic of the Kingdom of God, will be reduced to a minimum. From the general point of view that is the position to which we are moving. We can conceive, in the not distant future, a very efficient

world without a soul. Nor must it be forgotten that it is possible for the Church to function as a social institution long after the spiritual life in which it originated is exhausted. I do not say that religion becomes real and intense only as the degree of personal sin becomes conscious; but I can say that it is a psychological fact that religious experience never becomes vital, dynamic, intense, and satisfying until it is the resolution of conflicts engendered in the attempt to realize the fundamental needs of our being—the need for preservation, for creativeness, for status, and for rational and moral unity in our experience. According to the type of our conflict will be our type of mystical experience; for the evangelical type the conflict with sinful tendencies, the struggle to bring moral unity into the soul is basic; and I believe that this plays a part even in the philosophic mystics whose conflicts arise in the need for rational and moral unity.

Be all that as it may, it is scarcely the task of pastoral psychology to deal with these larger aspects; it is rather the work of those who deal with the psychology of the Christian faith as a whole.

DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE SEX TENDENCIES.

Every pastor is well aware, probably from his own experience, of the difficulties connected with the adjustment to sex. Although it is by no means the one difficulty between the individual and the realization of character and personality, it is a difficulty which lies behind a great deal of failure. One

must remember that neuroticism has all degrees; and it need not incapacitate wholly the power to adjust sufficiently to reality so as to be considered 'normal'; a sense of happiness, a degree of usefulness is not inconsistent with neuroticism as I use the term. When all is said in recognition of the conflicts engendered by our other needs, the creative need with its various sex instincts is the main cause of the severer conflicts which disintegrate the souls of men and women, and rob them of the happiness, character and personality which the exercise of the other tendencies of their being in a normal manner entitles them to.

The first thing we must keep in mind here is that the instincts relating to sex are not ends in themselves, they are the means to the satisfaction of needs. It is the failure to get the needs satisfied, rather than the failure to exercise the instincts that leads to unhappiness, and the lack of personality. Were the instincts ends in themselves, then their expression would at once determine the cessation of the conflict, or give the means to happiness. But this is not so. If it were, the cure for repressed sex instincts would be marriage; whereas it is very doubtful whether marriage could have any other effect than an accentuation of the nervous or moral troubles in such a case. Where the source of the trouble is abstinence, marriage may remove the cause, but not promiscuous sexual activities. I do not know any authority in psychoanalysis, or psychotherapy who advocates expressionism as the cure for either abstinence or repression. Some come near to

it occasionally, but it is the person who has never really studied human nature who gives this fatal advice. It may be the very expression of the instincts and neither abstinence nor repression which is the root of trouble. Instincts exercised with no regard to the ends they were evolved to serve will inevitably mean a failure in the development of personality, and not seldom a nervous breakdown. The organism rebels, as it were, as in cases of *coitus interruptus*, and there arise neurasthenic symptoms, if not an anxiety neurosis; there will be irritability, anxiety accompanied with depression, sleeplessness often, lassitude, and loss of normal interests. An illustration comes to hand from a lecture by Dr. Alice Hutchison to the conference of health visitors and school nurses: "Birth-control wrecks marriages, because the maternal urge cannot be so easily quenched. If you put a difficulty in the way of that urge you will find women harbouring a feeling of antipathy against their husbands." Here we have the sex instinct exercised irrespective of the need of the race; the need is unsatisfied. Even the maternal side of a woman may be exercised in a sublimated form and yet if the fundamental need is outraged nature will rebel; sex frigidity will result, and relations between husband and wife will be in constant danger. Here we have no direct interest in the sociological effects of birth-control; but its effects on happy marriage relationships, and on the religious life, cannot be passed by. There is great need of someone who will courageously tell the psychological effects of birth-control; indeed, the psychol-

ogy of marriage needs to be thoroughly thought out and plainly told. Few men understand women, and probably fewer women understand themselves.

It is no part of my task to enter into the ethics of birth-control. But if the Church must aim to be the conscience of the community she cannot pass on the question to the newspapers. I have found not a few cases where anxiety neurosis, the loss of interest in the Church, the failure of happy marriage relations, was due, not to wrong methods of birth-control, but to the fact that the ethical side of the question had not been faced. To a sensitive conscience the thought of 'tricking nature,' to use the very phrase of one whose trouble was due to this, means moral division of the mind. For Christian men or women, contemplating birth-control from one reason or another, the question whether it can be justified in *their* case, must be faced; and I think they have a right to expect guidance from those who take upon themselves the duty of instructing conscience. There are many cases where another child is impossible to contemplate because of the woman's health, or because of some structural defect, or economic circumstances; control or abstinence are the only alternatives. Abstinence in itself will not do harm if there is a corresponding sublimation of the tendency; but if there is a refusal of relations when they are possible under control conditions, psychical harm to the husband will almost certainly result. It must not be forgotten that many women become chronically ill to avoid rela-

tions; they have repressed their own tendency or have become frigid; and the unconscious mind has produced the illness as the resolution of the conflict between their tendency to play a wife's part and their fear of relations.

The wise minister, who has the confidence of his people, can do a great amount of good here, not merely in preventing unhappy relationships but in preventing illness of a functional kind. I could relate case after case where I have been able to prevent strained relationships from breaking altogether, or where I have been able to prevent a functional breakdown by a simple, straightforward talk on these relations. One tries to lift these relations out of the animal atmosphere into which so much of past teaching has tended to place them; one tries to show them not as the unfortunate necessities of married life, but as the psycho-physical means whereby the love relations are maintained. Birth-control is not merely a medical question; it is also a psychological and ethical question; from these points of view it can be justified.

The difficulty of the ordinary pastor is to find a way of approach for his people to open their minds on these difficulties of married life. I am afraid there is no general rule except that knowing there is difficulty, one tries to encourage the husband to come for a talk and then tactfully works until the difficulties are thoroughly examined. The fact that there is less reticence in speaking of these matters to-day on the part of both sexes should make it easier for the pastor to speak of these things without

the slightest embarrassment to his people or himself.

In a great many people who come to the pastor or psychotherapist, the sex root of their trouble is masked or hidden from consciousness, behind all sorts of symptoms, sometimes of a physical kind, or moral or spiritual. A young woman was sent to me because of excessive irritability, a lack of concentration and a tendency to copious weeping. It was nothing more than the difficulties occasioned by the incoming of sex interests at adolescence; she thought that every interest she felt in the other sex was bad, and the result was that the repression was drawing her mind to the tendencies, and they in turn were generating thoughts which when they were able to force themselves into consciousness caused tremendous fear of herself. Another woman lost interest in nearly all her church work and developed sleeplessness and other symptoms because she felt she must be fearfully wicked since she had sex desire after the climacteric had passed. When the tendency to repression sets in, fear of some degree is usually manifested; the obsessive thoughts may take hideous forms; the sense of guilt often becomes marked. The pastor may at once ease the situation by lifting the sense of guilt, by helping his visitor to realize that though he or she cannot help such thoughts coming into the mind, they need neither be repressed nor allowed to pass into acts; they can be allowed to pass by. I have found it helpful to use the illustration, that we see many people as we pass along the street but we do not stand and gaze at them.

But in all such cases, some attempt should be made to get at the disposition or complex in which such thoughts, fears or impulses have their origin.

Much more frequent and much stronger is the struggle of both sexes with masturbation; most people who have made no study of the subject would be rather astonished if they realized the prevalence of this struggle. A recent volume by Dr. C. S. Stanford Read¹ deals sanely with the subject. And what a lonely struggle it is; the unfortunate victim of the habit can tell no one about it because of the deep sense of guilt attached to it in his or her mind. It is common to every class, and I have dealt with the most educated as well as the poorer classes of adolescents of both sexes. Were the thing seen in its true light by those who deal with young people what tragedies would be saved. The first thing to do here is to lift the sense of guilt and the fear which the habit has generated. So often preachers forget that Christ came to save not to condemn, and 'sermons to young people' by a certain type of preacher leave these sufferers more depressed than ever, more conscious of their weakness; and thus their thoughts are thrown back on the habit until it comes to obsess them. Nothing but condemnation can be given to those who dwell with an unholy delight on the physical evils that are likely to follow from it; and if their purpose has been to rouse fear they can rest assured they have done so, but to the hurt of many a tender soul, who might have become one of God's own. Medical science is conclusive on

¹ *Struggles of Male Adolescence.*

the point that only *excessive excess* will cause permanent harm to the body. It is the mental struggle, the remorse on falling, the helplessness they feel when the temptation comes, the apparent unavailingness of their prayers and the loneliness of the struggle, throwing them ever more towards introversion, which cause the lack of happiness, and confidence, and the rise of a strong inferiority complex. Many a good Sunday School teacher has given up his work because of it, ashamed to feel that he is teaching the children ideals while inwardly feeling a castaway.

The youth must be made to realize that practically every young man has to pass through the fire of this particular temptation; both sexes must be told that sex feelings are natural, although they do not need to pass into desire; and even if they pass into desire they can be controlled. A doctor friend of mine put it this way when telling me of a patient I had sent to him because of certain physical symptoms: "*The case is a simple one. The pity is that one did not get hold of her twenty years ago. There would have been twenty wasted years saved and twenty years gained for the work of the Kingdom. For she is a fine woman this. It is her fineness that has been the cause of all her misery. She has tried to lock up her natural sex sensations in the coal-cellar and, like a dog, they have whined and howled and rendered the whole house doleful. If she had only had the sense to let the dog out to range the house naturally, while not dominating it, the animal would have been quiet and docile and no one*

would have noticed it was there." In a recent letter he tells me that I should scarcely recognize her, so happy, so busy, and so well is the woman.

Those italicized words are amongst the finest I know relative to this subject. It is the attempt to repress the sensations and thoughts which makes the thing the obsession it is. We must not attempt to repress the instinctive tendency itself else we shall do more harm than good; we must help the sufferer to see that it is a regression to an infantile manner of satisfying a desire or reacting to physical sensations. Often the harm is done in early childhood; mothers are apt to attach a sense of guilt to it when they see it in their young infant or child. At this stage there is no sexuality in the sense of adult sexuality, and the wise mother treats it in exactly the same way as she would picking the nose, or any other form of bad manners; that is the attitude which children should be taught to take to it; and the tendency would pass off and leave no dangerous residuum.

In dealing with the adolescent or adult I have found it very helpful to rouse his pugnacious instinct in regard to it; to make him see it as a challenge to his fighting powers; in this way his pugnacious instinct is thrown on to the side of his self-regarding sentiment. One of the most helpful ways is to get the victim to treat the feelings before they pass into desire as one might treat a bore, or even with a laugh. Once the desire is in consciousness, however, it cannot be treated in this way; it is then the struggle must begin for his manhood and the right

of his will to be master of his tendencies; his moral forces must be tapped. In analysing such cases one comes upon the fact that in nearly all the act involves hallucination of some sex object, a phantasmal object which becomes a substitute for the real sex object; in such a case the individual may be helped by refusing to hallucinate an object. It is worth noting, too, that so long as the conflict is kept on the conscious plane the mental effects are not nearly so harmful as when there is a repression of the complex; in the latter case the complex is active but is not allowed to generate the desire which would lead to its outlet; but a derivative outlet will be made and always of a serious kind, unless it becomes sublimated. It is well also to remember that neurotic symptoms become marked when abstinence is due to repression; often one with purely nervous symptoms will tell us that he has no desire now; it is simply that the complex is repressed and the nervous symptoms are the outlet of the tendency. As Jones puts it, it is the repression which is the real root of the symptoms; it uses up energy and draws the mind to itself and away from interests which would be likely to inhibit it. The mere cessation of the habit is not necessarily a cure unless the youth ceases the habit from a realization of its infantile form or because he has become adapted to his sex desires. The desires must be controlled by his sentiments, or rather his will must work through definite sentiments for the clean life, such as the desire to bring as clean a heart as possible to his beloved, to give healthy bodies to his future children, or simply

to his self-respect. None of these ways of dealing with the trouble is likely to do away with sex feelings—indeed, temptation may persist—but the fact that these feelings are recognized as part of the self, they come under the direct control of the will and they are likely to cease to obsess. The real danger of all sex feelings arises from the fact that they can so easily pass into desire, and when the self can satisfy them and is allowed to do so without control, definite sexual habit will set in. In the great majority the tendency in habit passes away with marriage, and indeed the struggle is soon forgotten, and no bad effects are left behind. The work of the pastor, when confronted with this type of difficulty, will be to talk over thoroughly the difficulties, and in this way he will be helping his visitor to talk them out; it will prevent the mind from becoming fixated upon it. All means of a physical kind, and all interests of a recreational kind likely to prevent the temptation, should be encouraged.

It must not be overlooked that masturbation is often a compensation for an inferiority complex and not the cause of it; and sometimes promiscuous sexual activities in adolescents is a means of "showing off" a secondary, not a primary, trouble. In all such cases the cause must be rooted out, and then the promiscuous or sexual habit will correct itself or at least will be more easily dealt with.

Whatever the cause of the aberration of sexual tendencies, the main aim must always be to reintegrate the tendency with the moral ideals and with conscience. For this purpose the pastor in all his

interviews will attempt to understand and watch for the tendencies in which the offending impulse can be incorporated legitimately; and at the same time he will be instilling, by suggestion or persuasion, the conviction that it is only as there is an inward change that the difficulties are likely to disappear. The interviews ought to be giving the individual a revelation of himself, and it is this latter which is effective. Nothing can be done with people until they recognize their own responsibility for their condition, and very little can be done until they believe that within them there are controlling forces which can be re-enforced by faith and prayer. There is no possibility of creating a person free from conflicting tendencies; the task is to reveal the conflicting tendencies and then to unify them by the will, the content of which is some large ideal, comprehensive enough to sweep all the tendencies within its orbit.

A WORD OF WARNING.

Before we close the chapter let it be said that if a minister or doctor is to deal with the sex troubles of those who come to him, he must cultivate the habit of emotional detachment. Unless he can acquire this detachment he is likely to do far more harm than good both to those who seek his aid and to himself. The man who cannot speak of sex matters without embarrassment or anger must refer people with sex difficulties to others. A strong word of caution must also be made to young ministers. I can conceive no more difficult task for a young minister than to be approached by young women of his congregation

about their sex difficulties. In such cases he will be wise if he sends them to one of those sane, motherly, understanding women who are to be found in most congregations. Working in co-operation with such a woman his knowledge will be exercised to the very best advantage. If in anxiety cases, or in cases where the sex cause is hidden from the person who seeks his comfort or aid, he is led to believe that strained relations between husband and wife are due to some sex cause, he will speak to the husband and not to the wife alone. On the other hand, it ought not to be forgotten that one of the great needs of the ministry is the cultivation of a much more objective view of sex. We must learn to treat with as much objectivity the psychological and moral aspects of sex, as the young medico has to cultivate in regard to the physiological. To those who think that there is a risk for a minister in dealing with the sex difficulties of their people, the answer is that we dare not shrink from a task which is a spiritual one; the minister who is likely to fall into temptation is not worthy to be a minister.

CHAPTER VIII

THE THERAPEUTIC AND INTEGRATIVE VALUE OF RELIGION

IN the first chapter I tried to indicate the difference between psychoanalysis, psychotherapeutics, and pastoral psychology, and we saw that the field of pastoral psychology is both wider and narrower than that of either of the other two. The latter have to deal with the morally diseased, the mentally divided, and the bodily and mental symptoms which such division creates; and I should think it is seldom that anyone visits a consulting room until his symptoms have become such as to hinder his adaptation to life. The aim of psychotherapeutics and analysis is to unify the personality or, to be more accurate still, to help the patient to realize the divisive tendencies working in the soul. It should be perfectly clear that a soul is not necessarily unified when the symptoms disappear; these disappear as the unconscious tendencies in conflict become conscious. As McDougall ¹ argues, it is very doubtful whether neurotic conflict can arise unless one or other of the conflicting aims is repressed. In itself, psychological medicine has no technique whereby it can unify the soul; for a soul is unified when, morally, some master-sentiment is chosen, when the abstract moral sentiments are acquired; and psychology cannot validate a moral ideal, it can only indicate the rôle such an ideal plays

¹ *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 217.

in the regulating of behaviour and its place in mental hygiene. Religion cannot stop at merely laying bare the conflicting tendencies; it must unify the soul, it must re-enforce the will, it must aim at creating a 'harmony between experience and feeling.' Practically most psychotherapists aim at this, but to do so they have to leave the field of psychology and enter that of ethics and religion. In so far as they attempt not merely to lay bare the conflicting tendencies but to unify the personality, their psychotherapeutic process does not differ from religious process, as Dr. W. M. Brown admits. In religious conversion the man is revealed to himself, and in that revelation realizes his need of God and, falling back upon Him, finds his soul unified, his mind reorientated and his whole attitude to life altered because the inner psychic attitudes have been altered in the process. A religious orientation is the most potent psychology knows. Did not James ¹ define conversion as "the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities?" Pratt ² argues that "the essential thing about conversion is just the unification of character, the achievement of a new self." It is when the tendencies are unconscious, the motives hidden from the conscious mind, that religious faith, its consolations, its dynamic, seem to be unavailing; and there the work of psychology begins; but the integration of

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, chapter on "Conversion."

² Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*.

these tendencies, once they have been laid bare, demands a process which differs in nothing from conversion. The essence of a 'cure' in psychology is that the self becomes unified to the extent that enables the individual to meet the demands of life without breaking down. That unification is of all degrees. The most successful cures in psychotherapy are those in which the individual has a strong religious sentiment which has been hindered in its functioning by some repressed tendency; once the tendency is made conscious the religious sentiment then resumes sway of the personality and all is right. The unification which psychotherapeutics makes possible is of all degrees, whereas in conversion we get what Pratt calls 'the inner unity of a perfect moral self-hood.' Self-realization must remain the aim of all psychological work in this sphere, yet in itself it cannot validate any aim, end, or purpose in obedience to which the self becomes realized. Self-realization is not to be identified with psychological expressionism—that is, with the expression irrespective of moral categories—of our instinctive and emotional tendencies. Expressionism seeks primarily not the outlet of the tendencies, but the pleasure, the satisfactions, instinctive or emotional activities can give; self-realization seeks the inner unity of the self, and that can only be got in so far as comprehensive ends and unquestioned ideals are the regulating factors in behaviour. These ends or ideals will not involve the repression of fundamental psychological functions, but ought to give outlet to all the needs of human nature. Here ethics and psychotherapy meet; here

religion comes to the aid of the medical psychologist. Religion alone can give an ultimate sanction to a moral ideal; it alone can offer a sentiment which has no boundaries, and which can give expression to every tendency in man—the sentiment of the Kingdom of God. The effect which binds the associated elements of the sentiment together, making it coherent and strong, is the individual's conscious relationship to God. What fear can undermine a man's mental balance if he knows that he is "hid with Christ in God," if he is possessed of that perfect love which casts out fear? What situation can defeat his conscious efforts if already he has the present victory that overcometh the world, even his faith? Neither psychology nor psychotherapeutics can be a substitute for religion here; they can but lay bare the devisive tendencies which hinder the soul from controlling its own destiny; they can only tell us the process by which the soul may be unified; they must fall back on moral and spiritual ideals.

THE PREVENTIVE POWER OF RELIGION.

It is no exaggeration to say that with the decay of the strong religious sentiments, neurotic troubles multiply and become more deeply rooted. Unless my memory misleads me, I think Freud has said something to that effect. Were the home and the school fulfilling their truly religious function we should hear less of the functional disorders with which psychological medicine deals. Religious training which always includes moral education can and ought to play a very large part in the education of the child.

Whatever their religious views, all would agree that the religious sentiment should become the controlling sentiment in the behaviour of the growing life. Looked at from the psychological point of view, the religious sentiment determines our response to God; what we believe to be God's will, and our response to life itself, for it gives meaning and value to life. A man's completeness will be found in fulfilling that will, and peace or harmony in becoming perfectly adjusted to it. "Thy statutes have become my songs in the house of my pilgrimage." Religion is never a bare knowledge of God or Christ; it always involves a sentiment which is the source of the deepest satisfactions; it kindles the highest aspirations and becomes the habitual centre from which a man acts. Such a sentiment will not be simply one sentiment amongst others which a growing life acquires; it will be the controlling sentiment, giving sanction and meaning to the moral ideal. In a word, religious education has for its function the helping of a growing life to acquire a Christ-sentiment as the integrating factor of the inner life.

It is impossible to conceive the value of such a sentiment in keeping the growing life free from the domination of any isolated instinct or desire. Whatever conflicts the adolescent may have, in virtue of this sentiment he is able to keep his motives in consciousness and thus avoid neuroticism. It is easier to conceive the temptations, the moral laxity, or the failure to achieve a personality which those who have never allowed their religious sentiment to control them will suffer. I am now taking for granted

that in teaching religion we are giving the child and adolescent a sane view of human nature and of God's will. There can be no doubt, as I have already shown, that a false view of God's will or of human nature may lead to false conflicts and a false division of the mind, and in turn to failure and nervous breakdown. Incalculable harm has been done by the giving of a religious sanction to a wrong view of our instincts and emotions; repression is bound to follow such a course of teaching. So often, also, when our young people come with their difficulties, we substitute prayer for thought, and exhortation for understanding. We must never forget that our conscience allies itself with whatever moral demands our religion makes, and in virtue of this there will be an attempt to repress any part of our nature, and any desire, if such is not in harmony with the religious teaching we have received. Otherwise there is an attempt to repress conscience itself, which is even more fatal to the achievement of character and personality. A healthy conscience, whose standards have the sanction of the religious sentiment, means a healthy self-criticism, and that is probably the most vital process in keeping the growing personality free from moral and neurotic disturbance. It is almost impossible to over-estimate the value of a healthy conscience, free from morbid views of human nature, and having for its content a large conception of the will of God as that has been manifested in Christ. Those who have been fortunate enough to have been brought up under influences which have helped them to acquire such a conscience are what James calls,

'the once born.' They have not been free from conflict, for conflict is the lot of all; but self-criticism of their own desires and behaviour has kept them free from unhealthy repression. If they have failed to act according to their standards they have always recognized their failure, and in humility have sought repentance and the strength to control the desires and impulses which would lead astray.

THE PREVENTIVE AND THERAPEUTIC VALUE OF CONFESSIONAL PRAYER.

Religious education, with its consequent building up of a healthy conscience linked with the will of God, is not the only preventive influence which religion supplies. Acts of worship are also effective. Psychoanalysis has shown that the great hindrance to the development of personality is repression; and the great majority of repressions arise because tendencies or desires are unacceptable to consciousness. It has also shown that the repression may be lifted by the rehearsal of the difficulties. Dr. Jung insists that it is the rehearsal of the difficulties in the presence of the physician that is the crucial factor. "One can easily understand," he says, "what it means to a patient when he can confide his experiences to an understanding and sympathetic doctor. His consciousness finds in the doctor a moral support against the unmanageable affect of his traumatic complex. No longer does he stand alone against these elemental powers, but a trustworthy man reaches out a hand, lending him moral aid in the battle against the tyrannical oppression of the uncontrolled emotion.

By this means the power of his integrating consciousness is re-enforced until he is able once more to bring the rebellious affect under control of consciousness. This indispensable influence of the physician may, if preferred, be described as suggestion.

"I would rather speak of it as the significance of the human interest and personal devotion of the physician; these belong to no method, nor will they ever become one, for they are the moral qualities, incontestably of the highest importance for all methods of psychotherapy, not for abreaction alone. *The rehearsed experience of the traumatic moment can reintegrate the neurotic dissociation, only when the conscious personality of the patient is so far re-enforced by the relationship to the physician that he is consciously able to bring the complex that has become autonomous once more under the control of the will.*"¹ I can testify fully to the truth embodied in the above quotation. But my contention is that had the traumatic moment been rehearsed before God before it was repressed, before the Christ Who can lend more than 'moral aid,' no unmanageable affect would have arisen and no neurosis. The inference from Jung's words and from psychoanalysis as a whole is that confessional prayer, prayer that lays the whole heart bare before God in Christ, is the strongest preventive and therapeutic agent we know and is of the essence of mental hygiene. A man buries his anxieties instead of laying them before God; a youth represses his sense of guilt instead of taking it to Him Who was, in all things, tempted

¹ Quoted by McDougall in *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 463.

like as we are; a woman represses her fears instead of telling them to Him Whose perfect love can cast out fear; and for them all trouble arises. If they are to be whole again, and enter that happiness God meant for all, the whole experience must be brought into consciousness. Far better had intimate confessional prayer been the habit from the beginning. Preachers forget that often their words reveal to their hearers the moral meaning of their desires, and thus inevitably create conflict; Christ wounds that He may heal, and the pastor must then take the place of the preacher and heal the heart whose division he has revealed.

SUGGESTION AND PRAYER.

In these days much is said of suggestion as a therapeutic agent and also as an educative agent. Again, I can testify to its value in both directions. But in true prayer as taught by our Lord suggestion-therapeutics is anticipated. "When ye pray, believe ye have already received." How few realize the value of that word of Jesus! Yet the essence of curative and educative suggestion lies within it. All suggestion depends in some degree on faith, either in the method or in the physician. There is a believing attitude, conscious or unconscious, behind the mind which is susceptible to suggestion. That believing attitude is what Christ demanded for effective prayer. Prayer is not a form of auto-suggestion, but all suggestion psychologically partakes of the nature of prayer.

Further, suggestion-therapy helps us to understand

effective prayer in another way. For suggestion, to be effective, must be articulated. I have tried to think away a headache and never managed to do so; on the other hand, I have found suggestion very effective when I have articulated it. There may be some to whom mental prayer comes easily; but my experience with many people is that effective prayer for the great majority should be articulated. One rises from articulated suggestion with the attention turned away from the difficulty; one acts as if the suggestion had already worked, and it does work. Many, in their prayers for strength to face some difficulty, temptation, trouble, or perplexity, wait expecting that while on their knees they will experience some change in their feelings or in the situation; but no change occurs. Prayer that is effective is found when we rise to meet our difficulty, face our trouble or temptation; it is then we find, often to our amazement, that the needed strength is there, the guidance has not failed, the mist has cleared away.

Were any of my readers to think that I had departed from science and taken to preaching, I should be exceedingly disappointed. I am simply rehearsing what I have tested in myself and seen in those with whom I have had to deal. I could give more than one case where the return to prayer realized what I had failed to do by suggestion. Let me repeat: for remedial and preventive therapeutics, for the upbuilding or healing of personality, I know nothing finer than simple, confessional, and trusting prayer. Psychology is not troubled with the problem as to *how* prayer works; it must simply record the

fact. No man hesitates to lift his arm to ward off a blow until he has learned the relation of the mind to the body; indeed, we have not the slightest idea as to how mind acts on body or body on mind; we nevertheless work on the assumption that they do interact. To quote James:¹ "Energy which but for prayer would be bound is by prayer set free and operates in some part, be it objective or subjective, of the world of facts." That is the assumption of religion, and we can say that it works.

THE DYNAMIC OF FAITH.

So far we have seen that a strong religious sentiment with an intelligent moral content is amongst the greatest preventives of neuroticism and failure to win a personality; likewise we have seen that simple, trustful, confessional prayer is both preventive and remedial. As much, if not more, may be said of faith. Let it be perfectly understood that I have no patience with any school of thought which would substitute prayer or faith for exact diagnosis of the cause of failure to win a healthy physical and mental life. Where there are bodily or mental symptoms, medical science is right in insisting that the treatment must be preceded by diagnosis. Such diagnosis would prevent the postponement of treatment until too late. Medical science to-day recognizes that no one can tell the limits of the influence of mind on organic processes; but it is just as certain that ailments which have a physical basis find their best and quickest remedy in physical treatment, not necessarily

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 466.

dissociated from mind healing, for there is a mental factor in all disease. On the other hand it is increasingly recognized that mental calm and hope which faith can generate may, and does, help the organism to health. In an exceedingly illuminating article in the *British Medical Journal* of February 25, 1928, Lord Dawson of Penn pleads for a recognition of the psychical factor in disease. He does not believe that body and mind can be separated in either diagnosis or treatment. "In both functional and organic diseases there are reactions of mind and temperament, and we have to study not only the material disease but the complete fabric or make-up of this or that personal illness." He does not think that psychical healing and physical healing should be divorced from each other but should be complementary and co-ordinated. I am sure of this, that the visit of the true sympathetic pastor who can tap his people's faith will never be resented but welcomed in the sick-room by the well-informed medical practitioner.

Our task here, however, has nothing to do with the healing of organic disease or even of functional disorder, but with the moral and spiritual conflicts which give rise to functional disorder and to failure to win all that a religious faith promises to give. In dealing with anxiety, some rebellious impulse which resists integration, or some compulsive habit or impulse, the arousal of faith should always be a first effort. Those who come to seek the pastor's aid do so with hope; but the hope must be turned into faith at the earliest moment. Faith means a present atti-

tude of certainty regarding the removal of their difficulties. Their dread of falling must be met by the certainty that God can keep them from falling.

Especially is faith needed when the individual has been driven into a state of anxiety by the coming back into consciousness of incidents long past and indeed long forgotten. When these incidents force themselves into consciousness in some way or another they bring back the guilt attached to them at the time, and one must then help them to see those incidents in the perspective of to-day. Where there are habits or practices which they never relate to their anxiety, fear, or symptoms there is nothing for it but to bring home the wrongness of them; in most instances it will be found that the sense of guilt is repressed. In such cases it is useless to attempt to explain away the consciousness of sin when it is brought up; it simply cannot be done without increasing the conflict or creating a new set of symptoms. Nothing but the arousal of faith in the forgiveness of sin can do any good. I am certain in my own mind that faulty dealing with this type of case can do irreparable harm which may have very sad results. You do not get rid of the sense of guilt by merely telling them that 'it was nothing.' The consciousness of sin is best met by the assurance of forgiveness, and in my opinion cannot be met in any other way that will leave the soul healthy.

There are few types of moral conflict, however, in which faith cannot be used to re-enforce the mind in its attempt to control its tendencies and desires. Through a restored faith in God, many people come

to regain faith in themselves, and thus to face the situations of life which created fear and dread and their resulting symptoms. If moral conflict is the great disintegrator of personality, faith is the great integrator.

There is really no limit to the application of Christian faith to the difficulties so many find in achieving a controlled and happy life, and which in the case of many prove insuperable. I have even been able to use with effect the old doctrine of the 'perseverance of the saints' to one who had great fears lest one day his tendencies would prove too strong for him. But there are two other doctrines (I sometimes wonder whether they are preached to-day) : The doctrine of the indwelling Spirit of Christ; and that of the energizing Will of Christ. One of the most painful maladies that can attack sensitive minds is that of obsessive thoughts which are wholly out of keeping with their moral standards. The continuous struggle to switch the attention to other things; the sense of shame which fills their minds that such thoughts should be theirs or that they should find themselves dwelling on them with pleasure, may weaken the body and cast the soul into the depths of despair. There is nothing for it here but to get back to the cause of such an obsession. That is not always easy; and I have found it of immense encouragement and benefit to tell the unfortunate victim of such an obsession that the indwelling Spirit of Christ may take possession of us. It is doubtful whether such thoughts can be driven out; as a rule such an attempt would probably mean repression; the task is to crush

them out. As one rehearses the experiences in which they originated, the way becomes opened for the indwelling Spirit.

Not seldom the pastor will feel helpless when dealing with those whose perversion, habit, temper, or compulsive tendency refuses to be moved. He cannot tell them to fall back on prayer; they have prayed hard. He cannot tell them to become interested in things, for that, too, they have tried but found impossible; their minds have become fixated on their problem. It is here that one may use with telling effect the doctrine of the energizing Will of Christ. It is not the content of His Will we ask them to accept, that is what they have tried to attain and failed; it is His very Will as a permeating tendency within our emotions, desires and impulses. His Will, not as an objective end but as subjective power, may become our will; we become not so much well-controlled as Christ-controlled. I know these doctrines raise theological and metaphysical questions; but those who are finding difficulty in attaining a personality in harmony with their conscience are not obsessed by metaphysical or theological difficulties but with the difficulties of psychological development, by their own weakness, and by impulses which defeat them. They have lost all faith in their own ability; hence into their very being must be introduced the faith, that not their love to God but His love of them, not their faith in God but rather His faith in them, not their hold of Christ but His hold of them, not their poor will to do but His will to redemption, must be their sure foundation. It is this

laying hold of God's share in the healing of the divided mind, in the whole process of salvation and sanctification which is of the essence of faith. James brings this out clearly in his chapters on 'The Sick Soul,' and 'Conversion' in the *Varieties*. How to induce this faith, how to bring a realization of the processes behind their failure and restoration to moral and spiritual health we really do not know. It brings us back again to the difficulty mentioned in our last chapter between 'knowing' and 'realizing.' How to induce 'saving faith,' how to help an individual to pass from 'knowing' to 'realization' is simply beyond us with our present knowledge. James himself said all attempts to explain the deciding factor in conversion are mere circumlocutions. Here are his own words: "If you ask of psychology just *how* the excitement shifts in a man's mental system, and *why* aims that were peripheral become at a certain moment central, psychology has to reply that although she can give a general description of what happens, she is unable in a given case to account accurately for all the single forces at work. Neither an outside observer nor the Subject who undergoes the process can explain fully how particular experiences are able to change one's centre of energy so decisively, or why they have so often to bide their hour to do so. We have a thought, or we perform an act, repeatedly, but on a certain day the real meaning of the thought peals through us for the first time, or the act has suddenly turned into a moral impossibility. All we know is that there are dead feelings, dead ideals and cold beliefs, and there are

hot and live ones; and when one grows hot and live within us everything has to recrystallize about it. We may say that the heat and liveliness mean only 'motor efficacy,' long deferred but now operative of the idea; but such talk itself is only circumlocution, for whence the sudden motor efficacy? And then our explanations get so vague that one realizes all the more the intense individuality of the whole phenomenon." What James says here about conversion is equally applicable to the phenomenon of the realization of the processes behind our difficulties as well as the realization of that grace which is sufficient for all our need. It is in this region we see the operation of the Spirit of God; but to say that is to go outside the sphere of psychology, but within the right of the pastor.

In closing, it is almost needless to remind ministers that if the application of religious faith to the difficulties I have recorded in this book is to be effective, their own faith and prayer life must be real. Their religious beliefs will be dynamic factors in their own life and there will be a deep sense of the inestimable value of the human soul. It is in reality the pastor's own faith which is the decisive factor often in dealing with the many difficulties which people find to the full, rich life of faith and service in which happiness and unity of character and personality are found. It is this which cannot belong to any method but must be part of the man himself. It is this which re-enforces those who come to us. They sense what we think about their chances of getting rid of their symptoms or of overcoming their

difficulties; they feel the contact of the pastor's own faith and this rouses whatever faith they have. They must be made to feel that there is no difficulty which the Gospel cannot meet; no situation beyond the means of God's help; no complex He cannot uproot, and no sin He cannot forgive. On the other hand, there must be no attempt to substitute prayer for thought, or vague calls to exercise faith; each difficulty must be carefully and understandingly as well as sympathetically dealt with; and in this way only can our work be effective with those who have found it beyond their strength to build up a strong and integrated self dominated by the religious sentiment. The more experience I get of the various types of neurotic trouble, the more knowledge of the inner processes by which the content of the soul is built up, the more I marvel at the grace of God; the more I feel the hopelessness of man without it, and the more I realize the need in our Churches for a Message which is also a Gospel.

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